What Is The Effect Of Truman's Attack On Japan?

In August of 1945, by the end of the Second World War, the world witnessed for the first time the extreme power of atomic weapons, in an unprecedented attack on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although, for many, the use of that new piece of weaponry had been essential and only done to eliminate Japanese threat toward the United States, specialists in the subject expose possible other reasons for such attacks, which will be further analyzed.
In a speech addressed to the nation of the United States after the first bombing, the former American President Harry Truman declared “Japan had begun the war from the air at Pearl Harbor”, and the nation had been repaid for what they had done with more destruction (“Press Release by the White House, August 6, 1945”). Bernstein argues that Truman’s statement is connected to the American people’s increasing demand for revenge on Japan for what had occurred at the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The antipathy of the population of the United States towards the Japanese contributed for the arrangement of such violent attacks, as it was paramount to determining the target nation of the new
weapons. Such interpretation was suggested by Bernstein, who also claimed that the attacks had been necessary to end the war quickly, sparing thousands of American lives (Bernstein 132).
Bernstein’s claim is related to a statement given by President Truman regarding the reasons that led to the attacks, in which he also states that the aim of the attacks was to save many people from perishing at war.
Miles Jr. argues, however, that such justification was not given by the President shortly after the bombings, but “only when the necessity of the attack and the wisdom in releasing the weapons began to be question” (Miles, Jr. 122). This leads to the notion that the attacks were caused by a revengeful feeling in the American people, originated at Pearl Harbor, and that after the nation had been calmed and no longer claimed for revenge, and the necessity of the attacks began to be questioned, a justification that spoke of sparing American lives was quickly created, not in fact referring to what led to the
bombings.
The circumstances of the bombings and of the cities chosen also lead to deduction of other possible intentions of the American government in attacking two specific cities in Japan. This claim is supported by former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who affirmed that the choice of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as the targets of the attacks was based in factors such as their population, their location, their conditions, and their value to the Japanese nation and army. Nagasaki and Hiroshima were both cities of more than 100 thousand inhabitants that had been very little destroyed by the war, and while the first was a major seaport that also contained numerous industrial plants, Hiroshima carried the headquarters of the Japanese army in the South. Finally, as indicated by an investigation article by BBC, Nagasaki was surrounded by mountains, a feature that would keep the destruction of the bomb isolated within a few square kilometers. Such choice leads to inferring that, not only did the American government search for the destruction of important sites in the Japanese territory (eliminating the possibility of the country continuing the war), but also saw the perfect opportunity to assess the power of destruction of the newly created weapons (which had, until then, been tested only in uninhabited areas) in populous spaces, also analyzing their effects on buildings and people (Stimson 98).
Endorsing such analysis, British historian Richard Headicar stated that the conditions of the two attacks differed in several ways. As mentioned by him in his article, the uranium bomb released upon Hiroshima was of different chemical composition than that of the plutonium weapon released upon Nagasaki, and of different yield. Also, the bombs were released from different heights, and, according to Headicar, the observed effects of each attack were recorded for further studies (Headicar Part 1, 2). Such statement supports the interpretation that the attacks took place, not mainly in the interest of ending the war and save thousands of American lives (at the cost of thousands of Japanese ones), but with the aim of testing the new weapons in construction and their power of destruction, also consolidating worldwide the American victory in the “greatest scientific gamble of history” (“Press Release by the White House, August 6, 1945”).