Before we can delve into the question of the Contract Right of Third Parties Act 1999 we must first discuss the ideology of Privity in contract law. This is something that has been prevalent for many years and is a highly controversial doctrine. In this essay I shall discuss the changes bought forward by the Act, define the doctrine and delve into the extent of the success of the Act taking into consideration it 's many various criticisms.
The Doctrine of Privity generally details that one cannot impose obligations deriving from it on any individuals who are not the parties bought forward. It is composed of two main rules. Firstly, a third party cannot take burden if he is not a contractual member. This is logically valid and reasonable, as it would be incorrect to subject a third party to a contract he/she is unaware of. Secondly, a person may not sue regarding a contract that fails to list him/her as a party. This is the case even if the contract in question was solely made to benefit the third party.
This second rule was a highly controversial issue and has a varying past. Prior to 1861 such cases as Dutton and Flannigan had demonstrated that despite this rule, there were instances in which a third party was entitled to sue. However, the case of Tweedle bought this progression to an end, as it concluded that third parties had no such rights in action and 50 years later this was latter reaffirmed in Dunlop.
This second rule was notable for binging out two main concerns. Firstly, when the claimant is seeking to assert a positive right under the contract (largely family arrangements) and secondly where he seeks to rely on a term in the contract as a defence to a claim bought by the claimant (complex commercial arrangements). These two issues can be demonstrated clearly in numerous cases. Firstly, in Beswick a widow was not allowed to seek