Why Did Stalin Evaluate The Non-Aggression Pact

In July 1940, Stafford Cripps the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union, stressed to Stalin that Germany was a threat to Moscow and thus asked him to consider a military alliance with Britain. However, Stalin denied. He insisted that the non-aggression pact still held high importance to the interests of both Germany and the USSR. After this meeting, Stalin told Molotov to send the minutes of the discussions that took place to Berlin. This was an attempt to reassure Hitler of Stalin’s continuous loyalty. However the attempt failed. It was three weeks after receiving this memorandum that Hitler first acknowledged to his leading generals that an attack on the Soviets would be sooner than expected. Hitler believed that if the Soviets could be
It gave Hitler’s ‘word of honour as head of state’ that all talk of ‘differences between us’ was ‘gossip’. It also claimed that the German forces would be moving off from their locations, something which Stalin believed or either pretended to believe. The last few hours of the non-aggression pact witnessed no outward signs of the impending explosion (ibid, p158). The invasion had come as a shock to Russia because they did not believe Germany would commence a war at the end of June which would mean they would have to fight a winter war, and not only this, but a war on two fronts. Russia had hoped that the onset of winter would deter Hitler from ensuing in war and with the delay the Red Army could peak at full military strength. However, nobody could advise Stalin. Molotov, even as Stalin’s right hand man, could not advise him. Molotov later admitted that they did ignore intelligence, but that they had to because they did not want to give Hitler another excuse to attack, especially in case it came earlier than he had planned. They knew war was coming but they also knew that they were weaker than Germany so a policy of prolonging its beginning was their only option. Although they knew it was coming, it was still a shock to them when the day finally came. Due to the lack of trust the Soviets had with their intelligence, they believed that any information they received would have to be verified which
This gave no allowance for the fact that the war would now have to be fought in winter. As the attack was launched Stalin who was left in shock failed to put the Red Army and air force into defensive mode. This led to a colossal loss of men and machines. In Poland, Stalin was faced with massive problems. After liquidating the entire Polish Communist Party (KPP) he lost several squads that were now needed as back-up (Davies 2006). Gorodetsky said that it was highly debatable whether Stalin was blinded by ideological notions, thus unable to tell between what were major and minor dangers. He also questions if Stalin thought that the takeover of the Baltic States was a reward from Hitler for his loyalty. Hitler really had no use for Stalin any longer. Stalin was courageous in his demands and he was not going to aid Hitler in his struggle against Britain, clinging to neutrality at all costs (1990, pp. 30-2). Perhaps these things did impact the start date of