Cheibub writes, “Dictatorial regimes…frequently succumb to internal disputes over leadership succession” (18). The majority of times, dictators do not set up a line of succession in the case of their death. In some cases, preset rules of succession may not be followed. Consequently, in many cases this leads to civil war after the death of the dictator, sometimes ending dictatorial rule in that country. As is true of Libya. Though dictators may seek autonomous control, many are backed by a party or group of those holding power. Cheibub reveals, “The ruling elite constitute the first major threat to dictators… [dictators] are frequently deposed by a fellow member of the regime” (18). Dictators depend on others when ruling, therefore, “[small institutions holding power] produce difference incentives and constraints on dictators which, in turn, should have an impact on their decisions and performance” (Cheibub 18). In order to appease the ruling elite that threaten to depose them, dictators create laws and violate the human rights of their citizens in order to please the elite keeping them in …show more content…
This systematic failure of dictatorships is caused by unstable regimes, selfish leadership, unclear lines of succession, and the constant concern of a dictator being overthrown. Value conflicts between people and rulers will always exist. Though a dictator may be a good ruler, they must always safeguard themselves from the threat of being overthrown. No matter how successful a dictator is, another group will always hold different views. The concentration of power in one individual leads to irresolvable value conflicts that result in failure.
Works Cited
Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. "Democracy and dictatorship revisited." Public choice 143.1-2 (2010): 67-101. The scholarly article, “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited”, written by José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland contemplates the strengths and weaknesses of the two respective systems of government. Cheibub writes, “Differences in authoritarian regimes account for variance in their economic growth and investment”. Cheibub later goes on to explore these differences and their effects. The authors also address the importance of value differences between regimes, and study the effectivity of government.
José Antonio Cheibub is a professor of political science at Texas A&M University. He focuses on comparative democratization, comparative politics, and legislative