Why The Challenger Turned To Collapse?

Spanish philosopher, George Santayana once wrote, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” This quote is widely used because of its relevance to a variety of topics. Engineers use reverse engineering to investigate an engineering failure and prevent it from happening again. We remember the tenth mission of the space shuttle Challenger that ended on January 28, 1986 in a catastrophic disaster. Seven astronauts were killed that day when the Challenger they were piloting, exploded at 72 seconds into the flight.
Thesis: The Challenger exploded because the solid rocket booster O-rings did not seal properly which allowed hot combustion gases to leak from the side of the booster and burn through the external fuel tank. The
The shuttle solid rocket boosters produce the thrust to overcome the Earth’s gravitational pull and achieve orbit. The shuttle solid rocket boosters are attached to each side of the external fuel talk. Solid rockets produce more thrust per pound than their liquid fuel counterparts. Once the solid rocket fuel has been ignited, it cannot be turned off or controlled, so it is immensely crucial that the shuttle solid rocket boosters be properly designed. The solid rocket booster used in the Challenger was a scaled up version of a Titan Missile. Morton Thiokol designed faulty solid rocket boosters leading the Challenger to
The night before the launch, Thiokol's engineers gave an hour-long presentation, presenting a convincing argument that the cold weather would exaggerate the problems of joint rotation and delayed O-ring seating. Marshall's Solid Rocket Booster Project Manager, Larry Mulloy, commented that the data was inconclusive and challenged the engineers' logic. Mulloy asked Joe Kilminster for his opinion. Kilminster stood by the engineers. Several other managers at Marshall expressed their doubts about the recommendations. Kilminster asked for a meeting off of the net, so Thiokol could review its data. Boisjoly and Thompson tried to convince their senior managers to stay with their original decision not to launch. The managers seemed to believe the O-rings could be eroded up to one-third of their diameter and still seal properly, regardless of the temperature. The data presented to them showed no correlation between temperature and the blowby gasses which eroded the O-rings in previous missions. Joe Kilminster wrote out the new recommendation and went back online with the teleconference. The new recommendation stated that the cold was still a safety concern, but their people had found that the original data was indeed inconclusive and their "engineering assessment" was that launch was recommended, even though the engineers had no part in writing the new