In addition months before this act was brought in, Roosevelt had set up an Office of Production Management to shift American Industry from peacetime production to military production, but more remarkably, he pushed Congress to approve the first peacetime military draft in U.S. history, a draft which required the registration of all men between the ages of 21 and 35. Even though Roosevelt states they were doing everything they can to prevent involvement, he implies there is still a ‘risk of involvement’. However Tindall and Shi’s argument is still weakened as the evidence ultimately shows Roosevelt was preparing for involvement in WWII. When these actions are considered, it appears that foreign policy at this time had more internationalist indicators. However, it’s important to consider that in Roosevelts Quarantine the Aggressors speech he implied that America needed to become an active participant in world politics, receiving a lot of backlash as a result. This shows the difficult position Roosevelt was in and explains his contradictory actions to an extent. As stated by Derrick Murphy who claimed it was almost an advancement towards internationalism by …show more content…
This view is also supported by Paul Johnson who provides a somewhat controversial argument that Roosevelt was ‘primarily concerned with his domestic policies’ and had no wish to partake in a ‘crusade against Nazism’. These views are supported by instances where Roosevelt accepted the restrictive nature of neutrality in order to make sure he had congressional support for the New Deal, essentially showing that Roosevelt made the New Deal and domestic policies his top priority. In contrast, Challener implies Roosevelt was very concerned with world politics but was stopped by a lack of public support. The lack of public support is evident by a poll taken in 1936 which showed that 60% of Americans favoured neutrality for America in any European war. The relevancy of this poll is that even though fascism was on the rise, the American public still believed they should avoid involvement. Even though Challener’s view is valid his failure to mention the internal battle between congress and the president weakens his argument as the Neutrality Acts were brought in specifically by congress in the years 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1939. These Acts sought to keep America insulated from the quarrels of Europe. Therefore we must draw the conclusion that