G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997.*
MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE, MARITES AGAPE, ESTEBANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JULIO VIVARES, respondents.
Courts; Jurisdiction; Settlement of Estates; Wills; Probate; As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to passing only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated.—As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the will’s provisions. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon where “practical considerations” demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are of doubtful legality, or where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined.—There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because “practical considerations” demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are of doubtful legality. Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the probate court may also do so. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon