Young V. UPS Case Study

The question before the Supreme Court concerning the Young v. UPS. Does the Pregnancy Discrimination Act require an employer to provide the same work accommodations to an employee with pregnancy-related work limitations as to employees with similar, but non-pregnancy related, work limitation? (http://www.oyez.org/cases) Samuel Bagenstos on behalf of the petitioner argued that UPS violated the second clause of the PDA. To his understanding the second clause means an employee seeking accommodation or benefits due to pregnancy is entitled to the same accommodation the employer would provide to an employee under the same restriction, but is not pregnant (http://www.oyez.org/cases). He contended that the second clause adds nothing to the first
and Congress purpose for the second clause was to insure equality in the day-to-day conditions of the workplace for female employees who become pregnant.
Bagenstos pointed out that UPS in their summary judgment provides accommodations to drivers with off-the-job injuries that result in DOT disqualification. UPS was not able to point to a single driver who’s had a lifting restriction similar to Peggy Young and not pregnant that did not get accommodated. Justice Breyer mention an easy way for Bagenstos to win in theory was to file a disparate impact claim. A Disparate Impact is an anti-discrimination law that holds that practices in employment may be considered discriminatory and illegal if they have an adverse impact on persons in a protected class. Peggy Young fall under this due to her pregnancy. Bagenstos argue that he didn’t file a disparate claim because he felt the second clause of the PDA says that “Women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related conditions shall be treated the same as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work (http://www.oyez.org/cases). What that says to an employer is don’t consider whether this person is affected by pregnancy or not so affected. This he felt was more of a vehicle to bring forth a claim more than
disparate claim.
General Verrilli Jr. who also supported the petitioner argued that the PDA was to reduce the number of women who are driven from the workforce or forced to go months without an income as a result of becoming pregnant. He point out that employers due to the second clause of the PDA is draw distinctions that treat pregnancy-related medical conditions worse than other conditions with comparable effects on ability to work. He concluded his argument with this case being about on the job versus off the job plus the certification categories of Department of Transportation (DOT) manual. The manual states people who lose their DOT certification and can’t drive as a result of physical conditions other than pregnancy that prevents them from doing the job they have to do, which could include lifting.
Caitlin Halligan on behalf of the respondent UPS argue that if Peggy Young believed that the policy that UPS applied, which was to provide accommodations to employees who are injured on the job but not to provide accommodations to any employees who sustained a condition incurred off the job, she could have brought a disparate impact claim. The same claim Justice Breyer ask Bagenstos as to why this type of claim wasn’t filed for this case. Halligan argued the second clause was added to the act to avoid case in which a court uses the same reasoning and reaches a different result. The petitioner suggest that the second clause somehow permits any distinction except on-the-job versus off-the-job. This result she argued suggests that you can have any distinction you want and it’s permissible under the PAD is far more contorted. She concluded that the distinction of on the job and off the job tracks what workers’ comp requires, which is payment for employees who are injured on the job. It is found advantageous to provide accommodations so employees can be at work while they are rehabilitating and provide productive work while on light duty.
The opinion of the court was written and delivered by Justice Breyer with a 6-3 majority.
Interpreting the PDA to required employers to offer the same accommodations to pregnant workers as all others with comparable physical limitations regardless of factors would be too broad. Congress did not intent for the Act to grant pregnancy such as unconditional “most-favored-nation status” however, congress clearly intended the Act to do more than define sex discrimination to include pregnancy discriminations. The Court held that the petitioner Peggy Young showed that she faced disparate treatment from her employer. Justice Alito wrote a concurrence that mention the language of the PDA makes employers liable for discriminatory conduct. He argued that treatment of pregnant employees should be compared to the treatment of non-pregnant employees in similar abilities and inabilities to
work.
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion arguing the Act prohibited tan employer from distinguishing between employees’ abilities and inabilities because of pregnancy, but the treatment for other reasons is permissible. Doing this will entitle pregnant workers to every possible accommodation which is not the intent of the Act. The main intent of the Act is to clarify that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination. Justice Kennedy who joined Justice Scalia in his dissent along with Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent. In his dissent, Justice Kennedy wrote that the majority opinion interpretation of the Act conflates evidence of disparate impact with that of disparate treatment. This creates unnecessary confusion in litigating pregnancy discrimination cases.