Comments and Criticisms on Meditation III
Comments and Criticisms on Meditation III
Clear and Distinct Perception
The Cogito is the one undubitable item that Descartes arrives at. But having reached this certain proposition, in the second paragraph of Meditation II he goes on to claim that it also gives him a criterion for truth. He says that what assures him of the truth of the Cogito is that he perceives it clearly and distinctly and that, thus: a statement is true if, and only if, it is perceived clearly and distinctly. This is Descartes criterion for truth.
At this point in his argument, he knows with certainty that he is a thinking thing. He now has to deal with objects he once considered that he did ‘know clearly and distinctly’ but which turned out not to be true at all - things like seeing the sky and the stars which, he has argued, turn out not to be directly perceived. You do not see stars directly; rather, you apprehend the mental images of stars in your mind. His mistakes have been due to trusting his sense experiences which can deliver ‘obscure and confused ideas’.
Instead of relying on his senses then, Descartes can only rely on his thinking alone. The Cogito has given him a criterion for truth because it is a self-evident proposition: just by inspecting it, one is forced to accept it as true. Here we might put Descartes on pause and ask about self-evident propositions.
There are 3 points that need making: self-evidence is subjective propositions are self-evident only if they are known directly propositions are self-evident only if they are clear and distinct.
The first point is that what is self-evident to one person may not be self-evident to another. Descartes uses phrases like ‘it seems to me to be most manifest’ and ‘I am so persuaded’ which reflect this subjectivity. And there is a difference between a proposition seeming self-evident and being self-evident. Descartes’ criterion for truth is itself a proposition and does not seem to be self-evident (it
Clear and Distinct Perception
The Cogito is the one undubitable item that Descartes arrives at. But having reached this certain proposition, in the second paragraph of Meditation II he goes on to claim that it also gives him a criterion for truth. He says that what assures him of the truth of the Cogito is that he perceives it clearly and distinctly and that, thus: a statement is true if, and only if, it is perceived clearly and distinctly. This is Descartes criterion for truth.
At this point in his argument, he knows with certainty that he is a thinking thing. He now has to deal with objects he once considered that he did ‘know clearly and distinctly’ but which turned out not to be true at all - things like seeing the sky and the stars which, he has argued, turn out not to be directly perceived. You do not see stars directly; rather, you apprehend the mental images of stars in your mind. His mistakes have been due to trusting his sense experiences which can deliver ‘obscure and confused ideas’.
Instead of relying on his senses then, Descartes can only rely on his thinking alone. The Cogito has given him a criterion for truth because it is a self-evident proposition: just by inspecting it, one is forced to accept it as true. Here we might put Descartes on pause and ask about self-evident propositions.
There are 3 points that need making: self-evidence is subjective propositions are self-evident only if they are known directly propositions are self-evident only if they are clear and distinct.
The first point is that what is self-evident to one person may not be self-evident to another. Descartes uses phrases like ‘it seems to me to be most manifest’ and ‘I am so persuaded’ which reflect this subjectivity. And there is a difference between a proposition seeming self-evident and being self-evident. Descartes’ criterion for truth is itself a proposition and does not seem to be self-evident (it