"The very concept of history asserts that human development is not predetermined not by nature, nor by God, nor by the totality of history itself" (Buck-Morss, Susan). However, there is always a combination of a willful action of knowledgeable groups within constraints and possibilities supplied by pre-existing structures. This is to suggest that there is a myriad of possibilities for people to make choices within given limits. Thus, an exploration of the Islamic Revolution in Iran conveys a great truth with vast implications: Religion can still be a more potent mobilizer of mass political action. In, addition, The Iranian Revolution consequently emerges as one of the most important events in modern history. In the same token, a relation between structure and society can better explain the role of social-political forces in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. To clarify my argument, let me propose an equipped definition of structure and society in the context of the Iranian Revolution. In such a context, structure evolved in three major forms: First, uneven development, which came as a result of the Shah's strict modernization (Smitha, 1998), and made a significant impact on structural relations between and within classes and state. Second, the autocratic state; this created a context in which the more the Shah relied upon the state's dependent-forceful system the more he removed himself from the society (Bill, 1987).
Given the structural constraints, the extent to which Iranian social and political forces could play a role was limited to three following groups: Radicals, traditional institutions, and the clerical charismatic leadership (Smitha, 1998). In the following part, I will discuss the nature and diversity of these religious political forces, in particular Muslim's forces of the revolution. Pre-revolutionary Iran never experienced a unified Islamic culture. Rather, there were chunks of cultural and political discourses,