R. V. Keegstra : in Support of the Dissent
R. V. Keegstra : In Support of the Dissent
Submitted in partial fulfillment of requirement for PHL613, Philosophy of Law
Sean Peters
500 204 129
April 11, 2012
Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Overview of R. V. Keegstra 2
Why does Freedom of Speech in Democracy Matter? 2 Factors of the Offense Principle 3 Why not Moralism? 4
Philosophical Analysis 4 Criticism 6 Recommendations 7
Conclusion 8
Appendices 9 Appendix 1 - Research and Methodology 9
Works Cited 11
Introduction
What does freedom of expression really mean? Why is it important to our democratic society? In the landmark case of R. v. Keegstra (1990), the issues of freedom of expression and hate speech is brought in front of the Supreme Court of Canada. The case also deals with issues of whether sections 319(2) and 319(3)(a) of the Criminal Code violated section 2(b) and section 11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The courts view that the objectives of having freedom of speech are correlated with democracy in the sense that for members of society to have their voices heard, they must be free to speak on matters that provide value back to society. This case has served as precedence for other freedom of expression cases. R. v. Keegstra can be looked at through many of the legal principles, but for the purposes of this essay, I will focus on the Offense Principle. This principle, brought forward by Joel Feinberg, is a tangent of John Mill’s Harm Principle, which deals with non-physical harm, such as hate speech. This is evident when looking at R. v. Keegstra, as the Offense Principle is the best principle to articulate why the dissenting judges ruled the way they did. I believe that the lead dissenting judge, Beverly McLachlin, ruled accurately in her judgement and I intend to support this ruling throughout this essay. As well, I will provide a summery of R. V. Keegstra, look at Philosophical principles as
Submitted in partial fulfillment of requirement for PHL613, Philosophy of Law
Sean Peters
500 204 129
April 11, 2012
Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Overview of R. V. Keegstra 2
Why does Freedom of Speech in Democracy Matter? 2 Factors of the Offense Principle 3 Why not Moralism? 4
Philosophical Analysis 4 Criticism 6 Recommendations 7
Conclusion 8
Appendices 9 Appendix 1 - Research and Methodology 9
Works Cited 11
Introduction
What does freedom of expression really mean? Why is it important to our democratic society? In the landmark case of R. v. Keegstra (1990), the issues of freedom of expression and hate speech is brought in front of the Supreme Court of Canada. The case also deals with issues of whether sections 319(2) and 319(3)(a) of the Criminal Code violated section 2(b) and section 11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The courts view that the objectives of having freedom of speech are correlated with democracy in the sense that for members of society to have their voices heard, they must be free to speak on matters that provide value back to society. This case has served as precedence for other freedom of expression cases. R. v. Keegstra can be looked at through many of the legal principles, but for the purposes of this essay, I will focus on the Offense Principle. This principle, brought forward by Joel Feinberg, is a tangent of John Mill’s Harm Principle, which deals with non-physical harm, such as hate speech. This is evident when looking at R. v. Keegstra, as the Offense Principle is the best principle to articulate why the dissenting judges ruled the way they did. I believe that the lead dissenting judge, Beverly McLachlin, ruled accurately in her judgement and I intend to support this ruling throughout this essay. As well, I will provide a summery of R. V. Keegstra, look at Philosophical principles as
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