1976 Military War Dirty War
Course Title: Latin America- Economies and Societies
Course Code: HIST2104
Professor: Dr. Sierakowski
Question #10: What was the impact of the 1976 military coup and the “dirty war” on Argentine society? (Oral Presentation)
Thesis: The impacts that the 1976 military coup and the Dirty War had on Argentine society was a great tragedy killing a numerous amount of Argentines in an effort to counter the perceived threat of leftist social activism.
The dirty war in Argentina started in 1976 after a military coup on March 25 of that year brought General Jorge Videla to power. The coup was the military 's response to the disorder and deteriorating economic conditions that preceded it. The disorder was marked …show more content…
by strikes and terrorism from the left and the right. Many Argentinians were relieved by the prospect of a military government putting down the violence and restoring order and stability. The period preceding the coup was one of violence, but nothing approaching the retaliatory and repressive violence of the dirty war to be unleashed by the new regime. The impacts that the 1976 military coup and the Dirty War had on Argentine society was a great tragedy killing a numerous amount of Argentines in an effort to counter the perceived threat of leftist social activism, a crime supported by the United States government. Despite its infamy, the causes of the Dirty War are not clearly understood.
To some degree it was a civil war – the junta orchestrating the violence certainly saw themselves as part of an existential conflict against internal communism and anarchy. However, this label does not fully express the history of the violence. Despite the violent aspirations of leftist and Peronist groups, the non-state actors that both opposed and supported the conservative junta never approached the organizational and military capacity necessary for serious action against the government. In this way the Dirty War was much more similar to a mass breakdown of civil society that sparked organized governmental violence against the Argentine population, and the Dirty War possibly shares more with the chaotic French or Chinese Cultural Revolutions than the more organized, bipolar conflict typically termed “civil wars.” What is interesting about the Dirty War isn’t its brutality – its torture and fear were symptoms that defined 20th century state failure across Latin America. Instead, what is interesting about Argentina’s descent into chaos is that, on the surface, it doesn’t appear to have been predictable. Despite its deep structural problems, Argentina in 1970 was a fairly wealthy country with a developed and relatively educated urban population, largely free from the grinding rural poverty that characterized its northern Latin American counterparts. Similarly, despite frequent social unrest is seems …show more content…
reasonable to have expected Argentina’s relatively high consumption level to have moderated social unrest. However, there were signs that Argentine society in 1970 stood on the edge of a precipice. The Peronist movement of the 1950s and 1960s had overturned the established Argentine political equilibrium, and Argentina’s five military coups by 1970 were high, but not exceptional by Latin American standards. However, what made Argentina exceptional was its extreme social inequality, which bred a class conflict whose violence and instability was extreme even by Latin American standards. This class conflict created the conditions that allowed Argentine society to become progressively more unstable throughout the 20th century and created the economic conditions that encouraged social divisions to explode into the chaos and violence of the Dirty War. This decision was a product of the lingering trauma of Peronism, which caused the military and the elites they represented to severely overestimate the threat posed by a violently angry working class. Despite their lofty ambitions of social change, Argentina’s armed extremist groups were mostly limited to isolated kidnapping and small-scale terrorist attacks and did not pose the existential threat the military perceived. It was this miscalculation that initiated the excesses of the Dirty War: the lingering psychological trauma of Peronism led elites to believe that they were already trapped an open civil war with the working class that threatened to overwhelm them and that their survival rested on quickly and decisively destroying working-class leftist groups. When initially unsuccessful, the military rapidly escalated the tactics they were willing to utilize against elements of Argentine society they perceived as undesirable. The unprecedented brutality of the Dirty War grew out of the military’s frustration over its inability to decisively destroy the leftist movement. Despite its unprecedented brutality, the Dirty War was fundamentally a continuation of the liberal-conservative class conflict that had defined Argentine society through the 20th century. The conservative National Reorganization Process junta’s criminal violence was motivated by a desire to end this conflict decisively by destroying their liberal ideological opponents among the working class. Leftists groups’ resistance to “capitalism” were explicitly an attack on the wealthy elite, and conservative death squads targeting liberal political activists and trade unionists operated especially freely in the slums. However, despite its similarities to the long-running pattern of Argentine development the Dirty War was far more violent than any other period of political conflict in the 20th century. The legacy of Peronism – which convinced elites that their survival was at stake and working class liberal activists that violence could rapidly provoke social change – and the rising social inequality of 1960s and 1970s created the conditions necessary for a complete collapse of social order. While the core social conditions that led to the violence of the Dirty War were the same as those that had fueled earlier conflicts, by the early 1970s Argentina was an economically stagnant, socially divided society that was permeated by fear and resentment. These conditions created the tinderbox that the political legacies of Peronism, leftist activism and military frustration ignited. This class conflict that culminated in the Dirty War has become much less influential after the 1983 return to democracy.
While class remains an important part of Argentine political and social identity, Argentine society seems unlikely to suffer another violent collapse. Just as economic malaise has precipitated Argentine political unrest; the relative stability of the post-1983 is likely at least partially due to improving economic conditions. The contemporary Argentine economy is clearly comparatively weaker than during the export economy era, especially in comparison to other large economies. Declining aggregate social stresses in the post-Dirty War period are likely responsible for the decline of class politics in contemporary Argentina. While it remains popular among poor slum residents, today’s Peronist movement has largely shifted its base away from unions and is a significantly less class-based party than the Peronism of the
1940s. The contemporary moderation of Argentine politics is not wholly due to economic factors. The military lost much of its political power in the aftermath of the return to democracy, and its absence has removed the wealthy conservative elite’s most powerful tool for subverting electoral politics. Nearly all shifts to conservative ascendency in the post-oligarchy era were accomplished by military coups, and the decline of the Argentine military after its disgraceful conduct during the National Reorganization Process significantly lowered the stakes of Argentine politics. Importantly, conflict between political parties has a low likelihood of escalating into a future military takeover. While class is still an important part of Argentine culture and continues to influence politics and personal identity, the divide between the rich and working class seems unlikely to lead to another catastrophic disruption of Argentine civil society.
Bibliography
Lewis, Paul H, “The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism,” (University of North Carolina Press, 1990).
Brown, Jonathan C., “A Brief History of Argentina,” Facts on File (2010).
Rouquie, Alain, “The Military and the State in Latin America,” (University of California Press Ltd. London, England 1987) Chapter 4 page 98 Gasparini, L., Guillermo Cruce and Leopoldo Tornaroll (2009). “Recent Trends in Income Inequality in Latin America.” Society for the Study of Income Inequality Working Paper Series.
Leaders of the Military Coup of 1976
Numbers 2 and 3 shows military brutality.
2. 3.
The members of human rights groups Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo and Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, carrying a banner with images of people missing during the 1976-83 dictatorship, march during a demonstration marking the 34th anniversary of the 1976 military coup in Buenos Aires, Wednesday March 24, 2010.
4.
Course Code: HIST2104
Professor: Dr. Sierakowski
Question #10: What was the impact of the 1976 military coup and the “dirty war” on Argentine society? (Oral Presentation)
Thesis: The impacts that the 1976 military coup and the Dirty War had on Argentine society was a great tragedy killing a numerous amount of Argentines in an effort to counter the perceived threat of leftist social activism.
The dirty war in Argentina started in 1976 after a military coup on March 25 of that year brought General Jorge Videla to power. The coup was the military 's response to the disorder and deteriorating economic conditions that preceded it. The disorder was marked …show more content…
by strikes and terrorism from the left and the right. Many Argentinians were relieved by the prospect of a military government putting down the violence and restoring order and stability. The period preceding the coup was one of violence, but nothing approaching the retaliatory and repressive violence of the dirty war to be unleashed by the new regime. The impacts that the 1976 military coup and the Dirty War had on Argentine society was a great tragedy killing a numerous amount of Argentines in an effort to counter the perceived threat of leftist social activism, a crime supported by the United States government. Despite its infamy, the causes of the Dirty War are not clearly understood.
To some degree it was a civil war – the junta orchestrating the violence certainly saw themselves as part of an existential conflict against internal communism and anarchy. However, this label does not fully express the history of the violence. Despite the violent aspirations of leftist and Peronist groups, the non-state actors that both opposed and supported the conservative junta never approached the organizational and military capacity necessary for serious action against the government. In this way the Dirty War was much more similar to a mass breakdown of civil society that sparked organized governmental violence against the Argentine population, and the Dirty War possibly shares more with the chaotic French or Chinese Cultural Revolutions than the more organized, bipolar conflict typically termed “civil wars.” What is interesting about the Dirty War isn’t its brutality – its torture and fear were symptoms that defined 20th century state failure across Latin America. Instead, what is interesting about Argentina’s descent into chaos is that, on the surface, it doesn’t appear to have been predictable. Despite its deep structural problems, Argentina in 1970 was a fairly wealthy country with a developed and relatively educated urban population, largely free from the grinding rural poverty that characterized its northern Latin American counterparts. Similarly, despite frequent social unrest is seems …show more content…
reasonable to have expected Argentina’s relatively high consumption level to have moderated social unrest. However, there were signs that Argentine society in 1970 stood on the edge of a precipice. The Peronist movement of the 1950s and 1960s had overturned the established Argentine political equilibrium, and Argentina’s five military coups by 1970 were high, but not exceptional by Latin American standards. However, what made Argentina exceptional was its extreme social inequality, which bred a class conflict whose violence and instability was extreme even by Latin American standards. This class conflict created the conditions that allowed Argentine society to become progressively more unstable throughout the 20th century and created the economic conditions that encouraged social divisions to explode into the chaos and violence of the Dirty War. This decision was a product of the lingering trauma of Peronism, which caused the military and the elites they represented to severely overestimate the threat posed by a violently angry working class. Despite their lofty ambitions of social change, Argentina’s armed extremist groups were mostly limited to isolated kidnapping and small-scale terrorist attacks and did not pose the existential threat the military perceived. It was this miscalculation that initiated the excesses of the Dirty War: the lingering psychological trauma of Peronism led elites to believe that they were already trapped an open civil war with the working class that threatened to overwhelm them and that their survival rested on quickly and decisively destroying working-class leftist groups. When initially unsuccessful, the military rapidly escalated the tactics they were willing to utilize against elements of Argentine society they perceived as undesirable. The unprecedented brutality of the Dirty War grew out of the military’s frustration over its inability to decisively destroy the leftist movement. Despite its unprecedented brutality, the Dirty War was fundamentally a continuation of the liberal-conservative class conflict that had defined Argentine society through the 20th century. The conservative National Reorganization Process junta’s criminal violence was motivated by a desire to end this conflict decisively by destroying their liberal ideological opponents among the working class. Leftists groups’ resistance to “capitalism” were explicitly an attack on the wealthy elite, and conservative death squads targeting liberal political activists and trade unionists operated especially freely in the slums. However, despite its similarities to the long-running pattern of Argentine development the Dirty War was far more violent than any other period of political conflict in the 20th century. The legacy of Peronism – which convinced elites that their survival was at stake and working class liberal activists that violence could rapidly provoke social change – and the rising social inequality of 1960s and 1970s created the conditions necessary for a complete collapse of social order. While the core social conditions that led to the violence of the Dirty War were the same as those that had fueled earlier conflicts, by the early 1970s Argentina was an economically stagnant, socially divided society that was permeated by fear and resentment. These conditions created the tinderbox that the political legacies of Peronism, leftist activism and military frustration ignited. This class conflict that culminated in the Dirty War has become much less influential after the 1983 return to democracy.
While class remains an important part of Argentine political and social identity, Argentine society seems unlikely to suffer another violent collapse. Just as economic malaise has precipitated Argentine political unrest; the relative stability of the post-1983 is likely at least partially due to improving economic conditions. The contemporary Argentine economy is clearly comparatively weaker than during the export economy era, especially in comparison to other large economies. Declining aggregate social stresses in the post-Dirty War period are likely responsible for the decline of class politics in contemporary Argentina. While it remains popular among poor slum residents, today’s Peronist movement has largely shifted its base away from unions and is a significantly less class-based party than the Peronism of the
1940s. The contemporary moderation of Argentine politics is not wholly due to economic factors. The military lost much of its political power in the aftermath of the return to democracy, and its absence has removed the wealthy conservative elite’s most powerful tool for subverting electoral politics. Nearly all shifts to conservative ascendency in the post-oligarchy era were accomplished by military coups, and the decline of the Argentine military after its disgraceful conduct during the National Reorganization Process significantly lowered the stakes of Argentine politics. Importantly, conflict between political parties has a low likelihood of escalating into a future military takeover. While class is still an important part of Argentine culture and continues to influence politics and personal identity, the divide between the rich and working class seems unlikely to lead to another catastrophic disruption of Argentine civil society.
Bibliography
Lewis, Paul H, “The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism,” (University of North Carolina Press, 1990).
Brown, Jonathan C., “A Brief History of Argentina,” Facts on File (2010).
Rouquie, Alain, “The Military and the State in Latin America,” (University of California Press Ltd. London, England 1987) Chapter 4 page 98 Gasparini, L., Guillermo Cruce and Leopoldo Tornaroll (2009). “Recent Trends in Income Inequality in Latin America.” Society for the Study of Income Inequality Working Paper Series.
Leaders of the Military Coup of 1976
Numbers 2 and 3 shows military brutality.
2. 3.
The members of human rights groups Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo and Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, carrying a banner with images of people missing during the 1976-83 dictatorship, march during a demonstration marking the 34th anniversary of the 1976 military coup in Buenos Aires, Wednesday March 24, 2010.
4.