Account Of Knowledge
On Gettier and Klein: Amending our Traditional Account of Knowledge
In his paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge,” Gettier refutes the traditional Justified True Belief account of knowledge by providing counterexamples that show that while the conditions provided by the JTB account are necessary, they fall short of being sufficient for knowledge. Klein’s paper, “A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge,” suggests a fourth condition with which to amend the JTB account so that it provides both necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. In this paper I will explain the what JTB account of knowledge is and what it is designed to do, how and why Gettier’s counterexamples proves that this traditional account fails, and finally …show more content…
In other words, S knows that P if and only if S has a justified, true, belief concerning P. The necessity of the first condition is obvious, since it can not be the case that we have knowledge of something that is false. It also seems obvious that we do not have knowledge of P if we do not believe that P. Can we claim to have knowledge of something we don’t believe? The last condition is the only one of the three that may not seem immediately obvious; however, if our knowledge wasn’t justified, then it would be nothing more than a lucky guess1.
Given the conditions specified by the JTB account of knowledge, the question to be asked is what exactly is this account designed to do? In providing an account, we aren’t concerned with the word ‘knowledge’, but with the concept that knowledge picks out. So, we aren’t trying to define what knowledge is, instead we are trying to give an account of what it is to have knowledge. As Steup puts it, when we are examining concepts such as knowledge and justification, we are interested in “what people have in common when they know something and when they are justified in believing something” …show more content…
But, is it really the case that Smith knows (b)? He believes (b), that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, but (b) is not made true by (a), that Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Instead, it is made true by the fact that Smith is getting the job and that he also has ten coins in his pocket. This counterexample shows that a person can be justified in believing a proposition that is deduced from a false proposition. Although Smith has a justified, true, belief, it doesn’t qualify as knowledge. Gettier has shown that the conditions of the JTB account can be met, yet one can still fall short of having knowledge. It seems that another condition must be added to our account of knowledge in order to circumvent such a
In his paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge,” Gettier refutes the traditional Justified True Belief account of knowledge by providing counterexamples that show that while the conditions provided by the JTB account are necessary, they fall short of being sufficient for knowledge. Klein’s paper, “A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge,” suggests a fourth condition with which to amend the JTB account so that it provides both necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. In this paper I will explain the what JTB account of knowledge is and what it is designed to do, how and why Gettier’s counterexamples proves that this traditional account fails, and finally …show more content…
In other words, S knows that P if and only if S has a justified, true, belief concerning P. The necessity of the first condition is obvious, since it can not be the case that we have knowledge of something that is false. It also seems obvious that we do not have knowledge of P if we do not believe that P. Can we claim to have knowledge of something we don’t believe? The last condition is the only one of the three that may not seem immediately obvious; however, if our knowledge wasn’t justified, then it would be nothing more than a lucky guess1.
Given the conditions specified by the JTB account of knowledge, the question to be asked is what exactly is this account designed to do? In providing an account, we aren’t concerned with the word ‘knowledge’, but with the concept that knowledge picks out. So, we aren’t trying to define what knowledge is, instead we are trying to give an account of what it is to have knowledge. As Steup puts it, when we are examining concepts such as knowledge and justification, we are interested in “what people have in common when they know something and when they are justified in believing something” …show more content…
But, is it really the case that Smith knows (b)? He believes (b), that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, but (b) is not made true by (a), that Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Instead, it is made true by the fact that Smith is getting the job and that he also has ten coins in his pocket. This counterexample shows that a person can be justified in believing a proposition that is deduced from a false proposition. Although Smith has a justified, true, belief, it doesn’t qualify as knowledge. Gettier has shown that the conditions of the JTB account can be met, yet one can still fall short of having knowledge. It seems that another condition must be added to our account of knowledge in order to circumvent such a