Administrative Law Case Study
You asked me to determine whether our client, Paul Grantham, can challenge the sufficiency of substituted service on his secretary at Mr. Grantham’s accounting office, when the landlord sued him individually. I have researched Oklahoma’s service of process statute, and I believe that Mr. Grantham’s challenge will be successful.
The Oklahoma service of process statute provides that service is valid when copies of the summons and petition are served by personal delivery. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(1)(c) (West 2012). In lieu of personal delivery, the statute allows for substituted service by leaving copies of the summons and complaint at the person's dwelling house or usual place of abode with someone who resides there and is fifteen …show more content…
years of age or older or, the summons and complaint may be served on an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. Id. Thus, in order for service to have been valid, it must have either been served on Mr. Grantham, personally, or on agent authorized by either appointment or law to receive service of process for him.
An individual cannot be served through a general agent unless that agent is authorized to receive service of process by appointment or by law. Graff v. Kelly, 1991 OK 71, 814 P.2d 489, 494. For example, in Graff a medical clinic brought suit against one of its physicians for breach of contract. After the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the clinic, the physician moved to vacate the default judgment on the ground that he was never validly served with process. Id. at ¶4, 814 P.2d at 491. On appeal, the physician argued that service on his receptionist at his place of business was not a proper substitute service. Id. The clinic contended that service was proper because the receptionist was the physician’s agent or, alternatively, because the physician received actual notice of the suit. Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the clinic’s argument and vacated the judgment. The Court held the service invalid. In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that actual notice alone was insufficient to establish in personam jurisdiction because service of process was not adequate. Id. at ¶11, 814 P.2d at 493. To make this determination, the Court utilized the three-part Steincamp test, which consists of three questions: (1) Is there a statute authorizing the method of service employed?; (2) Have the requirements of the statute been observed?; (3) Have fundamental due process requirements been met? Id.
The Court answered the first question affirmatively pointing to § 2004 which sets forth the requirements for substitute service of process.
Before answering the second question, the Court found it necessary to resolve what was required to authorize a person “by appointment” as an agent for the purpose of receiving service of process, and what was required to identify a person who has become an agent “authorized by law.” Id. The court defined an agent authorized by appointment as one who has received specific authorization to receive service of process by his principal by means such as a contract. Id. at ¶14, 814 P.2d at 494. The Court noted that general agency is insufficient to establish that a person has been authorized by appointment. The Court went on to define an agent authorized by law as one who has been authorized by legislative enactment to receive process. After finding that there was no evidence to support the clinic’s contention that the physician’s receptionist was appointed to receive service and there was no statute which would authorize the receptionist to receive service of process, the Court stated that the requirements of the applicable statute had not been met. Id. at ¶19 4, 814 P.2d at 495. As a result, the Court found it unnecessary to answer the third question and subsequently ruled that substitute service upon the receptionist at the clinic where the appellant was employed was ineffective as service upon the physician. Id. at ¶21, 814 P.2d at
496.
Given the Court’s decision in Graff, Mr. Grantham will likely be able to establish that the substituted service of process on his secretary was insufficient. Both cases involve professionals being sued individually. In Graff, the clinic sued the physician in his individual capacity. Similarly, the landlord sued Mr. Grantham individually as Paul Grantham. Additionally, the plaintiffs in each of the cases used substituted methods of service to serve the defendants at their places of work. In the Graff case, service was made on the physician’s receptionist at the physician’s place of business. Likewise, service was made on Mr. Grantham’s secretary at his accounting office. Lastly, service was not made on an authorized agent in either case. In Graff, the physician’s secretary had not been appointed to receive service of process by the physician and was not authorized by law to receive service of process, just as Mr. Grantham did not appoint his secretary to receive service of process and there is no statute which would indicate that his secretary was authorized by law to receive service of process. However, Mr. Grantham’s commercial lease agreement should be reviewed to determine whether his secretary was authorized by appointment to receive service of process by means of a contractual provision.
Due to the similarities between the cases, a court is likely to apply the reasoning from the Graff case to the facts of Mr. Grantham’s claim. Mr. Grantham did not receive service of process personally, nor was it delivered at his dwelling house or usual place of abode. Further, service of process was not delivered to someone authorized by appointment or by law. Following the reasoning of the Graff case, the landlord’s substituted service on Mr. Grantham’s secretary was invalid under Oklahoma law.
The Oklahoma service of process statute provides that service is valid when copies of the summons and petition are served by personal delivery. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(1)(c) (West 2012). In lieu of personal delivery, the statute allows for substituted service by leaving copies of the summons and complaint at the person's dwelling house or usual place of abode with someone who resides there and is fifteen …show more content…
years of age or older or, the summons and complaint may be served on an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. Id. Thus, in order for service to have been valid, it must have either been served on Mr. Grantham, personally, or on agent authorized by either appointment or law to receive service of process for him.
An individual cannot be served through a general agent unless that agent is authorized to receive service of process by appointment or by law. Graff v. Kelly, 1991 OK 71, 814 P.2d 489, 494. For example, in Graff a medical clinic brought suit against one of its physicians for breach of contract. After the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the clinic, the physician moved to vacate the default judgment on the ground that he was never validly served with process. Id. at ¶4, 814 P.2d at 491. On appeal, the physician argued that service on his receptionist at his place of business was not a proper substitute service. Id. The clinic contended that service was proper because the receptionist was the physician’s agent or, alternatively, because the physician received actual notice of the suit. Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the clinic’s argument and vacated the judgment. The Court held the service invalid. In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that actual notice alone was insufficient to establish in personam jurisdiction because service of process was not adequate. Id. at ¶11, 814 P.2d at 493. To make this determination, the Court utilized the three-part Steincamp test, which consists of three questions: (1) Is there a statute authorizing the method of service employed?; (2) Have the requirements of the statute been observed?; (3) Have fundamental due process requirements been met? Id.
The Court answered the first question affirmatively pointing to § 2004 which sets forth the requirements for substitute service of process.
Before answering the second question, the Court found it necessary to resolve what was required to authorize a person “by appointment” as an agent for the purpose of receiving service of process, and what was required to identify a person who has become an agent “authorized by law.” Id. The court defined an agent authorized by appointment as one who has received specific authorization to receive service of process by his principal by means such as a contract. Id. at ¶14, 814 P.2d at 494. The Court noted that general agency is insufficient to establish that a person has been authorized by appointment. The Court went on to define an agent authorized by law as one who has been authorized by legislative enactment to receive process. After finding that there was no evidence to support the clinic’s contention that the physician’s receptionist was appointed to receive service and there was no statute which would authorize the receptionist to receive service of process, the Court stated that the requirements of the applicable statute had not been met. Id. at ¶19 4, 814 P.2d at 495. As a result, the Court found it unnecessary to answer the third question and subsequently ruled that substitute service upon the receptionist at the clinic where the appellant was employed was ineffective as service upon the physician. Id. at ¶21, 814 P.2d at
496.
Given the Court’s decision in Graff, Mr. Grantham will likely be able to establish that the substituted service of process on his secretary was insufficient. Both cases involve professionals being sued individually. In Graff, the clinic sued the physician in his individual capacity. Similarly, the landlord sued Mr. Grantham individually as Paul Grantham. Additionally, the plaintiffs in each of the cases used substituted methods of service to serve the defendants at their places of work. In the Graff case, service was made on the physician’s receptionist at the physician’s place of business. Likewise, service was made on Mr. Grantham’s secretary at his accounting office. Lastly, service was not made on an authorized agent in either case. In Graff, the physician’s secretary had not been appointed to receive service of process by the physician and was not authorized by law to receive service of process, just as Mr. Grantham did not appoint his secretary to receive service of process and there is no statute which would indicate that his secretary was authorized by law to receive service of process. However, Mr. Grantham’s commercial lease agreement should be reviewed to determine whether his secretary was authorized by appointment to receive service of process by means of a contractual provision.
Due to the similarities between the cases, a court is likely to apply the reasoning from the Graff case to the facts of Mr. Grantham’s claim. Mr. Grantham did not receive service of process personally, nor was it delivered at his dwelling house or usual place of abode. Further, service of process was not delivered to someone authorized by appointment or by law. Following the reasoning of the Graff case, the landlord’s substituted service on Mr. Grantham’s secretary was invalid under Oklahoma law.