Aftermath of the Tsunami Recovery

Creative Destruction and the Aftermath of the Tsunami: Recovery of
Southern Sri Lankan Small Business in the Face of Inertia

Dr. C. Travis A. Perera
Senior Consultant, Entrepreneurship, Business Development & Operations
Management
Postgraduate Institute of Management, Sri Lanka
Telephone number: 94-777 756 109
Fax number: 94-11-2689643
Email: [e-mail]
Paper Presented
At the 5th International Entrepreneurship Forum held in Cape Town, South Africa from September 07-09-2005

Jointly organized by

Creative Destruction and the Aftermath of the Tsunami: Recovery of
Southern Sri Lankan Small Business in the Face of Inertia

Dr. Travis Perera Ph.D (Sri.J.), MBA (Sri.J.)
Senior Consultant, Postgraduate Institute of Management
University of Sri Jayewardenepura
Abstract
The Tsunami of December 26, 2004 killed over 35,000 in Sri Lanka, made 400,000 people jobless and damaged the economy by 6.5%. The physical damage is around
US$1.5billion, reconstruction costing $ 2 bn.. At the Sri Lanka Development Forum in
May 16, 2005 donors committed US$ 2.2 billion for reconstruction. In Schumpeterian terms the scene implies opportunities for creativity and innovation. In Lacanian terms, however, the real is more complex than reality.
Although entrepreneurs are opportunity seekers, take risk and thrive in uncertainty, and the supportive environment in Sri Lanka is more promising now than in the past, alignment of competency and institutional support is not fully realized for necessary recovery and growth.
This problem is studied by revisiting Inertia Theory for understanding entrepreneurial inertia, Network Theory for interaction of environment and entrepreneur, and Theory on Disaster Management to understand stage related issues.
Natural Disasters like the Asian Tsunami have a high impact on industry, and while research is lacking in this area it is more so in relation to small business. As such, the objective of this paper is to give insight into the current recovery process and to future preparedness for small business management following natural disaster.
The methodology followed involves a survey of at least 89 Sri Lankan small businesses affected by the recent Tsunami who are in the process of recovery. The unique process adapted by the Postgraduate Institute of Management in Sri Lanka of participation, observation and designing systems is utilized.

.
The Impact of the Disaster
Systems Theory implies through its principles of homeostasis, requisite variety and equifinality that following a change in the environment, depending on its inherent level of complexity, the system would respond to the change, adapt to the new complexity of the environment, and move into more sophisticated forms. (Sagasti, 1970.) In the same vein, Hisrich and Peters (1998); Kottler (1997);
Tyebjee, Bruno and McIntyre (1983); and Stevenson (1983) talk of how successful organizations respond to environmental uncertainty through innovation and creativity.
According to Schumpeter (1951) environmental uncertainty is the preferred environment of the entrepreneur, and ‘Entrepreneurship…consists of doing things that are generally not done in the ordinary course of business things: it is a phenomenon that comes under the wider aspect of leadership’ and it requires behavior ‘that includes (1) initiative taking, (2) the organizing or reorganizing of social economic mechanisms to turn resources and situations into practical account, and (3) the acceptance of risk of failure’ (Shapero, 1975.) Such resources were no doubt present in the form of local and foreign donors and resource persons volunteering for the cause.
The recovery patterns of entrepreneurs affected by the Tsunami shows varying rates. If they have entrepreneurial competencies, if the tsunami provided a challenge to them, and if resources are available, why then should there be varying recovery rates?
Three possible causes could be conceptualized from existing knowledge to explain varied behavior.
They are:
1. Entrepreneurial behavior during different phases of the disaster cycle
2. The patterns of networking by government and donor agencies during these phases, and
3. Strategies in overcoming post-disaster inertia in the recovering system

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The chaos and havoc created by the 2004 Tsunami provided a vivid environment in which entrepreneurial response could be observed in action. The damage done to business during this disaster is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Direct Impact on Businesses Caused by the 2004 Tsunami

Source: Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka, August 2005.

Recovery of affected businesses today however looks progressive. Surveying a sample of businesses in
Southern Sri Lanka gives an optimistic prognosis. Although slow growth is visible, it is varied although there appears to be a tilt towards positive entrepreneurial growth. The table of recovery rates below shows this trend:
Table 2. Percentage Recovery Rates of a Sample of Businesses in Southern Sri Lanka
Variable/ Business
Sales Volume
Employees
Vehicles
Main Product Stock
Area of buildings
Customers
Dealers
Source: Survey Data

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

6
20
5
33
20
100

100
50
250
50
25

150
125
100
150
80

50
20
5
50

25
100
42
100

200
200
200
167

117
100
200
117
143

1538
125
150
100

100
-

50
100
100
-

80
75
100
110
167
120
-

116
100
100
110
167
120
100

63
70
80
78
-

75
50
75
200
75
-

200
200
200
200
180
-

A Unique Methodology while DIEing in Disaster
The investigation however poses an uncertainty principle: It is difficult for the researcher to both observe and experience this particular situation, particular due to its traumatic interventions; neither is it possible to repeat the same situation for experimentation nor obtain the real from anecdotal evidence. However, a unique experience presented an opportunity for the author and his colleagues who work as resource persons at the Postgraduate Institute of Management in Sri Lanka. This experience provided a unique methodology to the team to be actors while observing the disaster cycle as it is unfolding into the present times.
The Postgraduate Institute of Management (PIM) in Sri Lanka had just prepared its 160 MBA and MPA students for research when the Tsunami struck on December 26, 2004. Its devastating impact was unprecedented and the ensuing chaos gave new purpose for the PIM. Having searched for an effective national program or agency to work with and failed, PIM called on all persons with ability and purpose to DIE (Dedicate their ability… Innovate new ideas… and Execute the solution) in disaster. PIM changed its regular program, and designed and launched its own program of disaster management.
The regular compulsory skill paper accounting for three credits took the form of camp management projects which culminated in the provision of temporary housing, and the traditional three-credit research became development projects and tsunami-based behavioral research. Two new compulsory disaster management courses were also introduced into the curriculum. The Acronym MBA too was changed to mean MBA = Making Business-learning Action-oriented. (www.pim.lk )
PIM’s organizational structure too underwent change. Senior faculty members now directed disaster management project units. Four guiding principles of the program are the Principles of Urgency, Plan
Integration, Focus and Participation.

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PIM’s Masters students are typically business managers and public administrators, and as such, exhibited great commitment in executing these projects amidst their regular jobs.
The PIM successfully generated its own funds to fuel the needs of 65 camp management projects in districts such as Kalutara, Galle, Matara, Hambantota, Trincomalee and Kilinochchi, 25 disaster management projects which include business re-startups, new businesses, building and setting up pre-schools, building of permanent housing, and executing scholarships programs for deserving affected students. In addition to this, 35 researches were undertaken on management related behavioral aspects of affected persons.
This experience was a demonstration how with a deep sense of corporate social responsibility, experiential learning could be realized. This was the source of knowledge and tacit methodology for understanding the issues related the context of this paper.

Entrepreneurs as Emergent Leaders During the Disaster Cycle
The Crisis Management Procedure Training Manual of the GoI-UNDP Disaster Risk Management
Program describes six distinctive stages in the disaster cycle: Impact, Response, Rehabilitation,
Reconstruction, Mitigation, and Preparedness. These stages are clustered into three phases as follows:
a.
b.
c.

The Pre-disaster Phase which focus on mitigation and preparedness, involve competencies such as anticipation, forecasting, and risk reduction
The Impact Phase characterized by traumatic destruction of life and property, calls for bravery, and intuition-based emergent leadership, and
The Post-disaster Phase which covers the stages of response, rehabilitation and reconstruction calls for much goals-directed, planning oriented and commitment generating behavior.

Based on the nature of these phases, entrepreneurial competencies as conceptualized by McClelland
(1961) could be posted as in the following figure:

Fig 1. Entrepreneurial Competencies in Disaster Cycle Phases

The role of the entrepreneur in pulling out of the disaster cycle is a unique one since the environmental forces he is against is mostly of a physically destructive nature rather than the regular market related ones he is more familiar with. In this task he exhibits the behaviors of an emergent leader. Any entrepreneurial effort should be positively moderated by institutional support, and this is usually provided by assigned leaders such as Divisional Secretaries, Grama Niladharis, the armed forces, officials of banks and chambers of commerce and industry. This situation, due to its in-built urgency and criticality demanded more transformational rather than transactional behavior from them too. Research shows the following behavior of emergent as well as assigned leaders as listed in the following table:

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Table 3. Entrepreneurial Competencies in Disaster Cycle Phases
Characteristics

Initiative
Risk-taking
Anticipatory actions
Taking charge of situations
Resource mobilization
Out of the box thinking
Team work evidence
Trust created
Goal Orientation
Total
Source: De Silva & Jayasuriya (2005)

(%) Evidence in Emergent
Leaders
21
06
04
14
14
03
10
07
20
100

(%) Evidence in Assigned
Leaders
17
05
04
11
16
01
13
13
20
100

De Silva and Jayasuriya (ibid.) also present their findings among emergent and assigned leaders in the Southern Coast of Sri Lanka as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Emergent leaders go beyond their assigned responsibilities as they felt that they are accountable for community issues in an emergency situation.
Assigned leader behaviors were restricted, as they were cautious of the tsunami situation.
Assigned leaders are not available especially at relief stage as many of them reside away from tsunami affected area.
Emergent leaders are compelled by situational factors to take sudden initiative to manage situation. For example when Tsunami affected sought refuge in places such religious centers, leaders of such centers were compelled to take action.
Emergent leaders have greater information about the affected area and they could freely use such information for quick decision-making.
Emergent leaders are more dominant in their own community than assigned leaders.
Emergent leaders were more involved in providing relief to the affected during relief and recovery stages which required more urgent assistance. However assigned leaders involvement was more significant during the recovery and reconstruction stages.
The main concern of both types of leaders was to provide support to the affected as much as possible to bring back their lives to normal.
Emergent leaders used their personal network to obtain the essential relief items to the affected. Most emergent leaders exhibited very traditional behavior and did not usually think out of the box.
Assigned leaders were more conservative than emergent leaders and exercised their authority with limitations.
Both categories appeared as to be more hard workers than smart workers.
Most of assigned leaders were more trusted than emergent leaders since they had been in the area for longer periods.
Some assigned leaders have acted beyond their authority to help the victims.
Emergent leaders were less effective in providing long term resettlement program for the victims. Most victims were more dependent on financial benefits offered by the Government.
The situation required assigned leaders to act beyond normal procedures to provide immediate relief to victims.
Assigned leaders are governed by rules and regulations which they are less likely to deviate from, where as emergent leaders have no such limitations in handling disaster situations.
Emergent leaders often provide support to victims by taking risks whereas assigned leaders are more concerned about procedures.
During the disaster cycle both assigned and emergent leaders have exhibited participatory style of leadership.
All victims have worked in teams in order to emerge from this situation while supporting both types of leaders.
From the post-disaster phase onward both assigned and emergent leaders appear to have worked for a common goal although they have different profiles.
From the response stage, emergent leaders have organized food clothes etc; for victims and subsequently they have involved with other infrastructure facilities at the camp site.
Most of assigned leaders did not confine themselves to a one particular camp during the camp management stages whereas emerged leaders focused on only one particular camp.

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25.

Leaders emerged with situation and the situation forced them to take control of the camps due to their social values.

What is significant here is that in order to effectively recover from natural disasters such as the tsunami, entrepreneurs need to be emergent leaders who should establish dyadic bonds for effectively sharing power and dependence with assigned leaders due to their respective varying patterns effectiveness at different phases of the disaster cycle.
The following table shows evidence of some such interventions in quick entrepreneurial recovery, facilitated by the PIM:
Table 4. Patterns of Entrepreneurial Recovery Facilitated by the PIM
Revitalizing the Coir Industry

Locations: Kuliegoda, Ambalangoda & Samudratheera Viharaya, Kamburugamuwa, Matara
Budget: US $ 2,000 (Rs. 21Million)
Principle Donors: Export Development Board of Sri Lanka; Foreign Students of Wakayama
University and the WIN Concord
PIM Teams: PCK Abeykoon, J Fernando, K Ramesh, P Ranawaka & N.T.Senadheera,
K.D.U.S. Nanayakkara, S. Karunaratne, O.M.K. de Silva
Supervisors: Dr. Travis Perera & Mr. Sisira Athuraliyage

Manufacturing of fibre glass boats, and Traditional
Canoes

Location: Ethagama Sumanarama Temple workshop: Sri Swarnarama Temple, North
Payagala
Budget: US $ 23,000 (Rs. 23 Million)
Principle Donor: ADRA Foundation, Czech Republic
PIM Team: Ms. Geethamanie, Ms. C. Karunaratne, and Ms. I. P. Lokupitiya
Supervisor: Dr A. K. L. Jayawardana

Development of a Recycled
Paper Manufactory

Location: Papyrus Recycled Paper Products, Wellawatte, Hikkaduwa
Budget: US $ 1,000 (Rs. 1Million)
Principle Donor: Soroptimist International of Colombo
PIM Team: Ms. P. H. Andradi, Ms. J. S. K. Gunaratnam
Supervisor: Dr. Travis Perera

Handloom Weaving Project

Location: Sri Sudheeraramaya Welfare Centre Akurala, Kahawa
Budget: US $ 2,000 (Rs. 2 Million)
Principle Donor: Academy of Design, Sri Lanka
PIM Team: Ms S. L. Speldewinde
Supervisor: Dr A. K. L. Jayawardana

Source: www.pim.lk

Polycentric Networking with Donor Agencies
Benini (1998) points out to the effects that networked organizations have on disaster management, and how ‘networks without a strong center the initial response may be hampered, but how organizational learning for later phases may be promoted.’ In the event of a disaster networks evolve where individuals, local and global organizations, and the affected persons too bond themselves for singular as well as common purpose.
Networks have evolved in disaster management as well. Particularly in major humanitarian crises, the resources of any one large relief organization alone are not sufficient to mount an adequate response, and typically pluralities of responders assume the task together, often with far-reaching operational understandings in the field, while their headquarters continue to behave as competitors in the market for humanitarian funding. However, the language of these organizations is less hyped with network concepts than it is with business publication language, perhaps out of a sense of modesty that there is little in the way of good theory to explain the network behavior of humanitarians. (ibid.)
In the case of the 2004 Tsunami, Sri Lanka experienced a wide assortment of such individuals and organizations working in affected areas. The diversity of these organizations varying from local to global, Bureaucratic to grass-roots structures, conservative to radical, political to a-political, religious to secular was inimical to effective networking. As such efforts were sometimes diluted if not nullified.
Whenever these relationships were managed, synergy was seen as a result.

5

Benini (ibid.) quotes Rosenthal et.al (1991) who recommend polycentric rather than centralized networks to counteract ‘groupthink’ and promote ‘problem-solving potentialities.’ On effectiveness in crisis situations Benini also proposes two hypotheses as follows:
• "If, in a crisis, the degree of perceived time pressure is high and the precrisis system authority structure mechanistic, operational crisis management will be characterized by paralysis."
• "If, in a crisis, the degree of perceived time pressure is high and the precrisis system authority structure pragmatic, operational crisis management will be characterized by situational dominance."(ibid.) These considerations would have a significant effect of entrepreneurial businesses at re-startup. If polycentric rather than centralized networking is required, then one would have to have a paradigm shift in managing donor networks. This concept is shown in the following figure:
Fig 2. Centralized versus Polycentric Networking

Using this principle, the PIM as facilitator, approached networking with donors to fund development projects through polycentric networking, as shown as paradigm 2 rather than by centralized networking as in paradigm 1. This is could be explained through the four projects already described:
Table 5. Examples of Polycentric Networking with Donors by the PIM
Project
Manufacture of Fibre
Glass Boats

Donors
ADRA Foundation,
Czech Republic

Revitalizing the Coir
Industry

Export Development
Board of Sri Lanka;
Foreign Students of
Wakayama
University and the
WIN Concord,
National Chamber of
Commerce
Soroptimist
International of
Colombo

Development of a Recycled
Paper
Manufactory
Handloom
Weaving
Project

Academy of Design,
Sri Lanka

Networking Rationale
The PIM team identified trained boat repairers while working on camp management.
The initial efforts to seek provision for livelihood needs brought them in contact with
ADRA, where the idea to start-up a boat manufacture was incubated, leading to
ADRA extending their funding to further stages. Subsequent connections with
Governmental and regulatory bodies were made as the project grew.
PIM teams working on camp management projects in Ambalangoda and Matara identified women who are experts in coir twining. In an effort to supply them with machines for their livelihood, they discover the possibility of establishing a cooperative where coir twine twisting could be forward integrated into the weaving of geo-textile for export. Here the help of EDB was sought for funding the manufacture of 200 twining machines. The personal networks of the teams enabled further funding. The National Chamber of Commerce was connected up for working capital.
The affected industry was identified from a list given by the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka (FCCISL). The interest of the PIM team in the industry was a driving force. The donors are a women’s organization, The entrepreneur is a woman, the team consists of two women too. This also appears to be a synergistic driving force.
The single PIM member who managed the project identified the opportunity while managing a camp. Being an entrepreneur too, she became the main source of funding through her own business. The result is that the new business which provides employment for many women of the affected area, will be operated by her leading to exporting the products.

Benini’s hypotheses state that mechanistic structure of formal organizations when applied to crisis situations lead to paralysis. Also due to the presence of emergent leaders who use more pragmatic approaches, having more situational dominance leads one to conceptualize that synergy between the networks of formal organizations and emergent ones is preferable for continuous effectiveness during the disaster cycle. Some suggestions for this type of networking are suggested:

6

1.

2.

3.

4.

Information exchange through the internet could be used effectively where information is uploaded by the formal organization to be available for action by emergent organizations. An example of this is when the FCCISL uploded information of effected business and the CNO gave statistics of affected areas for quick response by NGO relief organizations. The PIM website was used very effectively to source funds from international donors too.
Emergent organizations could also take advantage of the critical situation and move in faster than bureaucracy thereby filling gaps of inactivity and inertia. The example of the
Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) which is a leftist political party, moving into camp management is notable.
Formal organizations could link with grass-root organizations and local leaders for rescue operations due to their familiarity with the local terrain and culture. They could also be used for collecting accurate figures regarding the situation. This could also be done through the local social networks where piligeneema (the irrefutable acceptance of a person’s or organization’s standing in society) can be used.
Through the interest of community leaders for the community as a whole, equitable distribution of resources by NGOs and other donors could be effected.

Power is the reciprocal of dependence, and mutual dependence on power is the prerequisite of effective dyadic exchange and eventual networking. When networking takes place, power is enhanced, and weaknesses are eliminated, resulting in synergy. Quick recovery through the disaster cycle is therefore essential for the entrepreneur to return to the market. The model shown below is a suggestion for providing the necessary bonding between formal and emergent organizations:

Fig 3. Model for Dyadic Exchange in Disaster Recovery

Benini (ibid.) indicates that in the event of organizations networking in disaster management, dynamics should be special in all dimensions: temporal, social as well as substantive. In detail:
a.

b.

c.

In the temporal dimension, partners in network should follow the disaster cycle ‘with highly variable speed and intensity. When the phase require(s) slow deliberate progress when the progress is much hampered by the multi-actor, multi-location decision arrangement,’…or during ‘…a time of much greater effectiveness…with intense, very focused activity on which all participants were able to align themselves.’
The social connections within the network between partners whether big or small in organization should be of equal strength in order to perform since capability rather than complexity is of importance here. The inability to maintain this relationship would lead to network assymetricity and eventual fragmentation of the network.
In the substantive dimension, while it is important to network in unison, it is also important to maintain each partner’s own separate and independent identity, and each partner’s healthy respect for each other’s style. Dilution of this identity would eventually lead to groupthink and absence of creative conflict needed for decision-making and action.

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Wedges of Re-entry for Counteracting Entrepreneurial Inertia
Natural disasters have an effect on the total functioning of the human being: physically, socially, mentally and spiritually. As organizations are socio-technical systems, damaging effects exceed beyond the physical damage to buildings and property. In the case of entrepreneurial business, according to Faircloth and Bronson (2001):
While it is clear that natural disasters have a significant impact on business functioning, the research literature has not generally focused on this problem (Dahlhamer 1992). The process of small business’s response is not well understood and this presents a particular problem since they are especially vulnerable to disruption (Nigg and Tierney 1990). What natural disaster recovery literature that does exist is typically concerned with physical recovery (Quarantelli 1989).
Organizational inertia is the result of a relative lag in organizational response to the rate of change in the environment. In the post-disaster phase, demand gradually rises for recovery and reconstruction.
This exerts a pressure for growth in the production subsystems of the social system. While the demand growth is survival driven, the production subsystem which consists of small and big business units, they too being a part of the affected, and having significantly reduced capacity in their core functions, need much momentum for counteracting this inertia.
Coupled to the incapacity of the core functions, the mental syntax of the entrepreneur is often significant. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PSTD) has the effect of negating entrepreneurial characteristics. Faircloth and Bronson (2001) quote Powell (1991):
These organizations are said to be disoriented by the disaster and might see change as impossible, thus leading to a continuation of proven past behaviors. These organizations will survive in the long run only if the existing behavior is favorable to the environmental change.
Compounding the lack of organizational change due to the disaster are the PTSD like symptoms of key owners or managers, who see adaptive change in a personally threatening capacity.
While it is known that the preferred environment of the entrepreneur is uncertainty and market chaos, the statement is more tenable if the entrepreneur is not a part of the disequilibria. In such a situation, venture business strategy would involve more sponsorship than normal in order to provide wedges of re-entry to the entrepreneur. Some of these possible wedges by Vesper (1980) are described as follows:
i.
ii. iii. iv.

Exploiting partial momentum: Geographic transfer (of facility); Supply shortage; unutilized resources Customer Sponsorship: Receipt of an advance contract; Acceptance as a second source to keep pressure on a dominant supplier
Parent Company Sponsorship: Joint Ventures or licensing; Sellout of a corporate division; relinquishment of a company’s market position
Governmental Sponsorship: Favored status through purchasing ‘set-asides’ available to small or young companies; opportune timing of changes in rules or regulations governing an industry. Some of PIM’s experience in facilitating wedges of re-entry is described in the following two cases:
Karuna Gamage’s Papyrus Paper Products
Papyrus Paper Products in Hikkaduwa is a family business owned by Karuna Gamage & her husband. It manufactures hand made paper using 100% natural fibres. They also produce letter heads, invitation cards, thank-you cards, greeting cards, wrapping paper, wall paper, paper holders, table lamp shades, paper bags, photograph frames and ornaments using hand made paper.
As a result of the disaster the factory was flooded with saltwater and the machinery has started corroding and require urgent repair. The PIM team facilitated recovery in four stages:
1. Getting the business back into production by repairing the machines and expanding the factory for drying and storing finished goods material and raw material.
2. Training youth in handicrafts in order to absorb them in the business, streamlining the production process and introducing a production scheduling system and accounting systems. Rationalization of the layout.
3. Securing stable markets for paper and paper products. Advertising and publicity for the company. Obtaining technical help in further improving the quality of the products.
4. Creation of a website, Organising the business so that it grows and provides employment opportunities to the youth in its neighbourhood.
Karuna Gamage (left) with PIM project managers Janani Gunaratnam (centre) and
Harshini Andradi (right)

The total cost of the Project is estimated at approximately Rs. 1,000,000. The owners would fund the working capital while Soroptimists International pledged to fund the project.

8

Chamli de Soyza’s Sanchi Jaadi (Picked Fish) Business
In the pre disaster stage, Chamli’s Jaadi business was thriving. He had saved enough money and had just completed some buildings for his business. When the first waves came, Chamli and his family were wise enough to pack all the property deeds and other valuables and leave the premises.
The Tsunami devastated the area in which Chamli lived which experienced waves of over 15 feet. •

A part of Sanchi Jaadi just after the Tsunami

When the PIM team moved in they added momentum to Chamli’s efforts by:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Chamli de Soyza (centre) with PIM project managers Chittaranjan de Silva (left) and Asela
Galapattige (right) during reconstruction

In the post-disaster stage, things started happening slowly. But Chamli did not wait until he got help to start his business again. He immediately repaired his roof, and made his house habitable. The competitive instinct in him told him that if he was to survive, he had to start the restaurant immediately. This was a side business in addition to his Jaadi business.

Organizing funding to reconstruct Chamli’s business through the leading NGO
Sarvodaya
Providing Jaadi Vats, cutting knives, scales to the businessi
Providing funds to rebuild the cutting area, storage and sales point
Facilitating starting production
Designing and building concrete pillars used in new facility as reinforcements
Creating an environment in which the fear of his children fades and his family is happy to be back at home
Encouraging customers to pledge their support
Watching Chamli’s ambitious grow, where he wants to rebuild business better than before tsunami
Encourage him to plan to improve the restaurant and employ more people

Conclusion
Phenomenological procedure and techniques that were used extensively during PIM’s disaster management interventions gave more scope to the discovery of the complex process of entrepreneurial recovery and growth during a post-disaster situation, particularly to observe the intricate patterns that account for it. While the disaster cycle presents varying characteristics requiring varying entrepreneurial response, and it is imperative that relief organizations network strategically by sharing and balancing power. The realities of entrepreneurial inertia should be energized by facilitation. From these methods it was possible to give reasonable insight into how entrepreneurs could effectively move out of disaster and grow again.

References
Benini, Aldo A.; Network Without Center?: A Case Study of an Organizational Network Responding to an Earthquake: September 1998; www.colorado.edu/hazards/wp/wp100/wp100.html De Silva K and Jayasuriya J; Emergent and Assigned Leaders in Sri Lanka’s Post-Disaster Recovery; Unpublished MBA Research;
Postgraduate Institute of Management; 2005.
Faircloth III, James B., Bronson James W.: A Preliminary Examination of Why Small Businesses Don’t Adapt Marketing Practices
Following a Natural Disaster: An Inertia Theory Explanation; SASBE/SBIDA 2001 National Conference Competitive Paper
Sessions; [e-mail]
GoI-UNDP Disaster Risk Management Programme, www.undp.org.in; Downloaded on Jan 17, 2005.
Hisrich, Robert D. and Michael P. Peters; A Entrepreneurship; McGraw Hill, Boston, Irwin, 1998.
Kotler, Philip, Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning, Implementation and Control, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 1997
McClelland. Identifying Competencies with Behavior Event Interviews, Psychological Science, Vol. 9, No.5, September 1998.American
Psychological Society.
Rosenthal, Uriel, Paut 't Hart, Alexander Kouzmin; 1991; The Bureau-Politics of Crisis Management; Public Administration 69
(Summer): 211-233. Quoted in Benini (1998)
Sagasti, Fransisco; A Conceptual and Taxonomic Framework for the Analysis of Adaptive Behaviour; General Systems, Volume XV,
1970, pp. 151 - 160.
Sandberg, William R.; New Venture Performance – The Role of Strategy and Industry Structure; 1986, D. Heath & Co., Toronto.
Shapero, Albert; Entrepreneurship and Economic Development; Project ISEED, Ltd, (Milwaukee, WI: Centre for Venture Management,
Summer 1975) pp. 178.
Schumpter, Joseph; Change and the Entrepreneur; in Essays of J.A. Schumpeter, ed. Richard V. Clemence, (Reading, MA: Addison
Wesley, 1951.) 255
Stevenson, Howard H., Michael J. Roberts, H. Irving Grousbeck and Amar V. Bhide, New Business Ventures and The
Entrepreneur,Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill. 1999
Tyebjee, Tyzoon T., Albert V. Bruno and Shelby H McIntyre (1983), A Growing Venture Can Anticipate Marketing Stages, Harvard
Business Review, Vol. 61, No. 1, p. 62-66.
Vesper, Karl H.; New Venture Strategies; Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1980, quoted in Sandberg (1986)
Website of the Postgraduate Institute of Management – www.pim.lk

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References: Sessions; [e-mail] GoI-UNDP Disaster Risk Management Programme, www.undp.org.in; Downloaded on Jan 17, 2005. Hisrich, Robert D. and Michael P. Peters; A Entrepreneurship; McGraw Hill, Boston, Irwin, 1998. Kotler, Philip, Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning, Implementation and Control, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 1997 McClelland Sagasti, Fransisco; A Conceptual and Taxonomic Framework for the Analysis of Adaptive Behaviour; General Systems, Volume XV, 1970, pp Shapero, Albert; Entrepreneurship and Economic Development; Project ISEED, Ltd, (Milwaukee, WI: Centre for Venture Management, Summer 1975) pp Schumpter, Joseph; Change and the Entrepreneur; in Essays of J.A. Schumpeter, ed. Richard V. Clemence, (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1951.) 255 Tyebjee, Tyzoon T., Albert V. Bruno and Shelby H McIntyre (1983), A Growing Venture Can Anticipate Marketing Stages, Harvard Business Review, Vol Vesper, Karl H.; New Venture Strategies; Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1980, quoted in Sandberg (1986) Website of the Postgraduate Institute of Management – www.pim.lk