Airpower During Ww2

Strategic decisions seek to create an advantageous position over one’s opponent through the employment of the instruments of national power, and during World War II (WWII) airpower introduced a new and powerful element into the equation. Generally, there are considered four instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, economic (DIME). These instruments are the tools utilized by decision makers for the projection of power in support of national interests or objectives. Airpower played a role in the employment of each of these instruments during WWII, and in-turn, greatly influenced the strategic decision-making of both the Allies and the Axis. An examination of this role of airpower in each of these areas will demonstrate
Put more simply, one must bring a carrot or a stick to the negotiating table. Airpower enabled the use of both of these mechanisms during WWII. In 1938, Adolf Hitler invaded and annexed sections of Czechoslovakia. As a result, Europe’s major powers (excluding the Soviet Union) held a conference in Munich, Germany, to discuss the annexation. Rather than condemn Germany for their actions, Britain and France chose to do nothing in hopes that this small appeasement would prevent war and further aggression by Germany. A key factor in this decision was the perceived strength of the new German Air Force, the Luftwaffe (Yenne, 65). Not only did Britain and France not want war, they certainly did not want war when they were at a disadvantage. Hitler had the stick. Airpower played a key role in enabling Germany to achieve their objectives
Military leaders could no longer conduct ANY military operation without consideration for this new dimension of warfare. True, airpower would affect decision-making in doctrine, technology, procurement, and countless other areas, but what ultimately changed at the strategic level of decision-making was that the character of war had changed. Whether it was an Air Force, Army, Marine, or Naval operation, airpower could not be ignored. The Allies recognized that in order for Operation Overlord to be effective, they must have air superiority over the beaches. As a result, the ground operation would be delayed time and time again. The Allies launched missions targeting the German railways and roads to prevent the ability of the Germans to reinforce ground forces, but more importantly the bombers targeted the Luftwaffe. On the last day of what was referred to as the “Big Week,” the Allies struck the Messerschmitt Factory, which was the largest producer of fighter aircraft (Yenne, 182). Shortly thereafter, the Allies achieved the air superiority necessary for the amphibious operation to be conducted. Airpower had become a new and instrumental variable in the decision-making process when it came to the employment of the military