Alasdair Macintyre After Virtue

In his book After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre presents arguments dealing with the conception of virtue and morality in a contemporary setting. MacIntyre’s presentation of a history of virtue and his analysis of modern moral argument offers insights into the modern structure of virtue. MacIntyre works through his arguments by discussing the virtues in a historical sense. He analyzes the virtues established by past philosophers and societies, as well as examines a modern idea of the virtues. MacIntyre contrasts an Aristotelian view with an individualistic philosophy of virtue. He concludes his book with a discussion of the philosophical perspective he thinks is best for preserving virtue.
MacIntyre’s After Virtue: MacIntyre begins his arguments
First, Aristotle’s metaphysical biology has become outdated, therefore MacIntyre brings up a question. If we reject that biology can we still believe his teleology? (162) MacIntyre also explains that much of Aristotle’s philosophy is based on the relationship of ethics to the structure of the polis. He wonders, “how can Aristotelianism be formulated to be a moral presence in a world without city states?” (163) Finally, he questions the concept that conflict is a vice that should be avoided. MacIntyre will take these main points into account when formulating his own concept of virtue.
MacIntyre concludes his history of virtue by exploring the Medieval conception of morality. He touches upon the relationship between pagan and Christian virtues and how medieval philosophers had to navigate those. New ideas are presented, such as distinction between sin and vice. This is due to the culture of the time and the Christian society. After analyzing these historical views of virtue MacIntyre presents his own definition of virtue which attempts to make connections between
He states that “the explicit and thoroughgoing rejection of Aristotelianism… made it impossible … to supply anything like a traditional account or justification of the virtues” (228). MacIntyre believes this shift has created a society without virtues. He makes the point that “the replacement of Aristotelian or Christian teleology … is not so much at all the replacement of one set of criteria by another but rather a movement towards and into a situation where there are no longer any clear criteria” (236). Thus, he makes his claim that society has no clear set of morals. Here MacIntyre turns to the concept of Justice. As a modern society, we agree that the purpose of virtue is to be obedient to the rules, “but our individualistic society is unable to secure an agreement on those rules” (244). He explains that we have too many disparate, rival moral concepts of justice and there is no way of settling them rationally (252). MacIntyre concludes that our lack of a universal set of virtues leads to difficulty in moral debate and obedience of rules. He states that “Aristotelian tradition can be restated in a way that restores intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and commitments” (259) as was outlined in his own account of virtue. His solution is to move away from this individualistic view, toward an Aristotelian philosophy of