In turn, Williams asserts that such a compromise of emotional engagements for maximum utility usurps one’s sense of self, consequently marring the distinction between one’s commitment and one’s identity: “(...) that criterion would eliminate any desire at all which was not blankly and in the most straightforward sense egoistic. Thus we should be reduced to frankly egoistic first-order projects, and- for all essential purposes- the one second-order utilitarian project of maximally satisfying first-order projects.”2Abandoning certain commitments for the sake of another project can be acceptable, but when forced to relinquish those which a person deeply values, Williams argues they are robbed of “a sense of one’s moral identity” or what he describes as one’s integrity.
Williams offers us two scenarios to further exemplify his theory: “Jim”, who is told by the edicts of utilitarianism to murder one innocent Amazon Indian in order to prevent twenty more being murdered, and “George”, a chemist who is (also by the parameters of
Utilitarianism) forced to take a job creating weapons of mass destruction, since the balance-sheet of utilities shows that if George refuses, a far younger, more