Arguments Against The Mind/Brain Identity Theory

Throughout this paper, I will be arguing in defence of the Mind/Body identity theory. I will begin by outlining the theory itself as well as defining keywords and concepts used in claims and arguments, before discussing the arguments made against the Mind/Body theory, their subsequent critiques and counter-arguments. I will then conclude my defence of the theory and briefly discuss what implications it has on our society.
To briefly define the theory in question: the Mind/Brain identity theory, or thesis, is a form of ‘reductive materialism’ or ‘physicalism’, the bases of which state that everything in the world is made up of matter in motion and can, therefore, eventually be explained by scientific laws. The aim of the Mind/Brain theory looks
The Mind/Brain identity theory relies on the reduction of mental states to physical states, meaning that they are one and the same. If two things, like the mind and brain, are actually indiscernible, then they should follow Leibniz’s Law. This law simply states that ‘x’ can only be identical to ‘y’, and vice versa, if they share the same properties. In the case of the Mind/Brain theory, Leibniz’s law would imply that the mind and brain have identical properties. It is the idea of spatial locations which proponents of the Mind/Brain identity theory say apply to the brain but not the mind and therefore, by the standards of Leibniz’s law, cannot be the same entity. It is known that the brain is made up of multiple sections which are active when different neurons ‘fire’ and make connections with other neurons. In this way, we can talk about how neurons are to the ‘left, right, above or below’ each other, they are spatially related to one another. We can also say the same about states of the brain, for example, the activities of the “frontal cortices occur a few inches closer to your forehead than brain states of the visual cortex” which is 30cm away from my shoulder (Lacewing, 2015). Although we can, therefore, say that behavioural development, in the frontal cortices, occurs a few inches away from visual experiences we cannot say the same about feelings in the mind. For example, we cannot say that my thoughts about how I
Simply, nothing (we know of) without a brain can have any mental capacity. From scientific research, we know that if something does not have any neural tissue then it cannot have any mental states. However, when Chalmers proposes that the mind’s consciousness is something “above and beyond” the physical brain and not stemming from any neural tissue, it could mean that anything could have consciousness. By Chalmers’ standards, even though a rock doesn’t have any neural tissue, because the mind’s consciousness does not rely on such brain activity, that rock has as much ability to be conscious as humans do. Putting Chalmers’ theory into context makes it seem highly implausible in relation to everything we know about biology. Although we don’t yet know everything about biology, it seems a much larger leap to assume that entities without brains can have a mental state than it does to say that the activity of the brain is somehow our mind. All scientific evidence we have suggest that only ‘things’ with neural tissue can have a mind, and although we do not know how activity of the brain brings the mind into existence, it seems like a plausible goal for science to eventually