Arguments Against Utilitarianism
Perhaps rationally, many are skeptical that voting is a worthwhile practice. This is why, especially in the months leading up to an election, we are encouraged to vote by signs and posters, social media campaigns, our peers, and our government. Some maintain that voting is a ‘civic duty’ and a meaningful exercise in self-expression. Others contend that we should vote in pursuit of a democratic ideal, and still others argue that we should vote out of respect for those who have defended our rights.
As a consequentialist theory, utilitarianism is utterly unconcerned with these principle-oriented arguments. Utilitarians are concerned only with maximizing total social utility, or the overall well-being of society. Thus, utilitarians would assert …show more content…
For one thing, “in any election with a large number of voters, the chance that [one’s] vote will make a difference to the outcome is small. On most electoral occasions it will be infinitesimal” (PPE 472). In the extremely unlikely case that one’s vote does play a decisive role in an election, it remains uncertain whether one’s politician of choice will keep his promises. Especially in American politics, voters can almost expect our elected officials to abandon their campaign promises: “Read my lips; no new taxes!” (PPE 476). Finally, after a voter has improbably influenced the outcome of an election, and after his elected official has steadfastly carried out his platform, it still remains to be seen whether the final outcome resulted in increased overall utility. Public policy is complex, final outcomes are often uncertain, and “voters are often unable to accurately assess the relevant alternatives” to maximize utility (PPE …show more content…
While these policies may not translate into maximized social utility, it seems likely that this may result in a close approximation.
Using our free market analogy, this outcome can be explained by Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’. Smith writes that, with a large enough market (in this case the electorate), the most efficient way to allocate resources (in this case government policies and elected offices) is through each individual voter acting in his own self-interest.
In fact, this self-interested, free market approach may result in even better outcomes than even utilitarian altruism. Smith argues that “by pursuing [one’s] own interest, [one] frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it” (PPE 164-172). In other words: in the framework of our analogy, the self-interested voter frequently produces better political outcomes than voters with social welfare in
As a consequentialist theory, utilitarianism is utterly unconcerned with these principle-oriented arguments. Utilitarians are concerned only with maximizing total social utility, or the overall well-being of society. Thus, utilitarians would assert …show more content…
For one thing, “in any election with a large number of voters, the chance that [one’s] vote will make a difference to the outcome is small. On most electoral occasions it will be infinitesimal” (PPE 472). In the extremely unlikely case that one’s vote does play a decisive role in an election, it remains uncertain whether one’s politician of choice will keep his promises. Especially in American politics, voters can almost expect our elected officials to abandon their campaign promises: “Read my lips; no new taxes!” (PPE 476). Finally, after a voter has improbably influenced the outcome of an election, and after his elected official has steadfastly carried out his platform, it still remains to be seen whether the final outcome resulted in increased overall utility. Public policy is complex, final outcomes are often uncertain, and “voters are often unable to accurately assess the relevant alternatives” to maximize utility (PPE …show more content…
While these policies may not translate into maximized social utility, it seems likely that this may result in a close approximation.
Using our free market analogy, this outcome can be explained by Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’. Smith writes that, with a large enough market (in this case the electorate), the most efficient way to allocate resources (in this case government policies and elected offices) is through each individual voter acting in his own self-interest.
In fact, this self-interested, free market approach may result in even better outcomes than even utilitarian altruism. Smith argues that “by pursuing [one’s] own interest, [one] frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it” (PPE 164-172). In other words: in the framework of our analogy, the self-interested voter frequently produces better political outcomes than voters with social welfare in