Aristotle's Hylomorphism On The Relation Of Soul-Body

First of all, I try to put the some problems of Aristotle’s account of hylomorphism on the relation of soul-body. Then as a solution for the problem of hylomorphism, I examine functionalism; however, when we apply functionalism in living things, then we have to face with inconsistencies of Aristotle on substantial changes and the problem homonoymy. In this part, I compare functionalist approach with Burnyeat argumentation. However, against the problem and contradictions which are result of the functionalism, I will propose emergentism of mental causation which is proposed by Victor Caston. I support the emergentism, because it helps us to solve the problem of substantial change and the homonoymy problem. What is the relation of the soul to
the body? We can examine the relation between them by looking at Aristotle’s hylomorphism. It is a theory which is advanced by Aristotle perceives beings as a compound of matter and form.
The parts and material that constitute being is called as matter, so matter is body, whereas the power which organizes and combines all these parts and materials is called as form, so form is soul. There is a contradiction in Aristotle’s hylomorphism account. For example, there is a bronze, and this bronze is shaped to become the statue of Hermes, so a statue of Hermes starts to exist. Then, the same bronze is melted and sculpture reshapes this bronze to make the statue of Zeus. When Hermes loses its shape, Zeus acquires its own shape. Its shows that bronze itself has no any essential shape, so it is not essentially Hermes or Zeus. It shows that matter is contingently enformed by the form. However, it becomes problematic when we apply hylomorphic account into the soul and body relation. I can say that human body is enformed by the soul. Unlike bronze, human body cannot lose is form or its soul and remains in existence unless body die. According to this, a body which lost its soul means a death body. It becomes a body of a statue without any soul. It looks like a body, but this body is not a body which is potentially alive. However, the difference between the bronze and body, when body changes because of growing, it
cannot lose its form, but when bronze changes because of melting, it loses forms. In the bronze example, I can say that the process of development or generation is underlain by the matter, and matter is “contingently” enformed by the form, whereas no human body is contingently ensouled, but human body is essentially ensouled. The problem which is advanced by Ackrill is that hylomorphic account of change needs matter which is contingently enformed. For instance, before bronze is gaining the shape of a statue, bronze was still bronze which is constructed by the tin and copper. After the statue of Hermes is lost, bronze is still bronze. We can mention about the existence of independent matter in this example. However, we cannot mention about the existence of a body before body is ensouled. If human bodies does not count as bodies unless they are ensouled, and if these bodies are the souls of bodies, then human bodies are not applicable to a hylomorphic treatment. I agree with Ackrill, because according to hylomorphism, matter is contingently enformed,so bodies should also be contingently enformed, but the problem is that bodies are “homonymously”bodies when they have lost their soul, so bodies are not contingently but necessarily alive. For these reasons, the distinction between the matter and form is not applicable for the living things, but it is proper for natural substances. We see that hylomoprhic account cannot be adequate to examine body-soul relation, so there is functionalist interpretation of Aristotle. Functionalism measures the relation between physical implementation and behavioral output, so it is different from Cartesian dualism which claims independent mental life from physical substances. Functionalism mediates between sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. For example, if a dead body cannot count as body except homonymously, then all things should be defined by their function. According to this, to be a member of some kind X, all X things must manifest the characteristic function of the kind of X. For instance, something is a telephone, if and only if it can be used to do things telephones do, so a thing which cannot take a photo, or which cannot provide communication with someone cannot be a telephone. This is why, anything which is not able to manifest functions of life such as eating, perceiving, thinking cannot be a human body, except homonymously which means extrinsic similarities. With the help of functionalism, we can show that why a soulless body is not different from a statue unlike hylomorphic account. Sometimes, I agree with Hilary Putnam’s emphasis on functionalist interpretation of Aristotle, because Aristotle applies functionalist view explicitly to living things. He employs functional analysis to find the individual features of different kinds of souls. For instance, Aristotle constructs hierarchy within the soul. Each level of the soul has own individual function. According to this, one level has the capacity to digest, another has the capacity to perceive, and another one has the capacity to understand. However, every living being changes within time. What about matter during the changes of living being? Matter also has to be constrained only by its function However, even though functionalism necessitates the relation correlation between soul and material account, still the important things is not what a thing is, rather what a thing can do. For instance, human also can be constituted from other than flesh and bones, but even though human are constituted from other than flesh and bones, the important thing will be the soul which other than flesh and bones possesses. Aristotle gives primacy to form, so to identify the living thing, we should look at the type of activities which are implemented in specific materials. Consequently, I can say that functionalism presupposes and necessitates