Leone, Tom-James
June 11, 2013
Abstract
Having well-developed protocols on issues of security, as well as utilizing such well-developed protocols as part of a strategy in attending to security issues, and periodically reviewing such utilized security protocols as time passes-by in order to increase efficiency is the most enduring way to keep enriching the practices of , and in strengthening US homeland security. Due to lack of a single security protocol that could be utilized effectively in attending to all issues pertaining to security, the US government has continued to developing new security protocols, and equally deploys Existing Security Instruments (ESI) such as the …show more content…
Incident Command Systems (ICS), and the National Contingency Plan (NCP) utilized in Forest-Fires, to new disaster events such as Oil-spills without modification. Such continuing practices of replication without modification of ESI in regards to the typology or specificity of a disaster, the terrain (Land or Sea) where the disaster has occurred, is challenging to the emergency management process of managing Oil-spills, and should be reviewed.
Introduction Having well-developed protocols, and utilizing well-developed protocols as part of a strategy in attending to security issues in US homeland security while reviewing same periodically in order to increase efficiency is the most enduring way to keep enriching the practices, and strengthening US homeland security. And since there might not be in existence, a single security protocol that could be universally utilized effectively in attending to all issues pertaining to security, governments everywhere including the US, must continually look beyond current established threat perimeters for novel dangers, and learn to respond rapidly and effectively (Badey, 2008, p, 179-180). Indeed, looking beyond current threat perimeters in the processes of emergency management in the US will continue to require increased cooperation with the private sector, and from individuals who incidentally are the Stakeholders in every disaster or crisis event. Apart from eliciting the corporation of the private-sector and stakeholders, the US government unlike Nigeria has come to rely, and will keep relying on the continued practice of utilizing codified Laws and Statutes passed by the Legislature, which gives statutory authority to the emergency management tools utilized in disaster response and management. What is very troubling is that the US in copy-cat, replicates Existing Security Instruments (ESI) such as the Incident Command Systems (ICS) developed and utilized in Forest-Fires (Land) in conjunction with the National Contingency Plan (NCP) codified specifically for Oil-spills (Littoral) in attending to Oil-spill events without modification. Such practices are problematic and challenging to US homeland security and personnel and to the practices of emergency management.
Research Question and Problem Statement The research question is: Is the structure and codification of ESI the reason for failure of ESI in Oil spill disaster management, and can future copy-cat replication and deployment of ESI`s without modification, keep affecting Oil spill disaster response and management in the US? The proffered research question correlates the Problem Statements which are that: Copy-cat replication and deployment of ESI within the US enterprise system is problematic and challenging to the practices of emergency management, to US homeland security and personnel because the NCP codified resource compensatory structure forces the US government to relinquish governmental control of Oil spill response and management, and ceding such control regarding Oil spill response and management to the responsible party. In doing so, the NCP negates FEMA`s standard procedure of managing disasters which firmly lies with States in the US. Copy-cat replication and deployment of ESI within the US enterprise system is also problematic and challenging to the practices of emergency management because US homeland security professionals and other emergency management practitioners presently, utilizes, and will continue to keep utilizing such ESI` in attending to disasters without modification. On the other hand, the failures that would keep arising from the practices of Copy-cat replication and deployment without modification will keep reflecting on US homeland security practitioners and other emergency management officer’s professional security ethics and standards. At the end, communities impacted by disasters which such ESI would have been expended, would in-turn continue to be at the negative receiving end.
Methodology of Research The methodological approach utilized is the Mixed method research design. The primary reason for choosing Mixed method research methodology is to remain pragmatic while analyzing the various consequential issues and processes utilized by the US government during the Exxon-Valdez and in the Deep Water Horizon Oil spill events which are the primary sources of information for this research. Equally and most importantly too, Mixed method research design allows presents a better chance to be thematic in considering the multiple viewpoints, perspectives, positions, and standpoints (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007) (Pragmatism) of various contributors pertaining to the issues of Oil spill response and management in the US. What equally gave huge impetus to the choice of utilizing a Mixed method research design is that utilizing either quantitative or qualitative research design will not be enough in addressing the research questions and the challenges of the US continuing replication and deployment of Existing Security Instruments (ESI) within the US Enterprise and Stakeholder concept, and most especially in Oil spill events without modification.
Literature Reviews A historical overview of an ESI such as ICS according to proponents such as Epperson (2011) includes that the continued utilization of Incident Command Systems (ICS) in Oil spill disaster events by the US government is because of necessity. As a concept, ICS was developed and utilized in combating and suppressing wildfires in the State of California in the early 1970`s. Due to the various successes achieved when ICS was widely utilized in other wild-fires emergencies in various States in the US, qualified ICS to become an emergency management model, a designation which paved the way for ICS to be mandated by federal law, and quickly became the emergency management structure by which the US Coast Guard, the Oil industry, and other government agencies utilized in responding to Oil spills. Apart from becoming a federal Law, Buck, Trainor, & Aguirre (2006) informs that the constituents of ICS was another factor which made ICS more favorable to be adopted. This was because theoretically, the structure of ICS presented excellent opportunities to coordinating the activities of various disaster response agencies at the site of a disaster. Such theoretical constructs indeed, underpinned the importance and rationale behind the application of ICS as an emergency management tool in nine different disasters in which the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other task-forces were involved. By implication, an ESI such as ICS in practical utility had been scalable and potent. Lending voice to the necessity of incorporating ICS as a disaster management tool utilized within the US Enterprise and Stakeholder concept, a proponent of ICS such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (2013) posits that ICS could be useful in providing an organizational structure for incident management, while guiding the process for planning, building and adapting to structure.
In summary FEMA avers that using ICS for every incident in emergency management would help the user, whether US Homeland security personnel, or a corporate body to develop and maintain skills which could be utilized in larger-scale incidents. Regarding the National Contingency Plan (NCP) which remains the blue-print and the principal management tool that is currently utilized in Oil spill disaster response and management, Jackson (2011) informs that the importance of NCP is that NCP provides the US federal government with a framework for notifying and communicating citizens with information regarding Oil spill disasters, and the modalities to be utilized when Oil spills …show more content…
occur. In summary, Jackson (2011) also contends that the NCP outlines the tentative steps in managing such disasters and equally the propitiations and responsibilities of the responsible party regarding Oil spill response and management. Such tentative steps include: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the United States Coast Guard (USCG) providing Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSC) in the event of an occurrence. There is convergence in opinion between The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2012), and Jackson (2011) regarding utilization of NCP by the US Department of Homeland security (DHS) as a homeland security measure: That the NCP in detail codifies and describes how the US government should respond to Oil spills and other hazardous substance releases in the environment. However both position papers did not any way address the thorny issues of actual management by the responsible party, Crisis communicators or the roles of the communication media. In times of attending to disasters, Vendrell (2001) is of the view that one of the functions of NCP is to effectively communicate and manage resources in times of a crisis. Such communicating and managing are done across the board by all individuals responding to hazardous materials incidents through the utilization of linguistic terminologies that are both descriptive, decisive, and yet not difficult to understand. However, not every writer or published work agrees that ESI should as presently constituted, be widely replicated in every disaster event for reasons ranging from specificity, topography, Stakeholders, and the concerns of Stakeholders. The arguments against ESI includes that though an ESI such as ICS when deployed in several Forest-fires in the US had demonstrated efficacy, portability and robustness, that the results of efficacy, portability and robustness were obtained simply because of the terrain (Land) , and most importantly because such deployment and replication were done under the management of jurisdictional authorities of the States and municipalities that were ravaged by such wild-fires, and never under the management of a corporate body. Most importantly, such management of ESI by jurisdictional authorities followed the stipulations of the US constitution that wrested managerial responsibilities from the Federal government and ceded same to the States, but with a caveat for the Federal government to intervene only when the capabilities of the states and municipalities have become overwhelmed. From the prism of the Enterprise concept of US homeland security, Lister (2013) averred that devolving Oil spill management to the responsible party through contingency planning made good business sense, if such decision was made solely for the purpose to help mitigate potential financial damages to a corporate body. But that what would be better is having a contingency plan in principle that will afford the US government the immediacy, including the necessary emergency management tools in attending and solving Oil spill disaster problems. That such contingent plan should at the same time, be meeting the needs and perceptions of Stakeholders, and equally dealing with issues pertaining to the environment, ecology and fauna.
Homeland Security Integrative Project Research Findings Research finding includes that in applicability, ESI when replicated and deployed in both the Exxon-Valdez, and in the Deep Water Horizon Oil spill events (DWHO), all Oil spill disaster events, other than forest-fires, that ESI were not primarily managed by the impacted States such as Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia and Florida. Rather in the case of the DWHO, ESI were under the control and management per se of the responsible party British Petroleum (BP) as codified in the NCP by the US Legislature. A review of the National Assessment Report (2012) showed that the application of non-modified ESI during the DWHO spill event stretched thin, the organizational elements, and response capabilities of responders such as the US Coast Guard, Firefighters, and BP well beyond limits of what was previously envisioned in utilizing such ESI. The reason for this was that the expected levels of coordination regarding information management, and sharing involved when such protocols were to be utilized, and which should be the very essence of operating under a unified command were not met. Even prior to utilizing ESI in disasters other than Forest-fires, institutionalizing ESI across agencies and across response systems might be challenging, because, success of a disaster response and management operations when an ESI such as ICS is utilized usually depends on the ability to mobilize and effectively use multiple outside resources. The multiple resources in this case would also come from an organizational framework that is understood by everyone, a framework that has a common plan, and most importantly specified through a process of incident action planning. This then means that extensive training must be given to personnel before the occurrence of such disaster, if synergy has to be achieved. What might make copy-cat replication of ESI utilized in Forest-Fires un-suitable to be deployed without modification in an Oil spill event might be the terrain, sheer size and complexity of Oil spill disasters.
Forest-Fires and Oil spills are two different disaster events that have different trajectories, and require the deployment and utilization of specialized tools and equipment. Mostly, the tools utilized in attending to Forest-fires by personnel would be different from the tools that would be deployed in Oil spills, and new tools when provided to the same personnel without adequate training, in utility do create additional challenges. Where and when this process is negated, matching skill-sets are done inefficiently. Some of these includes: Deploying disaster trained personnel such as the US Coast Guard in supporting administrative positions, and in resource or planning sections. A reference case in point includes during the DWHO where the U.S Coast Guards members were inefficient due to lacking appropriate training regarding Oil-spill response and activities. Rather, U.S Coast Guards member’s services had been traditionally utilized in attending to mass rescue operations, natural disasters and national security
events.
Conclusion The resource compensatory structure of ESI such as NCP and codification of ICS by the US Legislature were significant factors that contributed to the failures witnessed when such ESI were expended in the Exxon-Valdez and the DWHO Oil spill events. Therefore future copy-cat replication and deployment of ESI`s in any Spill of National Significance (SONS) without due modification, would keep affecting Oil spill disaster response and management in the US. To guide against such occurrences: The structure and codification of ESI such as ICS and NCP ought to be immediately reviewed by the US legislature. The non-synergy in inter-operability and physical application of the ESI by the various organizations involved in a disaster management process, and never the efficacy of the existing systems, are also the pivotal issues that would need to be worked on immediately. There is also need for a multi-purpose extensive training of every personnel that would be deployed within the ICS, since success of utilizing ESI in any disaster event depends on obtaining synergy. When merging, deploying and applying ESI in any disaster, especially in spills including SONS, the terrain, typology, constituent of the disaster, and the primary managers of the disaster has to factored-in.
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