Asymmetric conflict, Israel, Palestine (Hamas), etc.
@minr_boy
Dr. Robert Packer
PL SC 437
December 17, 2012
Third Assignment
“Asymmetric conflict” between two opposing parties often involves the weaker combatant resorting to strategy - albeit generally unconventional - that compensates for its inadequacies in size or strength (Arreguín-Toft 2001). Recently, the phrase has come to define violent conflict between a conventional, highly capable military and an unconventional, illequipped, but resilient opposition (Tomes 2004). The recent conflict between Israel and Hamas in November of 2012 represents a classic example of asymmetric conflict (Pillar 2012) per both definitions. A number of decisive explanations exemplify asymmetric conflict (Arreguín-Toft 2001), such as the willingness of the weaker party to suffer greater costs, external support for the weaker party, and hesitation to amplify violence on behalf of the side with higher capabilities, among others. For multiple reasons, this explains why Hamas engages in sporadic rocket launches and attacks against Israeli soldiers at the Israeli-Gaza border (Pillar 2012), which are designed to wear down the resolve of the Israelis in a war of attrition.
Since 1950, weak actors have won a majority of all asymmetric conflicts (Arreguín-Toft
2001; 106). Due to Israel’s unequivocal military advantages in both technology and armament,
Hamas recognizes the necessity in avoiding a full-on conventional war. Thus, it realizes the need to employ unconventional strategy if it wishes to wear down the resolve of Israel and have a chance at success towards their end goal: the complete elimination of Israel and the creation of a new, Muslim, Palestinian state. Hamas’ constitution and practices glorify martyrdom (Marcus et al.), through which it provokes Israel to attack and garners internal support for future conflict.
Through its willingness to suffer the death of its own civilians and leadership, it has successfully provoked Israel to enter its territory
Dr. Robert Packer
PL SC 437
December 17, 2012
Third Assignment
“Asymmetric conflict” between two opposing parties often involves the weaker combatant resorting to strategy - albeit generally unconventional - that compensates for its inadequacies in size or strength (Arreguín-Toft 2001). Recently, the phrase has come to define violent conflict between a conventional, highly capable military and an unconventional, illequipped, but resilient opposition (Tomes 2004). The recent conflict between Israel and Hamas in November of 2012 represents a classic example of asymmetric conflict (Pillar 2012) per both definitions. A number of decisive explanations exemplify asymmetric conflict (Arreguín-Toft 2001), such as the willingness of the weaker party to suffer greater costs, external support for the weaker party, and hesitation to amplify violence on behalf of the side with higher capabilities, among others. For multiple reasons, this explains why Hamas engages in sporadic rocket launches and attacks against Israeli soldiers at the Israeli-Gaza border (Pillar 2012), which are designed to wear down the resolve of the Israelis in a war of attrition.
Since 1950, weak actors have won a majority of all asymmetric conflicts (Arreguín-Toft
2001; 106). Due to Israel’s unequivocal military advantages in both technology and armament,
Hamas recognizes the necessity in avoiding a full-on conventional war. Thus, it realizes the need to employ unconventional strategy if it wishes to wear down the resolve of Israel and have a chance at success towards their end goal: the complete elimination of Israel and the creation of a new, Muslim, Palestinian state. Hamas’ constitution and practices glorify martyrdom (Marcus et al.), through which it provokes Israel to attack and garners internal support for future conflict.
Through its willingness to suffer the death of its own civilians and leadership, it has successfully provoked Israel to enter its territory
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