Brink's Arguments Against Utilitarianism

Brink offers a reply in two parts to Williams’ claim that Utilitarianism fails to give the appropriate moral weight to an agent’s personal point of view. First, Brink (1986: 431) denies that Utilitarianism fails to account for the individual preferences of the agent. He asserts that the Utilitarian recognises autonomy as a valuable component to be considered in Utilitarian calculus. That being so, he acknowledges that the principle of impartiality requires that any value to be attributed to an agent’s preference to determine their own projects must be given the same weight as the preferences of anyone else affected by the potential consequences of the agent’s action (Brink 1986: 431) . Brink (1986: 434) also argues that it is incoherent to attack Utilitarianism on the basis that it may sometimes require a sacrifice of an agent’s commitments, as this is not a problem peculiar to Utilitarianism but to morality in general. He suggests that this criticism of
the very basis of the agent’s autonomy. Without the freedom to pursue one’s own commitments, an agent has little chance of realising the goals that they have chosen as their life’s work. The demand on the individual to treat internal motivating factors impersonally, which are by definition personal, fails to promote the very vessel by which happiness is realised - that being the projects we pursue and the relevant principles we uphold, which constitute the fundamental motivations which inspire one to live. In my opinion, Brink fails to successfully reject Williams’ claims, as he provides no compelling answer as to how Utilitarianism can, without compromising the principle of impartiality, give appropriate weight to an agent’s