Bruers And Brackman's Paper
In Bruers and Brackman’s work, A Review and Systemization of the Trolley Problem, they offer many other variants to the fat man being “But this time a heavy stone is located behind the man on the side track. The man on the side track is not heavy enough to stop the trolley. The stone will block the trolley if you turn the switch. But the man in front of the stone will die.” (Bruers and Brackman 254) By implementing the stone into the situation the survey actually showed that the percentage of people switching the trolley increased up to 75% from the 50% taken from the standard Loop case. Later in the article, however, they speculate that this increase is because of the stone being seen as a means of stopping the trolley rather than the man. Bruers and
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Brackman’s variants are all examples showing possible ways for these cases to occur in the real world.
Bruers and Brackman are frequently referenced in the paper as supporters of the loop case being an issue for DDE. Their views are slightly different from other philosophers on why the loop case causes issues. Instead of stemming from complexity issues in the Loop case their concerns come from DDE unclear answer to if the fat man’s death on the alternate track is intention or merely foreseen. This leads to their recurrent theme of moral theories in Kaufman’s paper of moral theories acting like moral algorithms. Bruer and Brackman “prefer a moral rule that works like a kind of algorithm; that is, a clear procedure applicable to all dilemmas, which provides an unambiguous answer as to whether action is allowed or not, and without reference fuzzy or amibiguous concepts.” (Kaufman 31) Kaufman describes this view of moral theories as unrealistic. In Bruers and Brackman’s work, A Review and Systemization of the Trolley Problem they present their views of the Trolley cases as “In other words, the best solution to the trolley problem is a clear algorithm to decide whether one should act or not, and the answers that this algorithm generates should be in line with intuitions.” (Bruers and Brackman 252) To expect a theory to uphold such a standard like an algorithm however is just unrealistic at this point and time. It can be reasonably accepted that if such a theory was known of that did accomplish this strict math and science like standard it would not be a theory anymore but fact. Not only that, it would make all other theories obsolete since it works in every situation it is applied to. There would be no further reason to test or question other moral theories, because an “algorithm” for right and wrong has been discovered. Kaufman agrees that Bruers and Brackman’s expectations of theories being able to always give determinate results even in borderline cases as impracticable. Kaufman uses the example of baldness as a borderline case to show that one cannot tell exactly when one’s hairline can be considered bald and that moral theories should not be subjected to this type of standard.
By analyzing Bruers and Brackman’s paper, it is nearly clearly stated why one should expect a theory to accomplish this. It is only inferred that a theory should work in this way for applicability and determinacy. This would be a great virtue of a moral theory but for a current theory to obtain this virtue is unlikely based on clear differences in moral intuitions shown throughout the trolley cases. Both Kaufman and Bruers and Brackman’s works reference causal chains with the trolley variants. On analyzing Kaufman’s section of causal chains, Kaufman appears disorganized and slightly confused in his approach to explaining it. Even when referencing a moral professor Kaufman’s points were hard to decipher from his passage. Bruers and Brackman’s explanation is much more clear in explanation and use effective examples to illustrate. However, there are multiple situations in their works where confusion arises just like Kaufman’s. They say at one point in their use of causal chains, “It might be the case that the trolley is too fast and is able to kill all six people, because all six
people are placed in the trajectory of the trolley. In other words, it is not clear that the five people are absolutely saved already at the moment when one pushes the fat man.” (Bruers and Brackman 260) No further explanation is given in their work, but it appears that they are talking about changing one of the core elements that are essential to the trolley cases. It is explained earlier that hypothetical cases are used to filter out “noise” and focus on specific variables. By knowing that pushing the fat man is ultimately saving the 5 people this accomplishes that “noise” and always the subject to focus primarily on if they should push the man. Without these strict rules to the trolley cases one can easily start implementing more hypotheticals, for example being able to run fast enough to untie everyone and save all 6 lives thus making a decision pointless.
This paper has attempted to further explain some of Kaufman’s points shown in his work. One, being how DDE is related to the Loop case through the intentional or foreseen effect of flipping the switch , a morally impartial act, and how the fat man being necessary can alter the criteria of DDE in question. Second, Kaufman’s solution of the Loop Case being too complex was effectively solved. The exact length of the added track was never specified and no scale was used so any logical amount could be assumed. The precise weight needed of the fat man and the combined 5 individuals in the cause was explained through the use of weighted vests and other heavy immovable objects like Bruers and Brackmans boulder. The issue of the subject knowing every circumstance was deemed to be necessary for the hypothetical case to be valid. Without this knowledge the case has too many variables present in order to collect useable results. Third, Bruers and Brackmans work, A Review and Systematization of the Trolley Problem, was analyzed in hopes of clarification of algorithmic moral theories that were referenced multiple times in Kaufman’s paper. Borderline cases logically counter the possibility of such theories from existing at this point in time. Finally, another go at understanding casual chains was attempted but was only somewhat achieved until the necessary conditions of the case were changed. Overall much of this paper supports Kaufman’s conclusion that the Loop case does not efficiently counter DDE, the only exception being complexity is not a valid defense used Kaufman’s work.
Brackman’s variants are all examples showing possible ways for these cases to occur in the real world.
Bruers and Brackman are frequently referenced in the paper as supporters of the loop case being an issue for DDE. Their views are slightly different from other philosophers on why the loop case causes issues. Instead of stemming from complexity issues in the Loop case their concerns come from DDE unclear answer to if the fat man’s death on the alternate track is intention or merely foreseen. This leads to their recurrent theme of moral theories in Kaufman’s paper of moral theories acting like moral algorithms. Bruer and Brackman “prefer a moral rule that works like a kind of algorithm; that is, a clear procedure applicable to all dilemmas, which provides an unambiguous answer as to whether action is allowed or not, and without reference fuzzy or amibiguous concepts.” (Kaufman 31) Kaufman describes this view of moral theories as unrealistic. In Bruers and Brackman’s work, A Review and Systemization of the Trolley Problem they present their views of the Trolley cases as “In other words, the best solution to the trolley problem is a clear algorithm to decide whether one should act or not, and the answers that this algorithm generates should be in line with intuitions.” (Bruers and Brackman 252) To expect a theory to uphold such a standard like an algorithm however is just unrealistic at this point and time. It can be reasonably accepted that if such a theory was known of that did accomplish this strict math and science like standard it would not be a theory anymore but fact. Not only that, it would make all other theories obsolete since it works in every situation it is applied to. There would be no further reason to test or question other moral theories, because an “algorithm” for right and wrong has been discovered. Kaufman agrees that Bruers and Brackman’s expectations of theories being able to always give determinate results even in borderline cases as impracticable. Kaufman uses the example of baldness as a borderline case to show that one cannot tell exactly when one’s hairline can be considered bald and that moral theories should not be subjected to this type of standard.
By analyzing Bruers and Brackman’s paper, it is nearly clearly stated why one should expect a theory to accomplish this. It is only inferred that a theory should work in this way for applicability and determinacy. This would be a great virtue of a moral theory but for a current theory to obtain this virtue is unlikely based on clear differences in moral intuitions shown throughout the trolley cases. Both Kaufman and Bruers and Brackman’s works reference causal chains with the trolley variants. On analyzing Kaufman’s section of causal chains, Kaufman appears disorganized and slightly confused in his approach to explaining it. Even when referencing a moral professor Kaufman’s points were hard to decipher from his passage. Bruers and Brackman’s explanation is much more clear in explanation and use effective examples to illustrate. However, there are multiple situations in their works where confusion arises just like Kaufman’s. They say at one point in their use of causal chains, “It might be the case that the trolley is too fast and is able to kill all six people, because all six
people are placed in the trajectory of the trolley. In other words, it is not clear that the five people are absolutely saved already at the moment when one pushes the fat man.” (Bruers and Brackman 260) No further explanation is given in their work, but it appears that they are talking about changing one of the core elements that are essential to the trolley cases. It is explained earlier that hypothetical cases are used to filter out “noise” and focus on specific variables. By knowing that pushing the fat man is ultimately saving the 5 people this accomplishes that “noise” and always the subject to focus primarily on if they should push the man. Without these strict rules to the trolley cases one can easily start implementing more hypotheticals, for example being able to run fast enough to untie everyone and save all 6 lives thus making a decision pointless.
This paper has attempted to further explain some of Kaufman’s points shown in his work. One, being how DDE is related to the Loop case through the intentional or foreseen effect of flipping the switch , a morally impartial act, and how the fat man being necessary can alter the criteria of DDE in question. Second, Kaufman’s solution of the Loop Case being too complex was effectively solved. The exact length of the added track was never specified and no scale was used so any logical amount could be assumed. The precise weight needed of the fat man and the combined 5 individuals in the cause was explained through the use of weighted vests and other heavy immovable objects like Bruers and Brackmans boulder. The issue of the subject knowing every circumstance was deemed to be necessary for the hypothetical case to be valid. Without this knowledge the case has too many variables present in order to collect useable results. Third, Bruers and Brackmans work, A Review and Systematization of the Trolley Problem, was analyzed in hopes of clarification of algorithmic moral theories that were referenced multiple times in Kaufman’s paper. Borderline cases logically counter the possibility of such theories from existing at this point in time. Finally, another go at understanding casual chains was attempted but was only somewhat achieved until the necessary conditions of the case were changed. Overall much of this paper supports Kaufman’s conclusion that the Loop case does not efficiently counter DDE, the only exception being complexity is not a valid defense used Kaufman’s work.