Butow's Argument Analysis
Butow supports his argument by stating that the militarists’ “attitudes” eradicated any thought for surrender. Providing primary sources from Marquis Kido, Japanese governmental and military officials, Butow offers evidence that provides historians with a new perspective. The new perspective that Butow focuses on examines the terms of surrender offered to the Japanese at the Potsdam Conference. Through his investigation of the Potsdam terms, the author argues that Japan would have surrendered much faster if the United States had retracted the idea of unconditional surrender. Based on Butow’s arguments future historians would develop the author’s initial findings through their research and viewpoints on the terms of unconditional surrender.
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Butow’s research on Marcus Kido’s influence on the emperor to accept terms that presented “peace and honor,” influences Feis’ argument. Feis claims that Kido’s ability to persuade Hirohito was crucial in moving Japan towards the choice to surrender. Feis takes a different approach to Butow’s thoughts on Kido’s efforts to surrender; with the understanding that the Japanese public would only end the war if the United States allowed the country to keep the emperor. Investigating Butow’s original claims, Feis identifies that the United States would not move from its demands for unconditional surrender. He argues that due to the country’s internal struggles, Japan directly prolonged the war. Feis argument allows him to question if the United States had not used the atomic bomb would Japan had surrender assembled in August 1945. This approach to history from a military aspect moved the topic of the decision to surrender in a new direction. Feis presents the question of whether the atomic bombs played an essential role in the decision-making that led to the Japanese’s surrender. Feis concludes his arguments by presenting the idea that Japan’s decision to surrender came from the threat that if the war lasted any longer, the United States would use a third atomic bomb. The author broadens the study of Japan’s decision through the understanding that the United States used the atomic bombs as a means to motivate Japan to
Butow’s research on Marcus Kido’s influence on the emperor to accept terms that presented “peace and honor,” influences Feis’ argument. Feis claims that Kido’s ability to persuade Hirohito was crucial in moving Japan towards the choice to surrender. Feis takes a different approach to Butow’s thoughts on Kido’s efforts to surrender; with the understanding that the Japanese public would only end the war if the United States allowed the country to keep the emperor. Investigating Butow’s original claims, Feis identifies that the United States would not move from its demands for unconditional surrender. He argues that due to the country’s internal struggles, Japan directly prolonged the war. Feis argument allows him to question if the United States had not used the atomic bomb would Japan had surrender assembled in August 1945. This approach to history from a military aspect moved the topic of the decision to surrender in a new direction. Feis presents the question of whether the atomic bombs played an essential role in the decision-making that led to the Japanese’s surrender. Feis concludes his arguments by presenting the idea that Japan’s decision to surrender came from the threat that if the war lasted any longer, the United States would use a third atomic bomb. The author broadens the study of Japan’s decision through the understanding that the United States used the atomic bombs as a means to motivate Japan to