Case: Performance Indicator
Q) Why has it been so difficult for Osinski and Winskowicz to get a golf ball manufacturer to sign a contract for their new technology?
In the case of the leading company in the market like 'Titleist', they hesitated that they applied the Performance Indicator technology to their top-line products-the Pro V1-or any other competitive products. Normally the leading company doesn't like moving from the current standing position where they were on the dominating position to the new challenge position. Particularly, the product of Titleist would be faced with a copycat product of other manufacturers and became very popular, so that consumers were not shopping within the Titleist family consumers to other brands with similar products. Thus, the success of this product introduction was paradoxically catastrophic for the firm's core brand, Titleist, as Pro VI became effectively its own brand. These difficulties delayed any plans to o deal with an innovation like Performance Indicator's technology. In the case of followers in the market like 'Dunlop Maxfli', 'Bridgestone', despite believing in the fundamental logic of the proposal of Performance Indicator, firms vas not particularly interested in pioneering the technology because they did try to read the leading company's mind and act. They preferred to execute like this strategy, "You go, We go".
Q) How much do you think that a potential customer (that is, golf )all manufacturer such as Bridgestone or Acushne should be willing to pay for Performance Indicator's technology?
I'm not sure to offer manufacturers a proper proposal about a basic licensing fee of $0.06 per golf ball. However if products applied new technology become a fad to golfers, manufacturers should consider an extra charge for the initiative of new technology among them. For instance, they might pay an annual 'fixed' licensing fee and also a kind of 'running' licensing fee which is based on the annual revenue.
In the case of the leading company in the market like 'Titleist', they hesitated that they applied the Performance Indicator technology to their top-line products-the Pro V1-or any other competitive products. Normally the leading company doesn't like moving from the current standing position where they were on the dominating position to the new challenge position. Particularly, the product of Titleist would be faced with a copycat product of other manufacturers and became very popular, so that consumers were not shopping within the Titleist family consumers to other brands with similar products. Thus, the success of this product introduction was paradoxically catastrophic for the firm's core brand, Titleist, as Pro VI became effectively its own brand. These difficulties delayed any plans to o deal with an innovation like Performance Indicator's technology. In the case of followers in the market like 'Dunlop Maxfli', 'Bridgestone', despite believing in the fundamental logic of the proposal of Performance Indicator, firms vas not particularly interested in pioneering the technology because they did try to read the leading company's mind and act. They preferred to execute like this strategy, "You go, We go".
Q) How much do you think that a potential customer (that is, golf )all manufacturer such as Bridgestone or Acushne should be willing to pay for Performance Indicator's technology?
I'm not sure to offer manufacturers a proper proposal about a basic licensing fee of $0.06 per golf ball. However if products applied new technology become a fad to golfers, manufacturers should consider an extra charge for the initiative of new technology among them. For instance, they might pay an annual 'fixed' licensing fee and also a kind of 'running' licensing fee which is based on the annual revenue.