Case Study: State Of New York V. Robert Strong

Attila Nagy
9/18/2017
ENC3465
Legal Brief 3

State of New York v. Robert Strong

Facts
Robert Strong belongs to the Sudan Muslim religious faith, which later named him one of the leaders. As part of a well-known ceremony, he performed a religious exercise on the victim by plunging three knives into his chest to stop his heartbeat and breathing without any health repercussion thereafter. Even though this has occurred for over forty years without any fatality, the victim did not survive this exercise.
Issue
Is the defendant, who fatally exercised his powers of “mind over matter” through plunging knives into victim’s chest for ceremonial purposes, guilty of manslaughter in the second degree?
Rule
According to NY Penal Code Section 125.15,
“a person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: 1. He recklessly causes the death of another person”
Application
To decide whether defendant should be charged with a lesser crime, we must define criminally negligent homicide. According to NY Penal Code, “a person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person.” Thus, the difference between the two charges is the mental state of the defendant: former indicating his awareness and deliberate ignorance of the harm, while latter showing his negligent failure to perceive such harm. Deciding whether defendant should be charged with the lesser crime is through the analysis of the given testimonies by both the defendant and his followers.
One of his followers stated that the defendant had performed this ritual before without any injury. This suggests that the defendant was conditioned to believe that due to his religious power, he would keep successfully performing the religious exercise. It did not occur to him to consider any negative consequences because of all the successful rituals he participated in before. It is also acknowledged that these rituals flowed smoothly each time in the past forty
years. Moreover, both the defendant and his followers testified that the victim volunteered beforehand. He gave his consent to be part of this act, and though he may have been dubious about the outcome, the defendant was anal about the success of his performance, thus evincing his negligent state of mind. Conclusion
Because there is a convincing amount of evidence proving defendant’s negligent mental state, he should be guilty of criminally negligent homicide as opposed to manslaughter in the second degree.

Harris v. Jones
Facts
William R. Harris, an employee at General Motors Corporation, was under the supervision of H. Robert Jones. Harris claims that Jones mimicked his stuttering on several occasions, causing him to experience substantial anxiety. After filing two employee grievances with unsuccessful resolutions, Harris decided to sue Jones for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress.
Issue
Is H. Robert Jones, the supervisor of William R. Harris at GM, liable for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress?
Rule
According to the law, “the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has four elements:
1. the defendant must act intentionally or recklessly;
2. the defendant's conduct must be extreme and outrageous; and
3. the conduct must be the cause of
a. Severe emotional distress.”
Application
William R.
Harris sued H Robert Jones on the ground of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. To analyze William’s claims, one must dissect the presented rule, starting with the definition of reckless. Reckless is defined as “involving a criminal degree of recklessness which causes injury to other persons or creates a risk of such injury.” In addition, extreme refers to “being so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Thus, Jones must act extremely and recklessly, which was indubitably not the case. There is a lack of evidence to prove Jones’ supposedly despicable character, and one can already tell that by acknowledging the lack of witnesses. Not only there are no witnesses, but the only person testifying for Harris (his wife) indirectly defies his claims by revealing his alcoholic and violent tendencies. Harris’ wife disclosed that once her husband threw a meat platter at her, and on several occasions, he overwhelmed her emotionally. Her testimony and the already said no apparent witnesses, all in all, question the validity of Harris’s claims and the benevolence of his character. Furthermore, Jones’ actions cannot be considered reckless or extreme because he never caused injury to Harris, nor did he act in an atrocious manner that would be deemed intolerable in this society. Given Harris’ testimony, it is acknowledged that
the organizational environment was rather ill-mannered and vulgar. He mentioned that other people mimicked his stuttering as well, and that he was not the only target. The culture circulates “profanity, name-calling and roughhousing among the employees”, according to Harris. Thus, Jones’ conduct cannot be considered extreme, when other workers endure what Harris could not, and when the dynamic of the workplace is tolerable by others.

In addition, whether Jones was the cause of severe emotional distress is a question that requires us to mention Harris’ family issues again. Prior to Jones’ harassment, Jones abused alcohol and radiated a violent disposition. He had been seeing a physician for a nervous condition for six years. This condition predisposed Harris to emotional distress. He was ill-tempered, according to his wife, causing him to abuse her on one occasion. This distress was already imbedded in Harris, and Jones merely acted as the catalyst in this situation. In essence, deciding that Jones was indeed the cause of severe emotional distress is like claiming that a person, already feeling nauseous, goes to a restaurant, worsens his nausea by eating, and blames the restaurant for serving adulterated food, knowing that the predicament started before he entered the building. This person would have no right to sue the restaurant for emphasizing his upset stomach. Aware of his predisposition, the person knows what he is getting himself into, just like Jones, who had already been familiar with the working environment and his fragile mental state. Therefore, it is illogical to pursue a case where the defendant was not the main cause of the problem. Because Harris was predisposed to emotional distress, it cannot be said that Jones was the cause of such distress, thus debunking the third criterion of the rule.

Clearly, the severity of the emotional distress is also questionable. According to Fletcher v. Western Life Ins. Co., "severe emotional distress" is defined as "emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it." The quantity of the distress cannot be determined in this case because prior to the incident, he already had family issues, making it impossible to determine how much Jones’ harassment contributed to Harris’ supposed emotional distress. There is a lack of evidence to determine the duration of such distress as well. Only his testimony is given to support the claims, and that of his wife fails to accomplish anything in his favor. We cannot prove that the emotional distress was long and substantial enough for it to be considered severe. Jones’ conduct is merely a “price of a complex society” (Knierim v. Izzo).

Conclusion
While it is undeniable that Jones’ conduct was insensitive, causing some level of anxiety in Harris, it is harsh and inconsiderate to assert that the level of emotional distress was substantial and unbearable. Jones did not act recklessly or extremely, and should not be considered the cause of Harris’ emotional predicament. Given the evidence (and lack thereof), Jones should not be liable for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress.