The Proposal includes two categories –1.) Social Constructivism 2.) Psychological Constructivism
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Abstract
Constructivism employs cognitive processes such as imagination, intuitions, feelings, values, and beliefs. The constructivist epistemology asserts that the only tools available to a knower are the senses. It is only through seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, and tasting that an individual interacts with the environment. Constructivism asserts that knowledge resides in individuals.
Constructivism is a theory of learning and meaning-making that individuals create their own understandings on the basis of an interaction between what they already know and believe and ideas and knowledge with which they come into contact.
Learning is a continual movement from the current intellectual level to a higher level which more closely approximates the learner 's potential. This movement occurs in the so-called "zone of proximal development" as a result of social interaction. Thus, an understanding of human thinking depends in turn on an understanding of the mechanism of social experience; the force of the cognitive process deriving from the social interaction is emphasized.
The beliefs we held about children’s learning are deeply grounded in our own convictions on what it means to be knowledgeable, intelligent, experienced, and what it takes to become so. Whether implicit or explicitly stated, these convictions drive our attitudes and practices as educators, parents, teachers, and researchers. We believe that knowledge is actively constructed by the child in interaction with his /her world and henceforth emphasis should be to offer opportunities for kids to engage in hands-on explorations that fuel the constructive process.If this is not done, the learner will achieve only a partial understanding
Bibliography: 1. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1085493 2. http://www.personal.psu.edu 3. http://ejite.isu.edu 4. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1466679