Container in-Security Initiatives

DRAFT Rev 0 Container In-Security Initiatives: Getting Risk-Based Supply Chain Security Right “I believe that we should treat every container destined to enter or pass through the United States as a potential weapon of mass destruction; every ship that carries it as a delivery device; and every port and point inland as a potential target”, Rob Quartel, chairman and CEO of Freightdesk Technologies and former member of the U.S. Federal Maritime Commission told the Government Affairs Committee of the U.S. Senate on 6 December 2001.1 The emergence of a terrorist threat to the United States of America has directed the attention of security professionals and politicians alike to the vulnerability of the supply chain to terrorist attacks, be it as a target of or a conduit for such attacks. The response has been a flurry of security initiatives led by the U.S. Most of these take a risk-based approach to supply chain security. The new security measures have been adopted and implemented with varying degrees of enthusiasm by U.S. trade partners. One reason for the muted response is that the U.S. focus on terrorism has transformed the perception of supply chain security from making it more “theft-proof” to making it more “tamperresistant“. The two issues are not as complementary as they seem to be at first glance, but that will not be the object of this discussion. Thus, I will be leaving aside the arguably more tangible problem of cargo theft and cargo diversion. Instead I will discuss the merits of actual and planned measures for the increased and targeted screening of containerised cargo in the context of counter-terrorism. Another issue I will focus on is the implementation of a preferential treatment system for “trusted” or otherwise vetted, certified, or approved-of shippers and participants in the global supply chain. This is actually a manifestation of the riskbased screening and inspection approach and is a recurring theme in the various container security