a) scientific and b) objective/value free.
The question of Psychology being a science is straightforward. Science is an absolute concept. Something can not be moderately scientific, just as something can not be moderately true; it either is or it isn’t, as there is no in between measure of the concept. The question of Psychology being objective and value free, however, is more complex. Objectivity can be achieved to an extent by appearing to remove the individual from the scientific process, for instance abandoning the use of personal pronouns when writing up findings, however without values there is no science and without science there are no values. The strive for value free science is a similar concept to a philosophers strive for a perfect utopian society; simply unattainable. As long as humans continue to play an active role in science and society it will be driven by values and science will provide the evidence to either reinforce or discredit these values.
Popper (1959) views science as the formulation of hypotheses that are testable and falsifiable. If science is about falsifying theories then it is correct to say that Psychology is a science; theories are formed and Psychological research provides evidence which either confirms or disputes the hypothesis. However, it would be equally as correct to say that Psychology is essentially a social science and is a science that has the power to improve society through empirical study. This is because the subject matter is crucially different to the subject matter used in the traditional sciences such as Chemistry, Physics and Biology. Psychology deals with human beings who possess free will and are therefore able to create their own views on the way society should be. Psychology does not necessarily disprove hypotheses, as who is to say which individual is right or which is wrong, however it does provide solid scientific
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