David Hume's Bundle Theory
Bundle theory, as explained by David Hume states that an object is solely and entirely comprised of a collection or “bundle” of properties. Hence, there can not be an object that does not possess such properties. Furthermore, it is unfathomable to even conceive of such an object as the mere conception of an object simultaneously brings to mind the object’s inherent properties. In The Unimportance of Identity, Derek Parfit thoroughly examines Hume’s bundle theory, testing it with various imaginary scenarios from ethical, moral and identity standpoints. Ultimately, Parfit disagrees with Hume’s more absolute interpretation of the conceptual schemes, arguing that there is no possible adequate critique of personal identity, citing the cognitive
…show more content…
Indeed, Parfit outright rejects this view, instead suggesting psychological continuity as what truly matters in survival of the self. “What matters isn’t that there will be someone alive who will be me. It is rather that there will be at least one living person who will be psychologically continuous with me as I am now, and/or who has enough of my brain” (440). He argues that the conceptual scheme of self we adhere to inherently limits our perspective on a surviving self, “though we need concepts to think about reality, we sometimes confuse the two. We mistake conceptual facts for facts about reality” (441). To close, he describes the understanding of a reductionist view towards survival of self as a liberating experience that makes even “death seems to disappear” …show more content…
However, neither personal identity nor psychological continuity on their own can ensure the survival of the self as Parfit or Hume would suggest. That is simply because they themselves are the individual bundles that comprise the self, indeed, personal identity and psychological continuity by themselves are simply not broad enough ideas to encapsulate the overarching concept of self. Indeed, in the middle of Parfit’s essay, he debates whether or not this is a question that even necessitates an answer, and this in addition to his conclusion that the survival of self is really a liberation in thinking suggests that the survival of self may not actually be possible in physical or metaphysical
Indeed, Parfit outright rejects this view, instead suggesting psychological continuity as what truly matters in survival of the self. “What matters isn’t that there will be someone alive who will be me. It is rather that there will be at least one living person who will be psychologically continuous with me as I am now, and/or who has enough of my brain” (440). He argues that the conceptual scheme of self we adhere to inherently limits our perspective on a surviving self, “though we need concepts to think about reality, we sometimes confuse the two. We mistake conceptual facts for facts about reality” (441). To close, he describes the understanding of a reductionist view towards survival of self as a liberating experience that makes even “death seems to disappear” …show more content…
However, neither personal identity nor psychological continuity on their own can ensure the survival of the self as Parfit or Hume would suggest. That is simply because they themselves are the individual bundles that comprise the self, indeed, personal identity and psychological continuity by themselves are simply not broad enough ideas to encapsulate the overarching concept of self. Indeed, in the middle of Parfit’s essay, he debates whether or not this is a question that even necessitates an answer, and this in addition to his conclusion that the survival of self is really a liberation in thinking suggests that the survival of self may not actually be possible in physical or metaphysical