Descartes Argument For Substance Dualism

There are various arguments on the philosophical position, substance dualism. Substance dualism is the postulation that there are two kinds of substances: physical and mental. However, in this paper I will be presenting Descartes’ argument from separability, derived from the argument essential extension for substance dualism. In addition, I will be addressing Arnauld’s triangle objection to Descartes’ “clear and distinct” aspect of the conceivability premise with an example case for clarification, along with Descartes’ response and my opinion on his reply. Lastly, I will present the Venus and Amnesia counterexample to the conceivability premise following with Descartes’ possible response to it. In Descartes’ meditations, he states that if something is distinctly conceivable apart from another, they can potentially exist separately; this can also be known as the conceivability premise. And if we are unable to distinctly and clearly
From this history, we are presented with two stars: the evening star and the morning star. During certain hours of the day the morning star would alter between the evening star and vice-versa. In this counterexample to the conceivability premise, it states that it is possible for the morning star to exist without the evening star, and that it is not possible for the evening star to exist without the evening star existing. Therefore, the morning star is not equal to the evening star. Following the conceivability premise, it would then suggest that if we can conceive the morning star and the evening star being equal, then it is possible for these the two to be equal. However, this counterexample disproves the conceivability premise because if you can conceive the morning star and the evening star being unequal, then following the premise, they are not possibly equal. This causes the premise to contradict