Descartes Cogito Argument Analysis

Descartes’ Cogito argument and defective nature doubt are mutually damaging to each other’s respective claims. Defective nature dismisses logic yet Cogito uses it, by doing so Descartes contradicts himself, falling trap to his own scrutiny. Ruling out his own perception, how can Descartes make plausible claims when he doubts his very ability to do so? The reasoning behind Descartes’ doubtfulness is that, in essence, he wants to know what he can and cannot doubt. If Descartes knows what is doubtable then, consequently, he is able to deduce what is real and begin the reconstruction of his beliefs. Descartes categorizes his doubts into three non-overlapping groups; sense, dream, and defective doubt. The first of Descartes’ doubts is sense doubt.
For one, Descartes’ reasoning for his Cogito argument is flawed. Descartes proposes the idea of defective nature doubt and that instead of being created by god he was created by an evil genius, an evil genius that has created him as a deceived person and therefore his judgement and perception of reality is that of a defective nature. Descartes admits that he may not be able to correctly perceive reality and therefore dismisses his own use of logic, but immediately after that he uses his logic to produce an argument for his existence. How can Descartes be sure that he is not being deceived by his defective nature when coming to this conclusion? He cannot. This is a major flaw in Descartes’ reasoning, he is contradicting himself. Another fault in Descartes’ argument is his inference of his existence from the fact that he thinks. If Descartes was created in a deceived state, how can he be sure that his reasoning is not faulty? Perhaps Descartes’ conclusion of “I am” derived from the premise “I think” is wrong because the evil genius deceived him about his own idea of thinking. The evil genius may have wired Descartes’ brain to make him only think that he exists, when in fact he does not. Thus, it wouldn’t follow that Descartes necessarily exists, which would make the Cogito vulnerable to doubt and uncertainty. By proposing the idea of a defective nature, Descartes unintentionally pulls a variation of the epistemic skepticism card. How can he know if anything can be true if his own perception is deceived? This question tarnishes the plausibility of his entire