body theory, brain theory, illusion theory, and bundle theory will be introduced. They will be evaluated and the conclusion will eventually be reached that the brain theory is the most convincing response to the problem of personal identity.
The body theory of identity is the notion that a person remains the same as long as the body is the same. It is possible to track a person’s body through space and time and know that someone is the same because they have the same physical body, with the same flesh and bone. Sir Bernard Williams argued that we identify more with our bodies than our minds because we would choose to prevent physical pain over pleasure to the mind. If we apply Aristotle’s general account of identity of human beings, then for someone to be the same person as before, they must always be of the same matter. This raise questions about situations such as Marcel Duchamp’s ‘ready-mades’ where the original of the artworks had been lost but the replacements are still labelled as the original. Peter Van Inwagen gave an example which is suppose that your son built a tower out of wooden blocks and was accidentally knocked over. While he is away, you quickly reassemble it with the same shape and structure. When your partner comes back, you exclaim, “Look what our son had built!” This would be false as the tower is a duplicate and not the same tower as it started out with. If you have an object taken apart and put back together, is it the same object? Furthermore, if a body were taken apart and reassembled, would it be the same person?
There are arguments against the body theory as the body is constantly changing. Heraclitus used an analogy that parts of Ship of Theseus are gradually replaced as it is broken and fixed. Does it become a different ship? What about injuries and handicaps? Soldiers whose legs were amputated in war would not be completely themselves but they would be recognized as the same person. The preceding definition of the body theory does not account for alterations to the same body, as it is impossible for a body to stay the same. Another issue is cloning where scientists take DNA from one being and use it to create a genetically identical body. Dolly the sheep is the first mammal to be cloned using the process of nuclear transfer. The clone and original sheep were genetically identical, having exactly the same physical properties. They may have the same bodies but they can’t be the same sheep. If a person was to be cloned, how do you identify two beings using the body theory if they are genetically identical? They would live two lives with different experiences. Therefore, the body theory alone cannot be considered a necessary definition when defining personal identity.
The brain view of the body theory looks to biological continuity of the brain because it contains a person’s memories and personality. John Perry gave an example, which is that ‘A’ has brain cancer and an exact duplicate of his brain but without cancer was produced. Although ‘A’ is biologically continued with a new brain, according to the brain view, ‘A’ had died and someone new had replaced him and continued in his body. This is closely related to the psychological approach of personal continuity, or personal persistence. It’s a continuation of the association between a person’s life and personality. The process ensures consistency of mental qualities such as self-awareness, sapience, sentience, and perception of one’s relationship with the environment. It seems obvious that one would go with the brain during a transplant as it contains our mental features. John Locke believed we are “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing” and H.P Grice claimed “one can only remember one’s own experiences”, which seems to suggest the brain’s functionality is essential to the problem of self.
Although, the brain theory corresponds well with the notion that many people who have a brain transplant is actually a body transplant, but there are duplication problems if half of a brain was removed while the other half remained, does the person continue to exist in the same body despite having only half of their brain? On the other hand, if one was to copy a person’s psychological properties into another body, the person with the properties will believe they are who their personality and memories are, even though the brain had not moved. Alan Watts had said, “Trying to define who you are is like trying to bite your own teeth.” It’s problematic to say which part of the brain is more important. Perhaps the ‘dominant’ hemisphere may be favoured and Derek Parfit’s argued, “How could I fail to survive if the other half of my brain was also successfully transplanted? How could a double success be a failure?” However, to think this way would be to make the mistake of assuming there is something important that we do not know. It questions whether there is an identity that we might imagine squeezing into the right hemisphere of the brain as the left hemisphere is cut away, as if jumping from plank to plank as successive beams of Theseus’ ship are replaced.
The illusion theory is the idea that no self persists through time as humans undergo continuous qualitative change. Buddhists such as Thích Nhất Hạnh have denied the existence of a self and put forward the view that it is nothing more than the product of social convention. Through science, it is fact that millions of cells dies per second and our body generate new cells. We change from one moment to the next and are constantly changing into a new person. To think that we persist through time is an illusion as empirical evidence points that there is no permanent or unchanging self. Philosopher William James agreed that we experience our personal selves as a constantly changing river and Heraclitus claimed that it is impossible to step into the same river twice. If our bodies undergo permanent change as well as our minds then the idea of a permanent self is indeed an illusion.
If a person is constantly changing and then why do they plan for the future? To do so must suggest that the person in the future they are referring to is same as the person they are now. If the self is an illusion, why are we able to identify people who we’ve seen days or even years ago? Further more, we don’t need to be the very same entity to be the same thing. For example, a person who lost weight would feel and look different but they are still the same person. Someone who remembers their childhood will still be able to identify him or herself even though their body has changed. However, how much change is required to become a different person? Are all parts of us equally important? Family and friends would still identify people who have lost part of their bodies as being the same person. Contemporary thinkers such as psychologist Susan Blackmore have argued from a physicalist perspective that the notion of selfhood is an illusion or an evolutionary trick. She argues that thoughts are generated physically and such beliefs like personal identity have originated by accident but are so beneficial to survival of the species that they are passed on like genes from person to person. These ideas and habits are termed ‘memes’. However, one can question why each person’s receptiveness to memes cannot count as grounds for personal identity.
Bundle theory suggests we are a set of properties that define who we are and that a permanent self does not exist. It is the changing collection of thoughts, sensations and experiences that define the term personhood and Derek Parfit claimed the thoughts we experience exist in a haystack-like bundle and are loosely linked through their contiguity in space and time. David Hume denies the existence of substances, as they are distinct from their qualities. He states that substances are simply collections of non-substantial entities. For example, an apple can be described as a certain shade of colour, odour and form. The object consists of only its properties and there is no object without properties nor can anyone conceive of one. To Hume, the self is “that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference.” If an impression suggests the idea of self, then that impression need to persist invariably the same throughout a lifetime. However, there is no impression that is constant and invariable. He claimed that emotions and sensations occur a few at a time, ever changing, and never equally exist all at once. A person is simply a collection of mental states at a certain time and there is no independent subject of the mental states higher than the states themselves. As Hume states, “I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.”
The issue with bundle theory is its illogical concept of a “bare particular”, a substance without properties.
The theory asserts that it is impossible to think of such thing. However, one could argue that something invisible or odourless may be impossible to imagine but that does not mean a substance with such qualities cannot exist. Likewise, it is not logical to assume that a person cannot exist if they cannot imagine a bare particular. Thomas Reid believed personal identity couldn’t be defined by our experiences. He wrote, “I am not action, I am not feeling’ I am something that thinks, acts, and suffers.” In addition, bundle theory cannot adequately account for things like habits, instincts, or virtually any other mental states. There is a lack of exposition on the relation of perceptions and how these are bundled together. James Van Cleve objected that if a substance were nothing more than a set of properties, any set of properties would fulfil the conditions to be that substance. For example, a red thing may be red, but a set containing red isn’t red. If a substance is a bundle of properties, then isn’t every set of properties a substance? Likewise, a further complication is that things could never change. All of the substance’s qualities would be
essential.
In conclusion, there is no certain approach in identifying a person as humans undergo constant change. The evaluation of the four arguments lead me to believe that the brain view of the body theory is the most convincing as it offer an explanation for mental change as well as bodily discontinuity. Each individual have a distinct personality that are formed by experiences and DNA. In the case of Dexter, although his physical appearance and way of thinking may be different from before, his identity did not change as it is defined by the continuity of his brain. His psychological persistence determines his potential to become what he is now and will be. As Wittgenstein said, “The human body is the best picture of the human soul.”