9/30/2012
The Euthyphro dilemma is found in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, in which Socrates asks Euthyphro, "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" Socrates and Euthyphro discuss the nature of piety in Euthyphro. Euthyphro says that the pious is the same thing as what is loved by the gods, but Socrates finds a problem with this: the gods may disagree among themselves. Euthyphro then revises his answer, so that piety is only what is loved by all the gods unanimously.
Socrates rises the dilemma about what pious is and do the gods love something because it is pious, or is something pious because the gods love it? Socrates and Euthyphro both agree that surely the gods love the pious because it is the pious. But than Socrates argues that we are forced to reject the second option: the fact that the gods love (something) cannot explain why the pious is the pious. This is because, if both options were true, they would go in circles with the gods loving the pious because it is the pious, and the pious being the pious because the gods love it. And this in turn means, Socrates argues, that the pious is not the same as the god-beloved, because what makes the pious the pious is not what makes the god-beloved the god-beloved. After all, what makes the god-beloved the god-beloved is the fact that the gods love it, whereas what makes the pious the pious is something else. Thus Euthyphro's theory does not give us the very nature of the pious.
However the “Divine Commands” by Robert M. Adams responds to this dilemma. The theory teaches that moral truth or piety does not exist independently from god and that morality is determined by divine commands, which are gods commands. Therefore what ever god commands is moral because god is all good and good comes from god. This theory assert that gods command is the only reason that a good action is moral. In essence this answers Euthyphro's dilemma in figuring