However, there are many contradictions to this experience-based view. In the case of the split-brain patient, each hemisphere of the brain is experiencing a different color, so by definition they must have two Egos in the same body.3 This seems very implausible. Although we may consciously reject the theory and scoff at its idea of souls, the author argues that we believe ourselves to be special, and therefore unknowingly subscribe to the Ego Theory. Cartain imaginary cases, like teletransportation or replacing cells in the body, reveal a person’s true beliefs.2 In the first case, the teleported version of yourself will be completely identical and psychologically continuous to you. According to Parfit, if you don’t identify with this Replica, and would refrain from pressing the teletransportation button, you still fundamentally believe yourself and your Ego to be unique. The same logic applies to the case of replacing a certain percentage of cells in your body with someone else’s. What percentage of your original cells would be sufficient to still be considered ‘you’?2 The Bundle Theory avoids these problems by essentially denying the existence of persons. Instead of attributing personhood to the body or brain, Bundle Theorists and Buddhists believe that people are merely arrangements of other elements.2 “Will it still be me?” as a response to the
However, there are many contradictions to this experience-based view. In the case of the split-brain patient, each hemisphere of the brain is experiencing a different color, so by definition they must have two Egos in the same body.3 This seems very implausible. Although we may consciously reject the theory and scoff at its idea of souls, the author argues that we believe ourselves to be special, and therefore unknowingly subscribe to the Ego Theory. Cartain imaginary cases, like teletransportation or replacing cells in the body, reveal a person’s true beliefs.2 In the first case, the teleported version of yourself will be completely identical and psychologically continuous to you. According to Parfit, if you don’t identify with this Replica, and would refrain from pressing the teletransportation button, you still fundamentally believe yourself and your Ego to be unique. The same logic applies to the case of replacing a certain percentage of cells in your body with someone else’s. What percentage of your original cells would be sufficient to still be considered ‘you’?2 The Bundle Theory avoids these problems by essentially denying the existence of persons. Instead of attributing personhood to the body or brain, Bundle Theorists and Buddhists believe that people are merely arrangements of other elements.2 “Will it still be me?” as a response to the