Essay on Practical Ethics

The relations between Media and the Military and whether or not they should be controlled.

Control of the media in regards to their access to the frontline yet also operational inclusion has been a controversial issue during the last century. Operational security, due to media’s reporting is being breached and often putting the lives of soldiers at risk with public animosity against the government. What people seem to forget is that despite the actions and events occurring during war times, while at times they may lack ethics and morality, reporting them during the war is not necessary and creates unwanted issues for the men and women on the frontline. Whilst both parties produce substantial arguments both for and against control, it is in my view, that the media should be controlled in their reporting of the war. The military has a need for operational security in order to complete their tasks effectively. They do not need to be putting in extra time and effort to cater to the media’s antics, yet if they do not control these antics, many lives both in war and back at the sovereign state could be in jeopardy. It is for this reason that this essay will cover the arguments given both for and against control of the media’s war reporting, giving examples of past and present issues that have sparked the debate; namely during Vietnam, Iraqi Freedom and The Gulf War. In relation to these, I will emphasise how the arguments for control of the media’s reporting is more convincing.

The Vietnam War will forever be remembered as the war that was brought into American living rooms which horrified and dismayed the American people. This was the consequential impact of the media’s reporting which showed constant force of destruction, suffering, and blood shed[1]. In the eye of the military it is believed that the media coverage of the war distorted the reality of actual events, which led to the loss of heart by the American people. Former diplomat Martin Herz denies that the media was the main cause of failure, but does acknowledge that the media played an important role in destroying the public’s will to continue to resist the Communist aggression in South Vietnam[2]. On the other side, Peter Braestrup argued that the public made up its own mind about the war, irrespective of what the press said. Yet it is quite clear that the media lacked sensitivity to the true dimensions of the Vietnam War. The media tended to construct sweeping conclusions from few scattered facts, thus distorting the picture of war through lack of maturity and seasoning[3].

Reports during the Vietnam War produced images of the press being narrow minded. One such example was an interview with a nurse who was tending to napalm victims. Her recollection stated that the media only ever had one thought in mind, and that was to interview the napalm victims. They never offered to help and they never wanted to examine other injuries as a cause of war[4]. From this it is noted that the media is in constant search for stories that they believe will sell, which often oversimplifies matters of extreme complexity. The media’s retort was that the correspondents sent over were too young and inexperienced to cover so difficult a conflict. Yet the argument still stands that despite who watched the broadcasts or if what was seen was absorbed, the public was not ready for such vivid imagery and thus the media needed to be controlled on a larger level.

This control of the media is evident in Iraqi Freedom, yet it also marked the first time when en-masse reporters were provided relatively unrestricted access to the frontline. The journalists, who reported during Iraqi Freedom, were placed into an embedding programme which placed the reporters into certain units to live with the soldiers[5]. This initiative brought about two main criticisms from the media. The first being that the embedded reporters felt they would come down with Stockholm syndrome and feel guilt for the stories the produced, and secondly that their focus was too narrow[6]. Yet the media has to adapt to the emergence of this programme as it proves to be successful for the military’s media objectives.

Throughout the last century, there are many examples in which the military gave the media the opportunity to work with no negotiations or constrictions. During the Korean conflict General Macarthur praised the media for their good coverage without a single security breach[7]. Yet this coverage did not last long after China entered the war, the negative reports caused the system to shut down, and strict censorship, much like in WWII was imposed. Other examples of media betrayal include incidents where statements made were blown out of proportion. Lt General Wallace’s statement is a prime example, “the enemy is different to the one we war gamed against”[8]. From this the media derived that the war was no longer winnable, bringing scrutiny to the military’s credibility. Due to many years of on and off again control, it was determined that some form of control over the media’s agenda had to be put in place.

During the 1983 invasion of Grenade the United States placed the media on a neighbouring island for the first two days. Despite protest from the media, a poll taken indicated that the American public supported the Administration’s restriction of press access[9]. This poll found that the American people would rather have been kept from the omissions taking place and be told farces, purely because it made life easier. This poll made it evident that control of the media was deemed necessary by the public, to whom the media was reporting for.

The idea then emerged following the poll that military press pools should be put in place, which started in 1984, and was first used in Panama in 1989, yet was deemed unsuccessful by the media. They had expected to witness the true horrors of war, but instead were only taken to areas were battles had already taken place. Reporters also found that independent reporters were getting their stories out before those in the pools, thus they were said to be a waste of military and media assets. The media’s argument against this form of control was that it was frustrating, new players were forced to emerge in the reporting business and a lack of trust was causing the media to revolt.

Despite this, the first Gulf War in 1990-1991 saw press pools remain in place, yet were larger in scope. The Panama press pools only consisted of about eight reporters, yet Operation Desert Storm saw 1,500 journalists in the Gulf region[10]. The military had counteracted the independent reporters by controlling the legalities of entrance into Saudi Arabia, and thus making press pools the media’s only option. While the military set ground rules for coverage, and gave the media safe access, reporters were still disappointed. They argued that the restricted access was indirect censorship. Middleton, a journalist herself, argues that control of media is not necessary, and instead a relationship should be formed between the two entities. Unfortunately for the media, too many cases can be revealed where trust has been the basis for reporting, and on a large scale has been broken. It is the negative stereotype that media cannot be trusted that has been the cause and the need for control. Quite simply, I believe the media needs to see that the control enforced by the military is of their own making. While Middleton argues that some media can be trusted and that it is unfair they are not given this trust, she needs to realise the risk such trust would impose.

In 1995, peacekeeping operations in Bosnia meant that journalists were allowed to report everything, unless they were specifically told it was off the record[11]. This freedom changed after Wall Street Journal correspondent Tom Ricks, distorted a speech given by an American commander to make him appear racist whilst talking to his troops. It was after this incident, that new rules restricted media coverage of conversations with troops to be entirely off the record[12]. Despite being widely criticised by the media, it is individuals like Rick that are the cause for the need for control.

Despite arguments put forward by the media, complaining that they are being exceedingly controlled and that stories are of narrow focus; a larger scaled picture needs to be seen. The military runs on secrecy, the power to surprise and overcome the enemy at hand. If the media are given free reign or do not understand the consequences of their actions, not only will the soldiers involved in the war be put at a great disadvantage, the citizens at home also watch victory slip from the military’s hand as the death tolls rise.

The media harshly criticises the embedding programme, yet they are given free transportation, shelter and food. In November 2002, due to complaints that they were not trained well enough to enter the frontline they were given training on basic pipe patching, safety awareness, cruise missile fundamentals and were familiarised with direct fire, nuclear-biological-chemical attacks, minefields, combat first aid, tactical marches and military jargon[13]. Whilst the media complains about the restriction, many reporters have appreciated the extent the military has gone. Reporter Andrew Jacobs for the New York Times described the embeds as “alternatively enlightening, entertaining, horrifying, and a physically exhausting experience which taught him combat survival skills and gave him a visceral appreciation for how the subjects of his coverage lived”[14].

Embedding journalists with defence personnel on military operations carries pros and cons for both sides. For Defence it allows civilian reporters to be exposed to what they do and better comprehend the role of the ADF in war. Yet it also means allowing largely untrained, sometimes uncooperative and regularly intrusive eyes and ears where instinct might suggest its better not to have them. For the media, it requires sacrificing independence for the sake of an inside look at a force on operation and it also restricts movement with large groups. But in all it is a compromise for both sides.

Despite the military’s attempts to control the media, nowadays anyone is a journalist, with camera phone and voice recordings, yet also satellite imagining gives away military locations[15]. Secrecy is so hard to keep these days, yet it is crucial to operational security and mission effectiveness. It is for these reasons alone, that I believe the military should continue to control the media. Whilst it takes up time and assets, the consequence of past reporting has been diminishing for the military’s of many countries and is not worth the risk.

The arguments that the media puts forward against control is merely that they find their job harder to complete. They also put forward the idea that history is being lost, yet the military includes journalists and historians during their war efforts and all battle planning and documentation is kept in public records. Whilst Pickup argues that the use of minders is successful, the media has again turned their backs on another form of control[16].

On the other hand is the military, whose whole purpose and intent relies on secrecy and security. They put forward very strong arguments for control, emphasising that not all information is necessary to the public during war times. The military argues that they are unable to trust the media, because monetary temptations prove to almost always overcome one reporter. The risk of allowing the media free reign during war times is too high, and thus the military have greater reasoning for control than the media do against it.

The extent to which the media should be controlled, I believe is the controversy at hand. Censorship has been put in place, where many transmissions have been stopped, and complete restrictions are enforced. I do not believe that censorship is necessary in today’s wars. I do feel that negotiations have to occur that calculate the circumstances that could arise. We need to realise that as apart of a democratic state, citizens expect to be as well informed as practicable, which is a reasonable expectation. Thus, the media need to work with the negotiations given to them, as seen in the Falklands to create the desired press outcome. The role of the media is not only to report battles in place, but also to report to duties, bravery and courage carried out by the men and women overseas. The media plays multiple roles in society thus they cannot be completely removed from the battlespace as citizens still want to be updated on their military’s progress.

Overall, it is evident that the media will have greater access to future military operations if they can manage to reach a high plateau of understanding. Reporters must understand the operations level of war in order to place the minute-by-minute actions into context. The military experiences a greater urgency to conceal its strength, location, and intent. This runs squarely counter to journalists’ desire to quickly report what they see and hear. It is this conflict of interest that outlines the need for media control. The extent of which may change from war to war, but the media issue will always be a soluble problem as reporters are taught to be hungry as those who breach the rules in place, always end up better off in their industry.

Bibliography
Stephen Badsey, ‘Media interaction in the Kosovo Conflict’, in Stephen Badsey & Paul Latawski (eds), Britain, NATO and the Lessons of the Balkans Conflicts, 1991-1999, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 79-97.

Tom Brokaw, ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, NBC Enterprises, September 2003, pp. 136-214.

Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War, Macmillan, London, 2000, pp. 108-162.

Alastair Finlan, ‘The Gulf War 1991’, Osprey Publishing, July 2003, pp. 75-91.

Gordon M. Gostein, ‘Lessons in Disaster: Mcgeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam’, Times Books, September 2001, pp.15-96.

William H. Hammond, ‘The Press in Vietnam as Agent of Defeat: A Critical Examination’, Reviews in American History, Vol. 17, No. 2, June 1989, pp. 312-323.

Brendan R. Mclane, ‘Reporting From The Sandstorm: An appraisal Of Embedding’, Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 77-88.

Karen Middleton, ‘Who’s Telling the Story? The Military and the Media’, Peter Dennis & Jeffrey Grey (eds), The Military, the Media and Information Warfare. Chief of Army’s Military History Conference 2008, Australian Military History Publications, Canberra, 2009, pp. 147-157.

D.J. Pickup, ‘The Media and the Minder: The Royal Navy’s Perspective’, Stephen Badsey (ed.), The Media and International Security, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 146-168.

Gordon Ramsey, ‘The Falklands War Then and Now’, After the Battle, March 2009, pp. 12-16.

Philip M. Taylor, ‘the Military and the Media: Past, Present and Future’, Stephen Badsey (ed.), The Media and International Security, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 177-202.
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[1] William H. Hammond, ‘The Press in Vietnam as Agent of Defeat: A Critical Examination’, Reviews in American History, Vol. 17, No. 2, June 1989, pp. 312-323.
[2] William H. Hammond, ‘The Press in Vietnam as Agent of Defeat: A Critical Examination’, Reviews in American History, Vol. 17, No. 2, June 1989, pp. 312-323.
[3] Philip M. Taylor, ‘The Military and the Media: Past, Present and Future’, Stephen Badsey (ed.), The Media and International Security, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 177-202.
[4] William H. Hammond, ‘The Press in Vietnam as Agent of Defeat: A Critical Examination’, Reviews in American History, Vol. 17, No. 2, June 1989, pp. 312-323.
[5] Stephen Badsey, ‘Media interaction in the Kosovo Conflict’, in Stephen Badsey & Paul Latawski (eds), Britain, NATO and the Lessons of the Balkans Conflicts, 1991-1999, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 79-97.
[6] Brendan R. Mclane, ‘Reporting From The Sandstorm: An appraisal Of Embedding’, Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 77-88.
[7] Karen Middleton, ‘Who’s Telling the Story? The Military and the Media’, Peter Dennis & Jeffrey Grey (eds), The Military, the Media and Information Warfare. Chief of Army’s Military History Conference 2008, Australian Military History Publications, Canberra, 2009, pp. 147-157.
[8] Brendan R. Mclane, ‘Reporting From The Sandstorm: An appraisal Of Embedding’, Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 77-88.
[9] Brendan R. Mclane, ‘Reporting From The Sandstorm: An appraisal Of Embedding’, Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 77-88.
[10] Brendan R. Mclane, ‘Reporting From The Sandstorm: An appraisal Of Embedding’, Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 77-88.
[11] Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War, Macmillan, London, 2000, pp. 108-162.
[12] Brendan R. Mclane, ‘Reporting From The Sandstorm: An appraisal Of Embedding’, Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 77-88.
[13] Philip M. Taylor, ‘The Military and the Media: Past, Present and Future’, Stephen Badsey (ed.), The Media and International Security, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 177-202.
[14] Brendan R. Mclane, ‘Reporting From The Sandstorm: An appraisal Of Embedding’, Parameters, Spring 2004, pp. 77-88.
[15] Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War, Macmillan, London, 2000, pp. 108-162.
[16] D.J. Pickup, ‘The Media and the Minder: The Royal Navy’s Perspective’, Stephen Badsey (ed.), The Media and International Security, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 146-168.

Bibliography: Stephen Badsey, ‘Media interaction in the Kosovo Conflict’, in Stephen Badsey & Paul Latawski (eds), Britain, NATO and the Lessons of the Balkans Conflicts, 1991-1999, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 79-97. Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War, Macmillan, London, 2000, pp. 108-162. D.J. Pickup, ‘The Media and the Minder: The Royal Navy’s Perspective’, Stephen Badsey (ed.), The Media and International Security, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 146-168. Philip M. Taylor, ‘the Military and the Media: Past, Present and Future’, Stephen Badsey (ed.), The Media and International Security, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 177-202. [3] Philip M. Taylor, ‘The Military and the Media: Past, Present and Future’, Stephen Badsey (ed.), The Media and International Security, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 177-202. [5] Stephen Badsey, ‘Media interaction in the Kosovo Conflict’, in Stephen Badsey & Paul Latawski (eds), Britain, NATO and the Lessons of the Balkans Conflicts, 1991-1999, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 79-97. [11] Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War, Macmillan, London, 2000, pp. 108-162. [13] Philip M. Taylor, ‘The Military and the Media: Past, Present and Future’, Stephen Badsey (ed.), The Media and International Security, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 177-202. [15] Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War, Macmillan, London, 2000, pp. 108-162. [16] D.J. Pickup, ‘The Media and the Minder: The Royal Navy’s Perspective’, Stephen Badsey (ed.), The Media and International Security, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 146-168.