Essays on Winch and Flyvberg

Essay 1: Winch
Winch argues that the study of society is inextricably connected to philosophy, not the empirical, predictive realm that it tries in vain to appropriate in order to gain credibility. Winch builds his argument by illustrating the problems with past and existing ways of thinking about empiricism, the study of human behavior, and the role of philosophy while simultaneously laying the groundwork for an alternative way of approaching sociology.
In order to make the case for the necessary tie between philosophy and sociology, Winch begins by showing the ways in which philosophy has been miscast as either an inferior rival to science or as filling a negative albeit fundamental role in the pursuits of other disciplines. These perceptions are largely based on a misunderstanding of the general aims and functions of philosophy. Winch argues that language is at the center of philosophy but a philosopher’s interest in language is not simply one of clarification (the aforementioned negative role of philosophy). Rather, language is at the center because it is the only means we have for making sense of the world around us and our place in it; one could say that language gives shape to our reality.
Winch argues for the primacy of epistemology and metaphysics within philosophy, noting the central question of philosophy to be that of reality or what we can know or say about a world external to ourselves as well as how this might inform the way we live. This points to a clear distinction between philosophy and science in that philosophy does not take our experience of an external world and language for granted, while science builds off of an assumption regarding the ‘realness’ of an external world. Consequently, science and philosophy are far from ‘enemies’ but rather have two very different paths and interests.
Winch further points out that the philosophy of science, religion, art, politics, etc. is not secondary to those particular fields, rather these should be understood as branches of philosophy. He reasons that the aim of philosophy is not to clarify matters for science, religion, or whatever the field, but rather to examine how that particular field works, the vocabulary used, how meaning and knowledge is generated (by what criteria), shared, and understood. With this perspective of philosophy it is easy to see the link to sociology. As sociologists, we are interested in these exact same things, all of which are built around language. Social relations require, build, maintain, and adapt language which is essentially shared meaning. Without some form of language, there is no means of communication, no means for understanding the world around us, and from an individual standpoint there would be no concept of oneself as a separate being. Language acquisition is where our world or at least our understanding of an external world begins, and it is the most basic element of society and by default any field of study, whether or not it is consciously recognized as such. For this reason, it is crucial for us to examine language itself as it serves as both a creator and a restrictor of our understanding of the world around us.
This centrality of language is the very reason why human behavior cannot be studied and/or predicted in the same way as meteorology or some other natural occurrence because to study human behavior equates to studying meaning and meaning is dependent upon human beings. Reducing human behavior to any universal law is problematic if not impossible because of its very nature. Language/shared meaning are not static and they depend upon the context in which you find them. To study human behavior is to engage in a conversation of sorts. You become an interpreter and meaning maker, a participant, regardless of whether it is acknowledged or not. We cannot divorce ourselves from our subjects of study; we are part of and a product of a social web from which we cannot escape.
The central thesis of Winch revolves around the ongoing problem faced by ‘social science’ as it struggles to fight what is invariably a losing battle, one that is situated in a language game that is not its own. That is to say, social science should not be geared toward the empirical and likewise it should not try to distance itself from philosophy, “for any worthwhile study of society must be philosophical in character and any worthwhile philosophy must be concerned with the nature of human society” (Winch p 3). Philosophy and sociology are necessarily entwined because both are interested in how meaning is created, shared, and understood which emerges from social interaction.

Essay 2: Flyvbjerg

An ongoing problem facing the social sciences is its untenable relationship with the empirical and our related failure to be taken as a significant player in addressing real world issues. In this regard, the social sciences can be seen as a world unto itself, engaged in an ongoing internal conversation, and creating authority figures that hold little weight outside of their own realm. Flyvbjerg argues that social sciences’ attempt to mimic the empirical framework in order to gain credibility has led us and continues to lead us astray. He offers a possible counter approach to the social sciences, and in turn, a way to gain credibility on our own terms. Flyvbjerg’s critique of the direction taken by the social sciences hinges on differentiating it from the hard sciences, not only in terms of their particular object or subject of study and methodology, but also in terms of their overarching goals and strengths. In elucidating these differences, he builds an argument for embracing context and the particular rather than the pretense of objectivity and universals.
First, Flyvbjerg redirects our attention from a seemingly unequal match-up between the hard sciences and social science to question the basic assumptions of this ‘rivalry’. The difference between these two fields is much greater than an issue of accuracy or validity, they have two very different objectives; while empiricism strives to explain or predict natural phenomenon, social sciences pursue an understanding of society and basic human interaction which is an altogether different enterprise. Any examination of society/human interaction is essentially a study of shared meaning, and a study of shared meaning requires more than simple observation. This endeavor is not as neat and tidy as a lab experiment involving inanimate objects, but it is a mistake to try in vain to make it such.
As sociologists, the more we try to distance ourselves from what we study, the less we learn about it. This is due to the dynamic nature of human interaction and language. These are never static; they are continuously negotiated by both ‘participants’ as well as ‘observers’. Indeed the terms participant and observer are misleading, for both parties are subjects, neither can remove themselves from the trappings of their particular make up (historical period, place, culture, family, education, etc.). When we conduct research without a dialogue with the subjects, meaning ends up being applied to their actions from the researcher and this invariably will not match the way these actions are understood by the people involved in the exchange. Shared meaning cannot be ascribed from an external source, nor can it be divorced from its context. Indeed, if we attempt to analyze an interaction without a deeper examination of the participants, we could only detail the physicality of an interaction. To understand the meaning behind any particular part of the exchange, we would need to have an understanding of how the people involved in the exchange understand it. How might the age of the persons involved, time of day, location/setting, personal history, social class, political climate, and so on influence or shape the behavior, interpretation, response, meaning, and understanding of an exchange? Would you interpret the interaction differently if it occurred in a bar, a funeral home, or a wedding? Certainly we have different social expectations for these settings, and our behavior and how it is perceived hinges on the particular cultural norms and background of the people involved. Ultimately, an understanding of any social interaction necessitates an examination of its context. It is for this reason that Flyvbjerg argues for the primacy of the case study. The case study allows for an in-depth examination of the particular which contrary to popular opinion can be an effective means for understanding social behavior on a wider scale.
Acknowledging the importance of context is at odds with empirical methodology and much of the research conducted within the social sciences. Sociologists are conditioned to write in a way that is meant to convey objectivity, and this style of writing is generally expected if you want to be published in academic journals. However, the study of society and human interaction cannot and indeed should not have the same modus operandi as say chemistry or physics. The focus on objectivity and universal rules corresponds to the beginning levels of learning and to the episteme and techne classes of philosophy. Phronesis or practical wisdom is a different way of knowing and understanding that goes beyond following a formula; it reflexively considers context in the interpretation of a situation as well as how certain courses of action may or may not be for the betterment of society. In this sense, the scope of the social sciences is much broader and less rigid than that of empiricism. For Flyvbjerg, this is the area in which the social sciences surpass the hard sciences.
The distinction between studying human behavior as opposed to say the laws of physics is at the core of Flyvbjerg’s proposal for a ‘social science’ grounded in and embracing of philosophy rather than empiricism. Prediction, consistency, and context-independent results are the objectives of hard sciences. The social sciences should not be striving after this as understanding human behavior cannot be achieved through this same process. The development of ‘laws’ and theory rest on the assumption that X Y regardless of context. This presents a problem for the social sciences as the examination of human behavior, which is ipso de facto social behavior, cannot or better yet should not be reduced to regularities and generalizations. The real question is not whether we can prove ourselves within a hyper-rational framework, but whether we can reclaim our raison d’être which lies in the project of phronesis.

Essay 3: Winch, Flyvbjerg, and Birchett
Both Winch and Flyvbjerg present persuasive arguments, though in my case it was not a tough sell. With my first degree being in religious studies, studying postmodern thought, queer theory, and having an early penchant for questioning things others often take for granted, I tend to gravitate toward the philosophical side and am generally put off by quantitative research as well as the hard sciences (unfortunately this is not a lucrative tendency). While I agree with both Winch and Flyvbjerg, I am less certain of where sociology would stand if it embraced their perspectives in lieu of its current preoccupation.
Let’s begin with Winch and the centrality of language. I have engaged in a similar argument regarding ‘truth’ with a couple of my friends, one of whom holds science and “discovering and communicating ‘Truth’” in the highest regard. I routinely make the case for ‘truth’ being a product of consensus at a particular point in time, and whether or not this ‘truth’ was true in some ultimate way has little significance. I should clarify what I mean by consensus; this does not mean something must be universally accepted to be the truth but simply a shared understanding amongst a number of people. Of course this suggests the existence of a multitude of truths. This line of thought can devolve into a sense of relativism and/or nihilism. I think this is a legitimate concern as I routinely struggle with these feelings as a consequence of sharing this perspective. My standard defense is regardless of whether an absolute truth exists or not, at the end of the day human connection, our relationships with one another, and dealing with the realities of our day to day life must take precedence. I draw from these connections and experiences to develop my own purpose and meaning for life. I can sit and ponder what is possible for us to know of a world external to ourselves, but I will still get a utility bill next week and if I don’t pay it, it will be cold and dark in my apartment. If I don’t maintain my friendships, there will be negative consequences that I choose to avoid. I have always struggled with a sense of tension between philosophical endeavors and the realities and/or pressures of everyday life. While I love engaging in philosophical inquiry, I often feel a sense of guilt for having/utilizing the luxury to do so. I think Winch is spot on in regards to language; it is the essential building blocks of social interaction, and the only means by which we can even conceive of a world external to ourselves.
Flyvbjerg builds a case for an alternative approach to social science which reconnects with its philosophical roots. He argues that we have been led astray with our ongoing focus on methodology and mimicry of the hard sciences. I agree with the major points Flyvbjerg offers, though it was unclear to me how a sociologist would then be distinguishable from just about any social critic. Is phronesis reserved for the social sciences? Also, while Flyvbjerg argues for that the empirical and social sciences both have their strengths, phronesis is presented as being on a higher level (attention to context as opposed to procedure). There is a sense that rather than being inferior to the hard sciences, social sciences are really more significant in the human project which made me a little uneasy. The subsequent argument for the primacy of the case study was compelling. I have always thought much of what we do in sociology is examining context. The case study offers an in depth examination of the particular, this can definitely offer a richer description and exploration of human interaction and society as a whole. The choice to conduct a case study of course depends upon the particular objectives and circumstances (indeed the context) of the research(er). As far as the popularity and supposed objective quality of quantitative research, I think this work is far from context-independent. All research involving human social interaction (subjects on all ‘sides’) is necessarily context dependent because of its reliance upon language/shared meaning.