Compare And Contrast Skepticism And The Outlines

When it comes to the second expostulation, (namely once again that the Skeptic is unable to follow a normal life, as life presupposes assent to beliefs); Sextus easily acknowledges we clearly cannot act and also engage in choice without holding some ideas to which we assent. The issue is not the fact that we possess beliefs; the issue for the Skeptic lies in the kind of beliefs they hold and the way in which they approach these beliefs. Therefore, the continual process of inquiry highlighted as a rebuttal to the first objection of Skepticism, does not mean they cannot partake in the best approximated action to date, given their previous investigations. It also does not imply that the Skeptic cannot act in a manner to optimise time taken of
inquiry. It means very much the opposite. Belief can be held, action can thereby occur, but the that to which the Skeptic does assert, namely the process of philosophising, occurs at a much deeper level than that of the Dogmatist. Hadot indicated ‘with Skepticism, the distinction between philosophy and philosophical discourse reaches an extreme point’. Arguably therefore, Skepticism paved the way for the philosophy of language. The Skeptic would not defend a thesis with supporting arguments but engage in its ethos instead. The intersection that the Pyrhonnist Skeptic cuts between Dogmatism and Sophism therefore reveals a much deeper level of philosophia. A meta level where two extremes of the debate about the ‘why’ or the ‘process’ of philosophy, most specifically where the way and why of discourse and of reasoning becomes the primary concern.

According to PHI 5-6, the Outlines usually do not assert Skepticism but merely report on it.
Though the Outlines are highly argumentative, these positions framed inside a story of Sextus’ own discussion is better characterised as a report, not a defence. Such a tactic is not only a question of the type of discussion, it is a Skeptic’s performance. The Outlines, in being a performance, can therefore not simply be seen as an explicit set of claims, but implicit too. The arguments within it are a crucial intervention against the show of Dogmatism rather than a defence of Skepticism. The Outlines are best fathomed as a dialectical operation (17). The performative aspect of the text implies that in the lack of a driven standard of truth, the Skeptic can nevertheless justify Skepticism by encouraging the crowd to carry out an experiential test of the illustrative report. Skeptic’s invitation to engage in philosophy in a certain manner, namely in order via equipolllence, epoché and ataraxia, should not be asserted as a dogmatic principle. It is not. It is an invitation to perform a certain approximated way of carrying out Skepticism. Equipollence, namely when there is equality regarding whether one should affirm or disaffirm a belief. As Sextus admits, we carry out any action where we engage in what seems to be the best strategy for what looks likely as giving us the outcomes we wish for. Equipollence is the standstill of the intellectual as he or she can neither reject nor posit
anything. Therefore the time spent in equipollence is fleeting, it is dynamic. It must be eventually bypassed for the philosopher to continue his process of inquiry or he would be paralyzed. Ultimately, ataraxia signifies freedom from agitation. Hence, ataraxia is no longer a narrow branch of philosophy; it is a requisite of philosophy, the aim of the philosopher is to be in a state of ataraxia. The differentiation between praxis and theory is a one between subject matters but in both instances, to philosophize is a specific sort of task (18). Even theory can therefore be construed as praxis in so far as it is a matter of doing. The way in which philosophy is performed is a matter of praxis. The shift that developed with Skepticism is not only to practice philosophy as a means of achieving happiness, but more so a process of engaging in a theoretical process by putting them through a demanding evaluation. Skepticism is therefore not so much a philosophy as known in the popular or rather explicit connotation of the word. It invites us to perform something. This performance cannot be characterised as a system of belief, as what it says or deducts is not as important as the effects it generates (19). We cannot appraise Skepticism as though it were a system of belief, and instead must attempt to detect what is being performed, including why and how.

Despite the identification of the ‘meta level’ due to the split between the Dogmatists and Sophists the Skeptics introduce, we must understand that the suspension of judgement is not in any complete way, proposed as a way to discover truth. Sense perception is always taking some form of position. As Sextus put it, sense perception continually leads us ‘to assent’. If we were to stay at a phenomenal level there is seldom equipollence due to the fact that appearances incline us. Ataraxia is therefore more so a way of decreasing error in contrast to the process of asserting the discovery of truth, in Sextus’ eyes. Coming to the future, we see this in the discipline of classical theoretical economics. Classical economists’ theories and models of human behaviour have asserted a dogmatic position, used as premises in latter theories, and risk management practices in banks. As this process ensues, the error and fragility increases in an area where truth has not yet been attained, impacting everyone’s livelihoods. Could this be happening in physics, mathematics and other more rigorous disciplines? A Pyrhonnist way of approaching this is to use a heuristic method. Heuristics, or trial error and revision, are an appropriate modern characterisation of Sextus Empiricus report of how the Skeptic wishes us to live. The Skeptic averts a firm position in anything, because such a firm position may generate very much via an exaggeration, unneeded disagreement and malpractice. The Skeptical way therefore assumes some form of humility or to draw a controversial parallel with Socrates’ statement, ‘I know one thing: that I know nothing’. A Skeptical way is a constant revision, it is not getting ‘carried away’.

We can therefore learn from the Skeptics that we must avoid this.
A Skeptic way of life simply lived could be demonstrated. There is not always a need to engage in discourse on this matter. There is the possibility that discourse is imperfect and as such demonstrating my means of ‘doing’ can often be a better philosophical device. Philosophy not only becomes an explicit form of reasoning, communication or discourse; but implicit too. It is a wonder that still to today, the field of philosophy as practiced in universities is not yet an exposition of this wide definition, but rather even, a contained form of explicitness. Coming back to myself as initially described in examples of my own epoché; am I philosopher? In the rather indoctrined way of classifying this as perhaps required by some form of institutional order; I am so long as I am performing research in the field. Of course, as I chose to write this paper, rather than, quit and resume my tasks in building this technology company, that means that I have faith in the value of what is to be learnt from Sextus and in philosophy, as it is distinctly characterised. What we have learnt in this paper though is that this distinction can be incorrect. These two actions are not so different. Philosophy can be practiced implicitly as well as explicitly. By inviting users of our Yumdine and Leuven Food Sharing’s technology to engage in some form of social activity very much by making it easier, namely sharing food and getting hold
of it and distribute it seamlessly, we allow them to experience and therefore to understand the role of sharing in eudomania. W We invite them to observe and hold that openness may ontologically make the food market much fairer, efficient and varied; indeed that openness as a term is linked to fairness and efficiency. Perhaps to unite both the explicit and the implicit in the way we do philosophy could be even more effective, providing of course, we can all communicate with each other. Communication is not simply taking part in the discourse, it is not simply taking part in a certain way of discourse either, it can be performance as well. Skepticism as a movement of Sextus’ characterisation is therefore, in my view, not yet fully realised as ‘philosophy’. The movement Sextus described is still taking place. In my view, there is still a lot of room to further join and make accessible mode of discourse of the academic philosophy community, with other fields, to make increase the rate and optimise time taken over all nodes of the Skeptical process.