Euthyphro's Dilemm Unrestricted Divine Command Theory

In the Euthyphro dilemma, Socrates questions how Euthyphro can be so certain of what actions are considered pious. Socrates asks Euthyphro the important question if “Gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it?” (Timmons 27) Put simply, are God’s commands right because God commanded them or did God command them because they are right? In what follows, I will explain what unrestricted divine command theory tries to accomplish, why Euthyphro’s dilemma poses a few significant problems to its views, and I will argue how embracing a restricted version of divine command theory can help avoid the obstacles the dilemma sets in place. It can be well argued that the unrestricted divine command theory is aimed to explain what is right and good depending on God’s commands. To understand the unrestricted divine command theory, one must understand the Theory of Right Conduct, which encompasses the nature of what makes an action right or wrong, and the Theory of Value, which helps explain intrinsic goodness and badness in relation to God’s commands. Intrinsic means a thing has its value in itself or “as it is”. It does not represent value like a dollar bill, but is the value. The Theory of Right Conduct states “An action A is obligatory if and only if (and because) God commands that we A” (Timmons 24). An obligatory action is an action one should morally do and is often referred to as required. “An action A is wrong if
This can be done as I have explained, by considering what is deemed right or wrong to be a “necessary” truth instead of being determined entirely by God commands. Therefore, adopting a restricted view of divine command theory can arguably avoid the issues that arise from Euthyphro’s