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The Agreement Bias in Negotiation: Teams Facilitate Impasse

Taya R. Cohen (Northwestern University)
Geoffrey J. Leonardelli (University of Toronto)
Leigh L. Thompson (Northwestern University)

Paper Presented at the
23rd Annual International Association of Conflict Management Conference
Boston, Massachusetts
June 24 – 27, 2010

Abstract:
This research represents the first empirical investigation of the agreement bias in negotiation.
The agreement bias is a negotiation trap characterized by settling for terms that are worse than one’s alternatives. Results from two experiments indicated that teams reduce the agreement bias by facilitating impasse in negotiations with a negative bargaining zone. Study 1 found that the addition of a single teammate was sufficient for generating discontinuity between teams and solos in their ability to avoid the agreement bias. Study 2 provided support for two proposed explanations for the agreement bias. Consistent with the faulty-judgment explanation, the role that required the most information processing benefited the most from the addition of a teammate. Consistent with the concern-with-being-liked explanation, solos were perceived as exhibiting more agreeable behavior than teams, and agreeable behavior was associated with a greater likelihood of agreement.

AGREEMENT BIAS

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The Agreement Bias in Negotiation: Teams Facilitate Impasse

Abstract
This research represents the first empirical investigation of the agreement bias in negotiation.
The agreement bias is a negotiation trap characterized by settling for terms that are worse than one’s alternatives. Results from two experiments indicated that teams reduce the agreement bias by facilitating impasse in negotiations with a negative bargaining zone. Study 1 found that the addition of a single teammate was sufficient for generating discontinuity between teams and solos in their ability to avoid the agreement bias. Study 2 provided support for

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