In Kathleen J. McInnis’s 24 August 2016, Congressional Research Service report, she states that Secretary Carter announced that the Defense Department would deploy an Expeditionary Targeting Force of 200 Soldiers to Iraq. The report goes on to state that it’s believed the ETF will conduct raids and collect intelligence, although its actual mission is classified. These “Boots on the Ground” missions are conducted by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and are more appropriate in when an airstrike would cause unacceptable collateral damage or when operating in an area the U.S. government doesn’t wish to officially acknowledge. In the 31 March 2016 Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations’ report on Operation INHERENT RESOLVE to Congress, the lead inspector, Glenn A. Fine makes mention of Secretary Carter’s “three R’s, Raqqa, Ramadi, and raids.” Given the high potential for casualties, raids are conducted only when there is a high degree of confidence in the intelligence ascertained. In his memoir, My Share of the Task, GEN Stanley McChrystal, then commander of Special Operations Forces in Iraq, touted the invaluable role of intelligence in the maturation of planning and executing raids. McChrystal lauds his intelligence analysts and how their products reduce the fog and friction of war. These raids are up-close and personal attacks that destroy terrorists’ morale while displaying the effectiveness of the Coalition. Simply put, SOF raids greatly contribute to the degradation of Da’esh’s
In Kathleen J. McInnis’s 24 August 2016, Congressional Research Service report, she states that Secretary Carter announced that the Defense Department would deploy an Expeditionary Targeting Force of 200 Soldiers to Iraq. The report goes on to state that it’s believed the ETF will conduct raids and collect intelligence, although its actual mission is classified. These “Boots on the Ground” missions are conducted by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and are more appropriate in when an airstrike would cause unacceptable collateral damage or when operating in an area the U.S. government doesn’t wish to officially acknowledge. In the 31 March 2016 Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations’ report on Operation INHERENT RESOLVE to Congress, the lead inspector, Glenn A. Fine makes mention of Secretary Carter’s “three R’s, Raqqa, Ramadi, and raids.” Given the high potential for casualties, raids are conducted only when there is a high degree of confidence in the intelligence ascertained. In his memoir, My Share of the Task, GEN Stanley McChrystal, then commander of Special Operations Forces in Iraq, touted the invaluable role of intelligence in the maturation of planning and executing raids. McChrystal lauds his intelligence analysts and how their products reduce the fog and friction of war. These raids are up-close and personal attacks that destroy terrorists’ morale while displaying the effectiveness of the Coalition. Simply put, SOF raids greatly contribute to the degradation of Da’esh’s