Fox And Lambie's Analysis
As a parting gift to each of us who served on President Eisenhower’s staff, our colleagues Fred Fox and Jim Lambie compiled White House…Staff Book…1953-61. It was something like a high school yearbook, with photos and bios of the graduates. After nearly a half century, it’s a useful place to start memory-jogging on who was there and how Congress looked to us.
It’s also a way to keep in perspective the differences in White House staffs, then and now. First, there’s the matter of size. Ours was tiny. On most days we could all have lunch at the same time in one small oblong room in the West Wing basement. In compiling their staff list, Fox and Lambie didn’t give us the key to who was in and who was out, but my hunch is that they included only …show more content…
those with White House Staff Mess privileges. One hundred-three names made the A-List for serving at some point during Eisenhower’s two terms. Exclude 15 military aides, such as the Air Force One pilots and the President’s doctors, and this left just 88. The group included six college presidents, six who had been generals, five former governors, but only three who had been elected to Congress.
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The burgeoning of White House staffs over time reflects two trends. One: Adding people to perform added functions. When I returned to the White House in 1969, for instance, I worked for a unit, the Urban Affairs Council, that hadn’t existed when I left the White House in 1961. Two: A more rapid turnover rate among staffers. Had overheated White House operations produced more burnout, a different sort of person, or the lure of more opportunities outside of government? Of the 88 staffers at Eisenhower’s White House, a dozen stayed for the full eight years, among them a core of such prominent aides as James Hagerty (press secretary), Bryce Harlow (speechwriting, legislative relations), Gerald Morgan (legislative relations, counsel), Wilton Persons (legislative relations, chief of staff), and Thomas Stephens (appointment secretary). Another dozen stayed almost as long.
The demographics reflect major differences from recent staffs. The 88 were almost all male, all white: There were three women and one African-American. When Kathryn Dunn Tenpas and I examined what we called “The A Team” of Bill Clinton (1993) and George W. Bush (2001), the percentages for women were 29 percent and 28 percent; for minorities, 8 percent and 11 percent, respectively.[i]
White House staffs now are also much younger. Between 1953 and January 1961 there were only five assistants in their twenties. I was the youngest at 25. Eleven were in their thirties, including Bradley Patterson, 33, who would become the leading authority on White House organization. I arrived at the White House shortly after Labor Day, 1958－having just been mustered out the army as a private first class－to assist my Johns Hopkins mentor, Malcolm Moos, recently named the President’s speechwriter. My White House impressions cover only the last two-plus years of the administration. However, I did serve with 58 of the 88, again a reflection of Ike staffers’ long tenure.
Dwight Eisenhower had strong feelings about staffs and how they were expected to work. In the first volume of his presidential memoirs, he wrote, “For years I had been in frequent contact with the Executive Office of the White House and I had certain ideas about the system, or lack of system, under which it operated.” He would “organize the White House for efficiency….Organization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent….On the other hand, disorganization can scarcely fail to result in inefficiency and can easily lead to disaster.”[ii] Motivated by such apprehensions, Eisenhower started early by inaugurating several completely new offices that have since become standard features of a White House staff: the chief of staff, the assistant for national security affairs, the cabinet secretary and the staff secretary. Collectively, they would make sure that nothing fell through the cracks. These small, carefully contained compartments would be filled with experts solely responsible for their assignments. No White House ever had less leeway for kibitzers.
Eisenhower also greatly upgraded the office of congressional relations. He was fortunate to have an expert ready for duty. Major General Wilton (Jerry) Persons was a comfortable and conservative Southerner, who had been the War Department’s chief lobbyist during World War II. Bryce Harlow had worked for Persons at the Pentagon and then headed the House Armed Services Committee staff. Gerald Morgan, a Harvard-trained lawyer, had congressional experience drafting the Taft-Hartley Act. Harlow was soon commandeered by the President to be a speechwriter, and his slot was assumed by Jack Martin, the longtime assistant to Senator Robert Taft, who had died in 1953.
Over time there were other changes.
Morgan became the President’s counsel in 1955. Martin was made a federal judge in 1958. And when Sherman Adams was forced out in 1958, Persons replaced him as the chief of staff and Harlow became the head of the congressional lobbying unit. Harlow was assisted by Jack Z. Anderson, a colorful former California congressman (and famous pear grower), and Edward McCabe, from the House Committee on Education and Labor, both of whom joined the White House staff in 1956. They were joined in 1959 by Clyde Wheeler, who had been working congressional liaison for the Secretary of Agriculture. Wheeler returned to Oklahoma to run unsuccessfully for Congress in 1960. Two other members of the liaison staff, Earle Chesney and Homer Gruenther, had duties that were more of the “goodwill” nature, such as taking VIPs on tours of the White House. As a group, the congressionalists cast a more conservative shadow than other staff units, a notable division during the 1954 conflict with Senator McCarthy.
Sherman Adams–Governor to everyone on the staff–had served one term in the House of Representatives. Several others also had had congressional experience. But while called upon from time-to-time, they were not meant to backstop the Persons/Harlow shop. They had jobs enough to keep them
busy.
Related A severe split within the Whig ranks, between partisans of Henry Clay and those of Zachary Taylor, preceded the party's convention in June 1848.
Prospects for partisan realignment: Lessons from the demise of the Whigs
J
Jimmy Carter: Why He Failed obama009_16x9
President Barack Obama’s First Two Years: Policy Accomplishments, Political Difficulties
The modus operandi for dealing with Congress was to let the departments do the heavy lifting. Farming out the bulk of congressional relations to the agencies helped keep down the size of the White House staff, a key element in Eisenhower’s theory of management, and, importantly, also insured that the lobbying was done by experts in substance, rather than simply experts in lobbying. More important politically, it kept the President—and his reputation—out of the line of fire. The prime example of how this worked was the administration’s agriculture proposals. Trying to reduce the 90 percent farm parity was hardly popular with farm groups. But Eisenhower’s lighting rod was Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, and the President always seemed more reasonable when compared to Benson.
The departments’ lobbyists had the day-to-day contact with the committees and members and took responsibility for getting legislation passed in a form acceptable to the President. The Persons/Harlow office only conducted a major assault on Capitol Hill once or twice a year. As Harlow told me, “It’s rather axiomatic in this work that a president cannot have too many congressional issues that are ‘presidential’ at one time. Otherwise none of them are presidential, and all of them suffer.” Presidential issues included major tax legislation, the interstate highway program, mutual security, Pentagon reorganization, and labor-management reform.
The departmental lobbyists gathered on Saturdays at the White House. Recalling these sessions from when he was at Agriculture, Wheeler said, “Bryce went around the room and asked each of us who we had been talking to on the Hill, who was backing our programs, and who was against us. He always let us have our say before smoothly setting out the Eisenhower agenda and how it affected each agency.”[iii] The White House staff also prepared a detailed agenda for the President to use in his weekly meeting with the Republican congressional leaders.
Part of what defined Dwight Eisenhower was reverence for the separation of powers, a West Point legacy. Most presidents spend their yea
It’s also a way to keep in perspective the differences in White House staffs, then and now. First, there’s the matter of size. Ours was tiny. On most days we could all have lunch at the same time in one small oblong room in the West Wing basement. In compiling their staff list, Fox and Lambie didn’t give us the key to who was in and who was out, but my hunch is that they included only …show more content…
those with White House Staff Mess privileges. One hundred-three names made the A-List for serving at some point during Eisenhower’s two terms. Exclude 15 military aides, such as the Air Force One pilots and the President’s doctors, and this left just 88. The group included six college presidents, six who had been generals, five former governors, but only three who had been elected to Congress.
Get daily updates from Brookings
Enter Email
Enter Email SUBSCRIBE
The burgeoning of White House staffs over time reflects two trends. One: Adding people to perform added functions. When I returned to the White House in 1969, for instance, I worked for a unit, the Urban Affairs Council, that hadn’t existed when I left the White House in 1961. Two: A more rapid turnover rate among staffers. Had overheated White House operations produced more burnout, a different sort of person, or the lure of more opportunities outside of government? Of the 88 staffers at Eisenhower’s White House, a dozen stayed for the full eight years, among them a core of such prominent aides as James Hagerty (press secretary), Bryce Harlow (speechwriting, legislative relations), Gerald Morgan (legislative relations, counsel), Wilton Persons (legislative relations, chief of staff), and Thomas Stephens (appointment secretary). Another dozen stayed almost as long.
The demographics reflect major differences from recent staffs. The 88 were almost all male, all white: There were three women and one African-American. When Kathryn Dunn Tenpas and I examined what we called “The A Team” of Bill Clinton (1993) and George W. Bush (2001), the percentages for women were 29 percent and 28 percent; for minorities, 8 percent and 11 percent, respectively.[i]
White House staffs now are also much younger. Between 1953 and January 1961 there were only five assistants in their twenties. I was the youngest at 25. Eleven were in their thirties, including Bradley Patterson, 33, who would become the leading authority on White House organization. I arrived at the White House shortly after Labor Day, 1958－having just been mustered out the army as a private first class－to assist my Johns Hopkins mentor, Malcolm Moos, recently named the President’s speechwriter. My White House impressions cover only the last two-plus years of the administration. However, I did serve with 58 of the 88, again a reflection of Ike staffers’ long tenure.
Dwight Eisenhower had strong feelings about staffs and how they were expected to work. In the first volume of his presidential memoirs, he wrote, “For years I had been in frequent contact with the Executive Office of the White House and I had certain ideas about the system, or lack of system, under which it operated.” He would “organize the White House for efficiency….Organization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent….On the other hand, disorganization can scarcely fail to result in inefficiency and can easily lead to disaster.”[ii] Motivated by such apprehensions, Eisenhower started early by inaugurating several completely new offices that have since become standard features of a White House staff: the chief of staff, the assistant for national security affairs, the cabinet secretary and the staff secretary. Collectively, they would make sure that nothing fell through the cracks. These small, carefully contained compartments would be filled with experts solely responsible for their assignments. No White House ever had less leeway for kibitzers.
Eisenhower also greatly upgraded the office of congressional relations. He was fortunate to have an expert ready for duty. Major General Wilton (Jerry) Persons was a comfortable and conservative Southerner, who had been the War Department’s chief lobbyist during World War II. Bryce Harlow had worked for Persons at the Pentagon and then headed the House Armed Services Committee staff. Gerald Morgan, a Harvard-trained lawyer, had congressional experience drafting the Taft-Hartley Act. Harlow was soon commandeered by the President to be a speechwriter, and his slot was assumed by Jack Martin, the longtime assistant to Senator Robert Taft, who had died in 1953.
Over time there were other changes.
Morgan became the President’s counsel in 1955. Martin was made a federal judge in 1958. And when Sherman Adams was forced out in 1958, Persons replaced him as the chief of staff and Harlow became the head of the congressional lobbying unit. Harlow was assisted by Jack Z. Anderson, a colorful former California congressman (and famous pear grower), and Edward McCabe, from the House Committee on Education and Labor, both of whom joined the White House staff in 1956. They were joined in 1959 by Clyde Wheeler, who had been working congressional liaison for the Secretary of Agriculture. Wheeler returned to Oklahoma to run unsuccessfully for Congress in 1960. Two other members of the liaison staff, Earle Chesney and Homer Gruenther, had duties that were more of the “goodwill” nature, such as taking VIPs on tours of the White House. As a group, the congressionalists cast a more conservative shadow than other staff units, a notable division during the 1954 conflict with Senator McCarthy.
Sherman Adams–Governor to everyone on the staff–had served one term in the House of Representatives. Several others also had had congressional experience. But while called upon from time-to-time, they were not meant to backstop the Persons/Harlow shop. They had jobs enough to keep them
busy.
Related A severe split within the Whig ranks, between partisans of Henry Clay and those of Zachary Taylor, preceded the party's convention in June 1848.
Prospects for partisan realignment: Lessons from the demise of the Whigs
J
Jimmy Carter: Why He Failed obama009_16x9
President Barack Obama’s First Two Years: Policy Accomplishments, Political Difficulties
The modus operandi for dealing with Congress was to let the departments do the heavy lifting. Farming out the bulk of congressional relations to the agencies helped keep down the size of the White House staff, a key element in Eisenhower’s theory of management, and, importantly, also insured that the lobbying was done by experts in substance, rather than simply experts in lobbying. More important politically, it kept the President—and his reputation—out of the line of fire. The prime example of how this worked was the administration’s agriculture proposals. Trying to reduce the 90 percent farm parity was hardly popular with farm groups. But Eisenhower’s lighting rod was Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, and the President always seemed more reasonable when compared to Benson.
The departments’ lobbyists had the day-to-day contact with the committees and members and took responsibility for getting legislation passed in a form acceptable to the President. The Persons/Harlow office only conducted a major assault on Capitol Hill once or twice a year. As Harlow told me, “It’s rather axiomatic in this work that a president cannot have too many congressional issues that are ‘presidential’ at one time. Otherwise none of them are presidential, and all of them suffer.” Presidential issues included major tax legislation, the interstate highway program, mutual security, Pentagon reorganization, and labor-management reform.
The departmental lobbyists gathered on Saturdays at the White House. Recalling these sessions from when he was at Agriculture, Wheeler said, “Bryce went around the room and asked each of us who we had been talking to on the Hill, who was backing our programs, and who was against us. He always let us have our say before smoothly setting out the Eisenhower agenda and how it affected each agency.”[iii] The White House staff also prepared a detailed agenda for the President to use in his weekly meeting with the Republican congressional leaders.
Part of what defined Dwight Eisenhower was reverence for the separation of powers, a West Point legacy. Most presidents spend their yea