In the Bible, the first humans made were Adam and Eve, and God gave them free will. Adam and Eve abused their free will, so sin made its way into the world. Everyone after Adam and Eve has inherited the effects of the Fall, including a loss of free will. At least with the first human beings free will was a condition of real human good, though it also meant the possibility of sin. Leaving the question of Adam and Eve's fall and its consequences for their descendants, this view is basically what is …show more content…
currently called the Free-Will Defense. An American Philosopher Alvin Platinga also believes in the idea.
He says how there may be a different kind of good that God cannot bring to us without permitting evil. If there is no evil, then how can good be determined? There are good things that don't include evil, however, God Himself can't bring them about without allowing evil. Platinga ends his excerpt by saying that a world containing people that are significantly free is more valuable than a world containing no free humans at all. God creates free human beings, but he cannot cause them to do only what is right. If God does in fact cause one to do good, or what is right, then they are not doing what is right with free will. He must create us capable of moral evil. He can't give us the freedom to perform evil at the same time prevent us from doing
so. On the other hand, British philosopher J.L. Mackie believes differently. Mackie believes that if God could make people free to do whatever they chose, then why didn't he just make humans do good all the time? He believes that God wasn't faced with a choice between making innocent people and making people who would sometimes go wrong. It would have been easier had God made people always go right. Mackie concludes that God obviously failed to reward himself of that possibility because it is contradictory with his being both omnipotent and completely good. He claims that if God is essentially omnibenevolent and essentially omnipotent, then it is logically impossible that God and evil should co-exist. Plantinga's free will defense is a subtle and complicated attempt at answering Mackie by arguing that it is logically possible that even an omnipotent God might be unable to create any considerably free creatures that always do the right thing. However, the great value of significant free will, a God placed in that predicament could be morally justified in creating significantly free creatures that sometimes go wrong. On the pro side of the Free-Will Defense, Platinga makes very good points. How could God make his creatures do good all the time? That would not be giving free will at all. In order for human beings to be capable of moral goodness, they must also be capable of moral evil. In the con side, many wonder that if God were all omnipotent and omnibenevolent, then why would he create any evil in this world? The Free-Will Defense could be argued forever, all views of free will are suitable and valid.