Frozen Embryo Case Study

I do not agree with the trial court’s decision in this case. I fully support Randy’s side of the case and I believe that the trial court erred when it awarded the three frozen embryos to Augusta because the award violated the parties’ embryo agreement. In addition, the agreement clearly provided for disposal of the frozen embryos in the case of divorce and the trial court was wrong for not enforcing that agreement. The specific provision in the embryo agreement stated that “we consent and authorize the embryos to be stored in a frozen state until Dr. Schnell and the IVF Laboratory determine that appropriate conditions exist for transfer of the embryos to the wife’s uterus and both the husband and wife agree to the transfer.” The trial court failed to honor the provisions of the embryo agreement because Randy (the husband) clear did not agree to the transfer. In fact, he was completely opposed to it.
The provisions also stated that
“if we are divorced or if either of us files for divorce while any of our frozen embryos are still in the program, we hereby authorize and direct, jointly and individually, that the frozen embryos shall be discarded.” So, the provision clearly and explicitly states that if one of them files for divorce that the frozen embryos need to be discarded. The provisions of the embryo agreement allow for the transfer of the embryos only if both parties agree and the trial court erred by not enforcing the agreement and ordering the embryos to be destroyed. Moreover, Randy filed for divorce and wanted the embryos destroyed. As a result, the embryos should have been destroyed without any further questions.
The agreement was very straightforward so it’s wrong, unethical, and immoral that the trial court did not honor the provisions of the agreement. After all, Randy did not want for any children to be developed or born from the embryos and his wishes should be honored in this situation. This is something so serious that both parties need to give their full consent and approval. However, Randy did not give his full consent or approval. Therefore, it’s unethical and unjust to award Augusta Roman the embryos when they should have been destroyed.
Some similar cases from other states are Davis v.
Davis (1992), in which the Supreme Court of Tennessee had stated that agreements between the progenitors should be presumed valid and enforced. Kass v. Kass (1998) reinforced this opinion, wherein the Court of Appeals of New York unanimously chose to uphold a consent agreement to donate the couple’s preembryos to research. In J.B. v. M.B. (2000) the Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that it would enforce IVF agreements, subject to the right of either progenitor to change his or her mind about the allocation of the preembryos at a later time. A.Z. v. B.Z. (2000) reinforced this position, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court indicated that consent agreements should not be enforced if one party later prefers a different result for the preembryos. Lastly, and most significant to the Roman v. Roman case, the Supreme Court of Iowa proclaimed in the case In re Marriage of Witten (2003) that neither party could use their preembryos without the other party’s contemporaneous mutual
consent.
In 2001, Texas had passed the Uniform Parentage Act, which included laws about gestational agreements and assisted reproduction, such as IVF. The court determined that Texas policy allowed a couple to determine in advance what should happen to their preembryos in the case of divorce. Citing Kass and Davis, the court concluded that IVF consent agreements about preembryos should be presumed valid and enforced, although subject to change if both parties agree on a different outcome. Thus, Justice Evelyn Keyes, writing the opinion for the unanimous Texas Court of Appeals, stated in February 2006 that the trial court should have enforced the progenitors’ prior agreement to discard the preembryos.