Functionalism And Eliminative Materialism By Paul M Churchland

Paul M. Churchland is a Canadian-native philosopher known for his specialty in the philosophy of the mind and neurophilosophy. As a previous professor at the University of California, San Diego, Churchland is a major proponent of the theory of eliminative materialism which he discusses in more detail in his article “Functionalism and Eliminative Materialism.” Churchland provides a great depth of the issues and differing positions associated with the mind-body problem, and I will work to defend Churchland’s proposed theory of eliminative materialism from the functionalist theory of mind in three parts. First, I will analyze in depth both functionalism and eliminative materialism with supporting examples and draw the difference in both ideologies.
Secondly, I will clarify the reasonings behind why Churchland argues against functionalism. And lastly, I will interpret the four main arguments in favor of eliminative materialism, and why I defend this particular theory over functionalism. So what is the idea of functionalism? Functionalism is where important features of a human’s mental states are actually sets of casual relations in regard to environmental effects on a body, other mental states, and the body’s behavior. This theory bares the question “What is it to have a desire versus to have a belief?” What marks these two ideological characteristics different from one another, is whether the mental state in question causes the person to behave. To be in the mental state of a belief is to be in a state where you truly believe something is possible and it moves you to satisfy your behavior. If you are in the mental state of desire, your want for that ‘thing’ will make you change the world around you even if it turns out that ‘thing’ is not entirely possible for you to achieve. In an easier way to see belief and desire play out, let’s say a person suddenly want’s a piece of red velvet cake and remembers there is one piece left in the refrigerator from a party last night. The belief that there is a slice of red velvet will move that person to the kitchen to look for the cake in the fridge. Let’s say it turns out unfortunately that there is no slice of cake left - the belief that there is a piece of cake will disappear since our behavior has not been satisfied. On the other hand, if the person strongly desires a slice of red velvet cake and it turns out there is no such slice in the refrigerator, he/she will go out and change the world so that there is cake - they might go out and buy a pre-made cake, make it from scratch, etc., in order to change their behavior and satisfy their desire. Thus, belief is changed if it is not found ultimately, while desire changes the world around you, and both ideas depend on inputs and output relationships. These notions of belief and desire help us detect behaviors since they both cause them, but they tell us nothing about feelings. They only help us solve ‘problems’ in the world. Eliminative materialism, on the other hand, works on the doubt that the understanding of common-sense psychological concepts will complement underlying physiological mechanisms, such as those of the brain and neuroscience. So as we better understand the underlying work of neuroscience, humans will be able to eliminate the concepts that have been used to ‘explain’ physiology before. Hence the idea of eliminativism - eliminating all past ideas that can no longer be explained by folk psychology. Churchland defines ‘folk psychology’ as weak, ordinary concepts that might pose as theories and can be explained in terms of beliefs or desires, yet are not improving with time. A good scientific should get better with scientific knowledge and evidence and if it goes nowhere, it should be given up on. We can use evolution as an example to see eliminative materialism at work.
Darwin’s theory of evolution states that all life is related in some way, and have descended from one common ancestor. He said as creatures evolve with time, the beneficial mutation will be preserved since they aid the survival of future generations - the theories of descent with modification and natural selection. Churchland argues that this process which ultimately led to the human species is a purely material mechanism, which started from a material starting point, in which the result must be purely material. The folk psychology that inherited characteristics are brought down from generation to generation in order to survive isn’t always true. There are countless anatomical body parts that are now vestigial - they have lost their ancestral function. Some examples are nipples in men, the appendix, or wisdom teeth. Millions of people have these removed for various reasons, and can healthily and happily resume their everyday lives. So as eliminative materialism would conclude, the idea that our body parts serve a sole purpose in proving us with the ability to survive in the world has been eliminated by scientific proof that many of these organs have no more use for
us. Concluding the battle between both ideological theories, the main difference is that functionalism fails to explain what the mind is as it simply focuses on what it does. Eliminative materialism helps to categorize the feelings and experiences we go through as a method of explaining mental life, eliminating any theories or folk ideas that no longer work. Churchland takes great care in refuting functionalism in his writing, thinking of it as a false empirical theory. The mental state of pain is used to explain why functionalism ultimately fails in its reasonings. Pain is a result of trauma to the body which causes other mental states such as stress and irritation that change our bodily behavior. A functionalist will argue that any mental state which fits these criteria and roles can thus be labeled as ‘pain’ as well. That leads a person to think that any entity or creature may then experience pain even if they do not have a human brain. However, this is noticeably false, since pain cannot be thought as the same as any other feeling. It must be clearly distinctive, and so as Churchland says, pain cannot the exact same as any other human brain state. Churchland further brings two other reasonings against functionalism: the inverted spectrum and the absent qualia problem. The way I may perceive the colors of the sunrise can very well be different to how my neighbor will describe the colors, even if we are watching the same sunrise at the same time. Thus, the inverted spectrum idea says that if humans can behave the same in regards to one another yet still have different experiences then our mental states are not related to just causal connections but also the inner qualities that describe the sensation of having said mental states. The absent qualia problem says that we may have a functional system that is complex enough to distinguish pleasure from the colors of the sky from pain, then functionalism is indeed false since such a system is entirely possible in humans. So now, having gotten functionalism out of the way, how does the argument in favor of eliminative materialism work? Let’s first see the four important arguments that set materialism apart from various other theories. First, materialism is parsimonious, playing as a simpler explanation and allowing us to explain everything in the world using only external properties and physical things. Thus it makes more sense to side with what requires fewer things. Secondly, materialism can explain things much more productively. We will soon be able to use neuroscience to explain any property from chemical to physical changes in the brain and how they result in neural changes. Thirdly, there is no need to draw a difference between functions of a humans brain and mind, for why would we need a brain without a mind and why would we need a mind without a brain? And lastly, like my example of evolution previously above, evolution claims that we are only physical things by means of physical processes. Folk psychology has failed to explain to us the most simple phenomenon of mental experiences (i.e. sleep, learning, memory), and questions surrounding how our brain works and such. So then it’s more than likely to believe that other explanations that used to satisfy us have now been replaced by better, actual theories that are modernly correct. These are the four arguments the Churchland uses to show that materialism is the most sensible theory to accept. I defend eliminative materialism because it only makes sense that with time and more scientific knowledge through proofs, data, and experiments we will need to let go of older ideologies that used to be able to ‘explain’ beliefs.
Instead, we will be able to form far more intelligent theories of defining phenomena. If we take a look the theory of evolution, vestigial organs and mental states of pain, they all help to demonstrate the true meaning of eliminative materialism and why it makes so much sense. I believe the clearest way to understand and to favor eliminativism from functionalism is the simple fact that functionalism forces concepts of folk psychology to embody brain states, but it is much more probable that such mirroring doesn’t exist. It is unreasonable to say the mental state of feeling excited is the same as when you see your favorite color, just because they both give you a feeling of joy and delight. They may provide an output of what appears to be the same feeling of happiness, but they both come from different places and are made up of different inner
workings. As eliminative materialism ultimately works, we will come to eliminate the theory of functionalism as we obtain more scientific knowledge in the future. There is a long history of the battle between common sense and science. Whenever this conflict has arisen in the past, scientists and philosophers of the like go with the best theory justified by the best evidence. So we’ve always favored the side of science, which leads us to form new concepts that make the most sense and are backed up by true science. Society used to think the sun revolved around the earth, but then science came up with the idea of a solar system, and the former ideology was abandoned for the new one. This is how many of the standing ideologies we base the foundation of science, philosophy, math and many other academic fields work - they were thought to be one way until a better explanation was found. I believe that eliminative materialism will continue to work well into the future of the philosophy of mind and neuroscience. As they say, science is ever evolving and that’s exactly what eliminative materialism aims to intend.