Functionalism and Physicalism
Functionalism and Physicalism
While acquiring knowledge on the topics of Functionalism and
Physicalism, I ran across many disagreement between the two. Interestingly, those disagreements gave me an impression of different sides arguing with their own support from their own theories. As if an Arabian and a Roman were arguing about whether the number eleven is an "Arabic" number or a "Roman" number.
Though, as I read more and more of the readings (especially Putnam's), I started to see a pattern that led me to think that maybe Functionalism is compatible with Physicalism after all; that these two theories can coexist.
The claim above is based on the information gathered in the two readings assigned and therefore, I should go step by step in order to arrive at my conclusion that they can indeed coexist. First, I draw Ned Block's elaboration on Metaphysical Functionalism as a start of my argument. As Block suggests,
Metaphysical Functionalism is mainly concern about what mental states are; instead of a psychological explanation (Block, p. 172). Moreover, they concern themselves with mental state type; not a specific token of the type. As in the case of pain, they are concerned with a mental state called pain, and not of particular pains (i.e. stomach-ache, pin-pricks, etc.). But, according to
Putnam, if the Physicalists does indeed attributes the name "physical states" to the enormous number of mental states we humans have, then, I think it would be impossible for them to be concerned only with the type and not the tokens.
But once they started to consider each specific pain (token), they will have to ascribe a different physical-chemical state to each token-state. Ultimately, the common thing "to all pains in virtue of which they are pains (Block, p.
172)" cannot be put in terms of a single physical state. Recall that the same problem does not exist in the consideration of Functionalism because
Functionalism concern itself basically with the causal
While acquiring knowledge on the topics of Functionalism and
Physicalism, I ran across many disagreement between the two. Interestingly, those disagreements gave me an impression of different sides arguing with their own support from their own theories. As if an Arabian and a Roman were arguing about whether the number eleven is an "Arabic" number or a "Roman" number.
Though, as I read more and more of the readings (especially Putnam's), I started to see a pattern that led me to think that maybe Functionalism is compatible with Physicalism after all; that these two theories can coexist.
The claim above is based on the information gathered in the two readings assigned and therefore, I should go step by step in order to arrive at my conclusion that they can indeed coexist. First, I draw Ned Block's elaboration on Metaphysical Functionalism as a start of my argument. As Block suggests,
Metaphysical Functionalism is mainly concern about what mental states are; instead of a psychological explanation (Block, p. 172). Moreover, they concern themselves with mental state type; not a specific token of the type. As in the case of pain, they are concerned with a mental state called pain, and not of particular pains (i.e. stomach-ache, pin-pricks, etc.). But, according to
Putnam, if the Physicalists does indeed attributes the name "physical states" to the enormous number of mental states we humans have, then, I think it would be impossible for them to be concerned only with the type and not the tokens.
But once they started to consider each specific pain (token), they will have to ascribe a different physical-chemical state to each token-state. Ultimately, the common thing "to all pains in virtue of which they are pains (Block, p.
172)" cannot be put in terms of a single physical state. Recall that the same problem does not exist in the consideration of Functionalism because
Functionalism concern itself basically with the causal