Genocide In Rwanda Essay
The genocide in Rwanda is arguably one of the greatest tragedies of the twentieth century. In 100 days approximately 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were murdered in brutal waves of violence. Despite this, the international community stood by and did nothing. There have been many arguments made over just why this was, ranging from ignorance of the situation, apathy towards peacekeeping missions, or simply having more pressing issues than a tiny state in Central Africa. This essay will examine why it was that the international community failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. It will do this by examining the role of the UN, Britain, the United States, France and the role of the media before looking at the brief argument that there was nothing
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the international community could have done to prevent the genocide.
Firstly, I am going to examine the ways in which the UN failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. Even before the genocide broke out “there was considerable pessimism at the UN regarding peacekeeping due to the failure in Somalia”. This resulted in an organisation which, while obliged to act in Rwanda, would only do so grudgingly and after considerable time had passed. Further confounding any potential action taken by the UN was its alleged ignorance of what was about to occur, despite “the numerous warnings of impending human tragedy in Rwanda made public by organisations such as Oxfam, ICRC, and Human Rights Watch’. While there was a UN peacekeeping force, UNAMIR, stationed in Rwanda, due to the UN’s chronic misreading of the situation, they were badly understaffed with no clear mandate. As Barnett states, “with only 5,000 lightly-armed peacekeepers scattered throughout Rwanda, UNAMIR was unprepared to confront the wave of terror unleashed by Hutu extremists against Tutsis and Hutu moderates”. The situation for UNAMIR was further worsened when, directly after the violence had broken out, the UN chose to “reduce Dallaire’s UNAMIR force by 90 per cent to a meagre 270 peacekeepers” , following Belgium’s decision to withdraw their forces. The result was that, while there were UN troops in Rwanda when the genocide was occurring, “the peacekeepers, with their limited capacity, could not protect civilians”. Even if the UN had been willing to bolster UNAMIR, it is incredibly unlikely that they would have managed it in time to halt the killings. Furthermore, “with the Bosnian crisis in full cry and the US embroiled in a Somalian nightmare”, the UN was already stretched both in terms of peacekeeping forces and focus. The presence of Rwanda on the Security Council didn’t help matters, as the Rwandan ambassador, Jean-Damascéne Bizimana, was able to convince the Security Council that there was no need for intervention in Rwanda. All of these factors contributed to a situation where the UN had neither the willpower nor the capacity to prevent the genocide. Ultimately, the dominant view at the time was that “the UN had more to lose by taking action and being associated with another failure than it did by not taking action and allowing the genocide in Rwanda”.
The role that Britain and the US had to play, both individually and with regards to the UN, is also a key reason for the international community’s failure to halt the genocide in Rwanda. I have chosen to examine both these states together, as their policy towards Rwanda in the lead-up to and during the genocide was one of apathy and disengagement. As Dallaire states, at a time when firm action was needed, “the doors to the people who held the most influence on the Security Council, the Americans and the British, remained firmly closed”. With the case of America, following their humiliation in Somalia, there was a strong unwillingness to committing US forces to anymore peacekeeping missions, particularly in Africa. As Dawden states, “as far as Washington was concerned, Rwanda was Africa and Africa was Somalia”. This caused the US to actively avoid any expansion of UNAMIR or any other measures, such as declaring the situation a genocide, which would commit US forces to any form of action in Rwanda. This attitude was further confounded by the fact that “nothing was at stake for the United States in Rwanda”. This disinterest towards Rwanda not only meant that the US had no motivation to get involved in preventing the genocide, it also meant that they had relatively little information on the region, as shown by the fact that “the United States maintained only a single human intelligence asset in Central Africa before the genocide – a defence attaché in Cameroon”. All of these factors built up to create a state that was not only disinterested in Rwanda, but completely ignorant of the developing situation there. This disinterest towards Rwanda was mirrored by the UK who “had no direct political or financial interests in this francophone country”. In fact, the only link the British had at the time to Rwanda was the RPF, who had a base inside their former colony of Uganda. While this did not equate to an interest in Rwanda, RPF intelligence “ensured that Britain was in possession of sufficient intelligence to permit a clear insight into the deteriorating conditions within Rwanda”, thus putting Britain in a position to have known about the preparations for genocide. However, despite this intelligence, Britain still saw no cause for intervention in Rwanda, as the RPF advancement was riding its own territories of Rwandan refugees. Therefore, Britain and the US failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda because they had no interest in the region and were either ignorant of the situation or saw the events as being beneficial to their own interests in the region.
France can be seen as the player in the international community with whom the most responsibility for not preventing the genocide rests. Not only did they have the most interest in, and therefore the most intelligence on, the political situation in Rwanda yet do nothing to halt the genocide, they also armed and trained the Rwandan army and militias, and continued to do so even after it became clear that genocide was taking place. Prior to the genocide, France had been responsible for arming and training the army, and subsequently the militia. There is even evidence that they witnessed several of the proto-genocidal massacres in the lead up to the genocide. In his book, The Silent Accomplice, Wallis quotes an ex-militia as saying:
“Eventually we killed the Bigogwe [villagers] who lived in the region. They were Tutsis, they were killed after the arrival of the French – who stood by and did absolutely nothing even though they were the ones who had taught us to do so much damage”
This not only shows clear evidence that the French were arming and training the militias, but that they were aware of the nature of the regime yet did nothing to stop it. In fact, “the French even continued arming the interim government after recognising that genocide was taking place and after an embargo was imposed by the UN Security Council”, which raises the question of just how essential France was to the implementation of the genocide. Not only did France continue arming the interim government while the genocide was going on, in the run up to it they failed to share any information they had with other states that could have led to the prevention of it. While their role in arming the Rwandan military and militia can be seen as directly contributing to the genocide, their active concealment of the preparations for it from the international community means that France not only failed to prevent the genocide but actively encouraged it.
One consistent factor that prevented the international community from halting the genocide was the belief that the violence that was occurring was not one-sided, but rather part of an ongoing civil war. This was further enhanced by reporting by the media where “violence was initially depicted in the context of a two-sided civil war – one that the Tutsi were winning – rather than a one-sided, ethnic genocide against the Tutsi”. The fact that many states were reliant on the media for their intelligence on the issue meant that the focus given to the genocide and the explanation behind it played a major role in deciding what stance to take on it. This is particularly true in the case of America, where any suggestion that the conflict didn’t require UN action was used to justify the lack of response. The fact that “the foreign story of the moment was Bosnia and its coverage was already stretching budgets and staffing levels” meant that Rwanda was awarded even less coverage than it would have done normally, with the effect that much of the world’s attention was diverted away from the genocide. This meant that the public in places unwilling to intervene, such as the US, would know practically nothing about the events transpiring and thus be even more opposed to any action. If the media attention was going to be focused in any state in Africa at this point it was going to be “South Africa, where the first post-apartheid elections were being held”. All of these factors contributed to the failure of the international community to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, as they were being fed false information via the media, who were the main source of information on Rwanda in states like America, while at the same time having their attention diverted to other events, such as Bosnia and South Africa.
There is, however, a strong argument to be made that there was nothing the international community could have done to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. “A Hutu sense of historical injustice, compounded by Belgian colonial favouritism toward elite Tutsi” created an ingrained hostility within Rwandan society, which was liable to flare up into ethnic violence at any moment. This, when combined with the presence of a strong nationalist core and the outside threat of Tutsi violence from the RPF, meant that “it was highly improbable that an outside force could halt the terror in Rwanda” once it started. Therefore, while it could be argued that the international community should have taken steps to halt the genocide, there is a counter-argument that sees the Rwandan genocide as inevitable, due to the domestic situation in Rwanda.
In conclusion, the international community failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda mainly because there was no willingness to intervene in Rwanda.
Both Britain and the US had little or no interest in the country which caused neither state to want to risk sending troops in to what could be a complex situation. This translated into a lack of effort made on the part of the UN with regards to peacekeepers, sanctions and reacting as the situation developed, as, with two Security Council members disinterested and other humanitarian crises developing in Eastern Europe, any action in Rwanda would have been an uphill battle. While there was one country with an interest and influence in the region, France, they abused their power there and instead trained and, arguably, aided the genocidal interim government in killing Tutsis. The media played a central role in compelling the international community into inaction by limited reporting on the situation or playing down what was occurring there, thus further compelling inaction on the part of the UN, Britain and the US. While there is an argument made that the genocide in Rwanda was inevitable, due to long-running ethnic tensions and the speed with which it developed, had the international community reacted quickly enough and with enough force then it could have been prevented before it even started. As it was, the international community lacked the drive for intervention in Rwanda, which enabled the Hutu nationalists to follow through on their genocidal
plans.
the international community could have done to prevent the genocide.
Firstly, I am going to examine the ways in which the UN failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. Even before the genocide broke out “there was considerable pessimism at the UN regarding peacekeeping due to the failure in Somalia”. This resulted in an organisation which, while obliged to act in Rwanda, would only do so grudgingly and after considerable time had passed. Further confounding any potential action taken by the UN was its alleged ignorance of what was about to occur, despite “the numerous warnings of impending human tragedy in Rwanda made public by organisations such as Oxfam, ICRC, and Human Rights Watch’. While there was a UN peacekeeping force, UNAMIR, stationed in Rwanda, due to the UN’s chronic misreading of the situation, they were badly understaffed with no clear mandate. As Barnett states, “with only 5,000 lightly-armed peacekeepers scattered throughout Rwanda, UNAMIR was unprepared to confront the wave of terror unleashed by Hutu extremists against Tutsis and Hutu moderates”. The situation for UNAMIR was further worsened when, directly after the violence had broken out, the UN chose to “reduce Dallaire’s UNAMIR force by 90 per cent to a meagre 270 peacekeepers” , following Belgium’s decision to withdraw their forces. The result was that, while there were UN troops in Rwanda when the genocide was occurring, “the peacekeepers, with their limited capacity, could not protect civilians”. Even if the UN had been willing to bolster UNAMIR, it is incredibly unlikely that they would have managed it in time to halt the killings. Furthermore, “with the Bosnian crisis in full cry and the US embroiled in a Somalian nightmare”, the UN was already stretched both in terms of peacekeeping forces and focus. The presence of Rwanda on the Security Council didn’t help matters, as the Rwandan ambassador, Jean-Damascéne Bizimana, was able to convince the Security Council that there was no need for intervention in Rwanda. All of these factors contributed to a situation where the UN had neither the willpower nor the capacity to prevent the genocide. Ultimately, the dominant view at the time was that “the UN had more to lose by taking action and being associated with another failure than it did by not taking action and allowing the genocide in Rwanda”.
The role that Britain and the US had to play, both individually and with regards to the UN, is also a key reason for the international community’s failure to halt the genocide in Rwanda. I have chosen to examine both these states together, as their policy towards Rwanda in the lead-up to and during the genocide was one of apathy and disengagement. As Dallaire states, at a time when firm action was needed, “the doors to the people who held the most influence on the Security Council, the Americans and the British, remained firmly closed”. With the case of America, following their humiliation in Somalia, there was a strong unwillingness to committing US forces to anymore peacekeeping missions, particularly in Africa. As Dawden states, “as far as Washington was concerned, Rwanda was Africa and Africa was Somalia”. This caused the US to actively avoid any expansion of UNAMIR or any other measures, such as declaring the situation a genocide, which would commit US forces to any form of action in Rwanda. This attitude was further confounded by the fact that “nothing was at stake for the United States in Rwanda”. This disinterest towards Rwanda not only meant that the US had no motivation to get involved in preventing the genocide, it also meant that they had relatively little information on the region, as shown by the fact that “the United States maintained only a single human intelligence asset in Central Africa before the genocide – a defence attaché in Cameroon”. All of these factors built up to create a state that was not only disinterested in Rwanda, but completely ignorant of the developing situation there. This disinterest towards Rwanda was mirrored by the UK who “had no direct political or financial interests in this francophone country”. In fact, the only link the British had at the time to Rwanda was the RPF, who had a base inside their former colony of Uganda. While this did not equate to an interest in Rwanda, RPF intelligence “ensured that Britain was in possession of sufficient intelligence to permit a clear insight into the deteriorating conditions within Rwanda”, thus putting Britain in a position to have known about the preparations for genocide. However, despite this intelligence, Britain still saw no cause for intervention in Rwanda, as the RPF advancement was riding its own territories of Rwandan refugees. Therefore, Britain and the US failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda because they had no interest in the region and were either ignorant of the situation or saw the events as being beneficial to their own interests in the region.
France can be seen as the player in the international community with whom the most responsibility for not preventing the genocide rests. Not only did they have the most interest in, and therefore the most intelligence on, the political situation in Rwanda yet do nothing to halt the genocide, they also armed and trained the Rwandan army and militias, and continued to do so even after it became clear that genocide was taking place. Prior to the genocide, France had been responsible for arming and training the army, and subsequently the militia. There is even evidence that they witnessed several of the proto-genocidal massacres in the lead up to the genocide. In his book, The Silent Accomplice, Wallis quotes an ex-militia as saying:
“Eventually we killed the Bigogwe [villagers] who lived in the region. They were Tutsis, they were killed after the arrival of the French – who stood by and did absolutely nothing even though they were the ones who had taught us to do so much damage”
This not only shows clear evidence that the French were arming and training the militias, but that they were aware of the nature of the regime yet did nothing to stop it. In fact, “the French even continued arming the interim government after recognising that genocide was taking place and after an embargo was imposed by the UN Security Council”, which raises the question of just how essential France was to the implementation of the genocide. Not only did France continue arming the interim government while the genocide was going on, in the run up to it they failed to share any information they had with other states that could have led to the prevention of it. While their role in arming the Rwandan military and militia can be seen as directly contributing to the genocide, their active concealment of the preparations for it from the international community means that France not only failed to prevent the genocide but actively encouraged it.
One consistent factor that prevented the international community from halting the genocide was the belief that the violence that was occurring was not one-sided, but rather part of an ongoing civil war. This was further enhanced by reporting by the media where “violence was initially depicted in the context of a two-sided civil war – one that the Tutsi were winning – rather than a one-sided, ethnic genocide against the Tutsi”. The fact that many states were reliant on the media for their intelligence on the issue meant that the focus given to the genocide and the explanation behind it played a major role in deciding what stance to take on it. This is particularly true in the case of America, where any suggestion that the conflict didn’t require UN action was used to justify the lack of response. The fact that “the foreign story of the moment was Bosnia and its coverage was already stretching budgets and staffing levels” meant that Rwanda was awarded even less coverage than it would have done normally, with the effect that much of the world’s attention was diverted away from the genocide. This meant that the public in places unwilling to intervene, such as the US, would know practically nothing about the events transpiring and thus be even more opposed to any action. If the media attention was going to be focused in any state in Africa at this point it was going to be “South Africa, where the first post-apartheid elections were being held”. All of these factors contributed to the failure of the international community to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, as they were being fed false information via the media, who were the main source of information on Rwanda in states like America, while at the same time having their attention diverted to other events, such as Bosnia and South Africa.
There is, however, a strong argument to be made that there was nothing the international community could have done to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. “A Hutu sense of historical injustice, compounded by Belgian colonial favouritism toward elite Tutsi” created an ingrained hostility within Rwandan society, which was liable to flare up into ethnic violence at any moment. This, when combined with the presence of a strong nationalist core and the outside threat of Tutsi violence from the RPF, meant that “it was highly improbable that an outside force could halt the terror in Rwanda” once it started. Therefore, while it could be argued that the international community should have taken steps to halt the genocide, there is a counter-argument that sees the Rwandan genocide as inevitable, due to the domestic situation in Rwanda.
In conclusion, the international community failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda mainly because there was no willingness to intervene in Rwanda.
Both Britain and the US had little or no interest in the country which caused neither state to want to risk sending troops in to what could be a complex situation. This translated into a lack of effort made on the part of the UN with regards to peacekeepers, sanctions and reacting as the situation developed, as, with two Security Council members disinterested and other humanitarian crises developing in Eastern Europe, any action in Rwanda would have been an uphill battle. While there was one country with an interest and influence in the region, France, they abused their power there and instead trained and, arguably, aided the genocidal interim government in killing Tutsis. The media played a central role in compelling the international community into inaction by limited reporting on the situation or playing down what was occurring there, thus further compelling inaction on the part of the UN, Britain and the US. While there is an argument made that the genocide in Rwanda was inevitable, due to long-running ethnic tensions and the speed with which it developed, had the international community reacted quickly enough and with enough force then it could have been prevented before it even started. As it was, the international community lacked the drive for intervention in Rwanda, which enabled the Hutu nationalists to follow through on their genocidal
plans.