Group Motivation In Civil War

Group Motivation and Civil War Onset Civil war onset has notably been attributed to three different possible factors – opportunity for insurgency, economic opportunity, and identity motivations. At their core, civil wars rely on groups of insurgents, bound together by some common identity or goal, in order to operationalize a rebellion. While individuals in insurgencies may have common goals and take advantage of the same opportunities, these groups have to already exist in some politicized fashion in order for a rebellion to mobilize. Identities, be they ethnic, religious, or any other trove of possible affiliations, form the basis for these divides. In order for a theory to fully address the circumstances surrounding the onset of Civil
War, it should take an approach that centers analysis on group motivation and action, rather than those of either individuals or states. Using this criterion, one can evaluate more astutely why civil wars arise, as opposed to individual and state approaches that give better answers as to how these wars arise. While knowing the mechanics of how insurgencies form is important to the understanding of civil war onset, understanding why these groups form gives a more full picture of the circumstances surrounding rebellion. Thus, those theories that focus on group formation over individual motivation or state capacity provide a better framework of analysis as to why civil wars occur. Individuals sharing a common attribute form cleavages over time, and some of these cleavages will favor rebellion under the right circumstances. Groups, in turn, are the units that civil wars depend on – groups go after economic opportunities, groups take advantage of the faults, groups comprise the insurgency. For this reason, the most compelling theory is that which uses groups as its primary unit of analysis. The Fearon and Laitin piece, in conjunction with the Posen piece, theorize that civil wars start as a result of opportunity – namely, factors that favor insurgency and the state’s inability to suppress it. They thus conclude that “financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more feasible and attractive” (Fearon and Laitin 75). Posen’s argument also centers on opportunity for rebellion, most notably the collapse of the state. According to Posen, from this collapse, factions rise and then compete, resulting in a security dilemma between the groups that escalates into civil war, “Unless proven otherwise, one group is likely to assume that another group’s sense of identity, and the cohesion that it produces, is a danger” (Posen 31). Both theories hinge on the state’s inability to suppress rebellion as the main factor in civil war onset. In theorizing about the opportunities that favor insurgency, Fearon and Laitin give greater agency to the state than to groups in civil wars, “Where states are relatively weak and capricious, both fears and opportunities encourage the rise of would-be rulers who supply a rough local justice” (Fearon and Laitin 76). This theory then focuses on the importance of individual actors and the weakness of the state, rather than group action. While individual leaders may come to power, and a weak government may aid in the path to civil war, existing or newly formed groups are the actual agents of rebellion. In order for a leader to mobilize, there must be some coherent goal or shared identity that has already created this faction, and that will allow the rebellion to scale. Where the state is weak, groups may take advantage – not just rebel leaders trying to institute their own form of justice. Posen’s piece, on the other hand, writes specifically about group dynamics in conjunction with state failure; his argument centers around the idea that once the state is unable to suppress rebellions, competing groups will rise and favor offensive action as the means to dealing with each other, resulting in a civil war. While Posen’s piece acknowledges the agency of group dynamics in internal conflicts, his argument still gives more power to the state’s capacity to deal with these groups. These groups rise and civil war occurs when there is a breakdown of imperial power (Posen 27), but this argument encompasses very few civil wars – Posen focuses his attention on Yugoslavia, but most civil wars have occurred without the collapse of the state. Most groups that rebel and that may face the security dilemma then also face it from the state, as another competing entity for resources and power. While Posen’s article uses groups as the unit of analysis, it denies them the agency necessary. ADD MORE HERE According to Collier and Hoeffler, rebellions arise when the factors that favor insurgency are strong, in this case meaning that civil wars will occur when they can financially benefit the rebellion.
This analysis of civil war onset relies on the country’s GDP per capita and the effect this metric has on individuals’ motivations; when a country has slow economic progress and the GDP/capita is low, individuals have a lower opportunity cost to joining an insurgency (Collier and Hoeffler 569). This, compounded with a state with trafficable resources that aren’t protected by the state, provides an economic incentive to insurgents. Additionally, Collier and Hoeffler argue that this economic incentive applies to groups in terms of securing funding or
resources. Collier and Hoeffler’s approach focuses on individual motivations as well as on group needs, but ultimately finds the individual economic motivations for joining an insurgency to be the most plausible explanation for the onset of civil war. While Collier and Hoeffler’s piece addresses group motivation for economic gain and opportunity, this doesn’t address why these factions existed in the first place. Economic opportunities entice individuals and become the goals of groups, but there is no evidence provided that these groups form solely on the basis of economic opportunity. Collier and Hoeffler state that, “the grievances that motivate rebels may be substantially disconnected from the large social concerns of inequality, political rights, and ethnic or religious identity” (Collier and Hoeffler 589), focusing on the grievances of individuals within an identity or group rather than the grievances of the group as its own entity. Based in their analysis, it seems evident that individuals have economic motivations for joining insurgencies, given the strong correlation with low growth and low GDP per capita, but the cleavages they are joining are likely to be those of existing groups now looking to take advantage of the opportunities available. While Collier and Hoeffler’s article addresses the “greed and grievances” that bring individuals to insurgencies, and the opportunities then presented that spur on rebel groups, they fail to address the formation of these groups, the cleavages along which they form in the first place.

These group cleavages are the focus of both the Cederman et al article and the Horowitz piece. Horowitz’s argument centers on the idea that civil war is less likely to occur in countries with a very homogenous or very heterogeneous population. Rather, when the country is comprised of large, competing ethnic groups, these divisions motivate rebellion, “what makes [ethnic conflict] intractable is that claims to political inclusion and exclusion have an area of mutual incompatibility” (Horowitz 196). According to Horowitz, civil war for these groups stems from a need for power within the state, as political power and inclusion are what allow a group to get the resources they desire. Cederman et al also address these group cleavages, but focus more on how these groups are affected by state actions and how this results in rebellion, as “representatives of ethnic groups with less access to power are more likely to challenge the government” (Cederman et al 114). For both, the key factors in understanding civil war onset are the cleavages between groups. Each of these pieces focuses largely on group divides on the basis of ethnicity or religion, remaining primarily on an analysis of group motivation, action, and mobilization.
Horowitz’s article goes on to imply that the conflicts plaguing areas with strong ethnic and religious divisions are not the only civil wars affected by group dynamics, “The intensity of any conflict is, in large part, a function of the relative strength of group claims” (Horowitz 215). This is key to understanding civil war onset as a more general concept – rebellions are fueled by group claims, and these groups for via shared identity, grievances, or from other cleavages that have formed. The Cederman et al article also finds its focus in group action and motivation, as groups under this model are likely to rebel in order to gain state power. While the power of the state here is a present, important force, the agency remains with the groups as they attempt to acquire the resources they desire and gain political power.
MOREEE Ultimately, not every civil war stems from ethnic or religious grievance, nor does every ethnically or religiously divided state have a civil war. But by analyzing the onset of civil war at the group level, and identifying motivations for rebellions to form from these groups, Horowitz and Cederman et al’s pieces have made the most convincing arguments.